"Eugenics talk" and the language of bioethics

Can 'eugenics' be defended?

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of 'genetic enhancement' has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR 'eugenics', rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether 'eugenics' can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each other.

How should we theorize about justice in the genomic era?

The sequencing of the human genome and advances in gene therapy and genomic editing, coupled with embryo selection techniques and a potential gerontological intervention, are some examples of the rapid technological advances of the "genetic revolution." This article addresses the methodological issue of how we should theorize about justice in the genomic era. Invoking the methodology of non-ideal theory, I argue that theorizing about justice in the genomic era entails theorizing about (1) the new inequalities that the genetic revolution could exacerbate (e.g., genetic discrimination, disability-related injustices, and gender inequality), and (2) those inequalities that the genetic revolution could help us mitigate (e.g., the risks of disease in early and late life). By doing so, normative theorists can ensure that we develop an account of justice that takes seriously not only individual rights, equality of opportunity, the cultural and sociopolitical aspects of disability, and equality between the sexes, but also the potential health benefits (to both individuals and populations) of attending to the evolutionary causes of morbidity and disability.

Looking into the shadow: the eugenics argument in debates on reproductive technologies and practices

Eugenics is often referred to in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices, in relation to the creation of moral boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable technologies, and acceptable and unacceptable uses of these technologies. Historians have argued that twentieth century eugenics cannot be reduced to a uniform set of practices, and that no simple lessons can be drawn from this complex history. Some authors stress the similarities between past eugenics and present reproductive technologies and practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the continuity view') in order to condemn the latter. Others focus on the differences between past and present practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the discontinuity view') in order to defend contemporary reproductive technologies. In this paper, I explore the meanings of the word 'eugenics' and the relationship between its past and present uses in terms of contemporary debates on reproductive technologies and practices. I argue that moral disagreement about present technologies originate in divergent views of condemnable and justifiable features of the past.

Student projects in medicine: a lesson in science and ethics

Regulation of biomedical research is the subject of considerable debate in the bioethics and health policy worlds. The ethics and governance of medical student projects is becoming an increasingly important topic in its own right, especially in the U.K., where there are periodic calls to change it. My main claim is that there seems to be no good reason for treating student projects differently from projects led by qualified and more experienced scientists and hence no good grounds for changing the current system of ethics review. I first suggest that the educational objectives cannot be met without laying down standards of good science, whatever they may be. Weak science is unnecessary for educational purposes, and it is, in any case, unlikely to produce good researchers in the future. Furthermore, it is curious to want to change the system of ethics review specifically for students when it is the science that is at stake, and when the science now falls largely outside the ethics remit. I further show that ethics review is nevertheless important since students carry a new potential conflict of interests that warrants independent oversight which supervisory support does not offer. This potential conflict may become more morally troublesome the greater the risks to the subjects of the research, and students may impose greater risks on their subjects (relative to professional researchers) by virtue of being inexperienced, whatever the nature of the project. Pragmatic concerns may finally be allayed by organizing the current system more efficiently at critical times of the university calendar.