Changing the "when" and "what" of intended actions

Subliminal modulation of voluntary action experience: A neuropsychological investigation

Human voluntary actions are often associated with a distinctive subjective experience termed 'sense of agency'. This experience could be a reconstructive inference triggered by monitoring one's actions and their outcomes, or a read-out of brain processes related to action preparation, or some hybrid of these. Participants pressed a key with the right index finger at a time of their own choice, while viewing a rotating clock. Occasionally they received a mild shock on the same finger. They were instructed to press the key as quickly as possible if they felt a shock. On some trials, trains of subliminal shocks were also delivered, to investigate whether such subliminal cues could influence the initiation of voluntary actions, or the subjective experience of such actions. Participants' keypress were always followed by a tone 250 ms later. At the end of each trial they reported the time of the keypress using the rotating clock display. Shifts in the perceived time of the action towards the following tone, compared to a baseline condition containing only a keypress but no tone, were taken as implicit measures of sense of agency. The subliminal shock train enhanced this "action binding" effect in healthy participants, relative to trials without such shocks. This difference could not be attributed to retrospective inference, since the perceptual events were identical in both trial types. Further, we tested the same paradigm in a patient with anarchic hand syndrome (AHS). Subliminal shocks again enhanced our measure of sense of agency in the unaffected hand, but had a reversed effect on the 'anarchic' hand. These findings suggest an interaction between internal volitional signals and external cues afforded by the external environment. Damage to the neural pathways that mediate interactions between internal states and the outside world may explain some of the clinical signs of AHS.

Effects of intentional movement preparation on response times to symbolic and imitative cues

Speeded responses to an external cue are slower when the cue interrupts preparation to perform the same or a similar action in a self-paced manner. To explore the mechanism underlying this 'cost of intention', we examined whether the size of the cost is influenced by the nature of the external cue. Specifically, we assessed whether the cost of intention is different for movements made in response to an imitative cue (an on-screen hand movement) compared to those made in response to a symbolic cue. Consistent with previous reports, externally cued responses were significantly slower on trials where participants were preparing to perform an internally driven movement later in the trial. Also as predicted, simple response times to the imitative cue were faster than those made to the symbolic cue. Critically, the cost of intention was similar for each cue type, suggesting that preparing an intentional action influenced responses cued by the symbolic and imitative cues to a similar degree. These findings suggest that the nature of the external cue does not influence the response time delay associated with concurrent intentional preparation. Together with previous findings, the results of the current study shed further light on the potential mechanisms underlying the cost of intention.

Choosing to Stop: Responses Evoked by Externally Triggered and Internally Generated Inhibition Identify a Neural Mechanism of Will

Inhibiting inappropriate action is key to human behavioral control. Studies of action inhibition largely investigated external stop signals, yet these are rare in everyday life. Instead healthy adults exert “self-control,” implying an ability to decide internally to stop actions. We added “choose for yourself” stimuli to a conventional go/no-go task to compare reactive versus intentional action and inhibition. No-go reactions showed the N2 EEG potential characteristic of inhibiting prepotent motor responses, whereas go reactions did not. Interestingly, the N2 component was present for intentional choices both to act and also to inhibit. Thus, free choices involved a first step of intentionally inhibiting prepotent responses before generating or withholding an action. Intentional inhibition has a crucial role breaking the flow of stimulus-driven responding, allowing expression of volitional decisions. Even decisions to initiate self-generated actions require this prior negative form of volition, ensuring the “freedom from immediacy” characteristic of human behavior.

The controlled imitation task: a new paradigm for studying self-other control

In the automatic imitation task (AIT) participants make a cued response during simultaneous exposure to a congruent or incongruent action made by another agent. Participants are slower to make the cued response on incongruent trials, which is thought to reflect conflict between the motor representation activated by the cue and the motor representation activated by the observed action. On incongruent trials, good performance requires the capacity to suppress the imitative action, in favor of producing the cued response. Here, we introduce a new experimental paradigm that complements the AIT, and is therefore a useful task for studying the control of self and other activated representations. In what we term the "Controlled Imitation Task (CIT)", participants are cued to make an action, but on 50% of trials, within 100 ms of this cue, an on-screen hand makes a congruent or incongruent action. If the onscreen hand moves, the participant must suppress the cued response, and instead imitate the observed action as quickly and accurately as possible. In direct contrast to the AIT, the CIT requires suppression of a self-activated motor representation, and prioritization of an imitative response. In experiment 1, we report a robust pattern of interference effects in the CIT, such that participants are slower to make the imitative response on incongruent compared to congruent trials. In experiment 2, we replicate this effect while including a non-imitative spatial-cue control condition to show that the effect is particularly robust for imitative response tendencies per se. Owing to the essentially opposite control requirements of the CIT versus the AIT (i.e., suppression of self-activated motor representations instead of suppression of other-activated motor representations), we propose that this new task is a potentially informative complementary paradigm to the AIT that can be used in studies of self-other control processes.

Imaging volition: what the brain can tell us about the will

The question of how we can voluntarily control our behaviour dates back to the beginnings of scientific psychology. Currently, there are two empirical research disciplines tackling human volition: cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. To date, there is little interaction between the two disciplines in terms of the investigation of human volition. The aim of the current article is to highlight recent brain imaging work on human volition and to relate social psychological concepts of volition to the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. A host of studies indicate that the medial prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in voluntary action. Accordingly, we postulate that social psychological concepts of volition can be investigated using neuroimaging techniques, and propose that by developing a social cognitive neuroscience of human volition, we may gain a deeper understanding of this fascinating and complex aspect of the human mind.

One action system or two? Evidence for common central preparatory mechanisms in voluntary and stimulus-driven actions

Human behavior is comprised of an interaction between intentionally driven actions and reactions to changes in the environment. Existing data are equivocal concerning the question of whether these two action systems are independent, involve different brain regions, or overlap. To address this question we investigated whether the degree to which the voluntary action system is activated at the time of stimulus onset predicts reaction times to external stimuli. We recorded event-related potentials while participants prepared and executed left- or right-hand voluntary actions, which were occasionally interrupted by a stimulus requiring either a left- or right-hand response. In trials where participants successfully performed the stimulus-driven response, increased voluntary motor preparation was associated with faster responses on congruent trials (where participants were preparing a voluntary action with the same hand that was then required by the target stimulus), and slower responses on incongruent trials. This suggests that early hand-specific activity in medial frontal cortex for voluntary action trials can be used by the stimulus-driven system to speed responding. This finding questions the clear distinction between voluntary and stimulus-driven action systems.

The quick and the dead: when reaction beats intention

Everyday behaviour involves a trade-off between planned actions and reaction to environmental events. Evidence from neurophysiology, neurology and functional brain imaging suggests different neural bases for the control of different movement types. Here we develop a behavioural paradigm to test movement dynamics for intentional versus reaction movements and provide evidence for a 'reactive advantage' in movement execution, whereby the same action is executed faster in reaction to an opponent. We placed pairs of participants in competition with each other to make a series of button presses. Within-subject analysis of movement times revealed a 10 per cent benefit for reactive actions. This was maintained when opponents performed dissimilar actions, and when participants competed against a computer, suggesting that the effect is not related to facilitation produced by action observation. Rather, faster ballistic movements may be a general property of reactive motor control, potentially providing a useful means of promoting survival.