Tracking the shift to 'postgenomics'

Animal Emotions and Consciousness: Researchers' Perceptions, Biases, and Prospects for Future Progress

Do animals have emotions? Scientists and philosophers have long struggled with this question, with debates ranging from whether animals experience an "internal world" to whether we are capable of studying it. Recently, theoretical, and methodological advances have rekindled this debate, yet, it is unclear where the scientific consensus on these topics lies today. To address this gap, we administered a survey of professional animal behavior researchers to assess perceptions regarding (1) the taxonomic distribution of emotions and consciousness in non-human animals, (2) respondents' confidence in this assessment, and (3) attitudes towards potential for progress and possible pitfalls when addressing these questions. In general, animal behavior researchers (n=100) ascribed emotionality and consciousness to a broad swath of the animal taxa, including non-human primates, other mammals, birds, and cephalopods, with varying degrees of confidence. There was a strong positive relationship between how likely a respondent was to attribute emotions to a given taxa and their confidence in that assessment, with respondents assuming an absence of emotions and consciousness when they were unsure. In addition, respondents' assessments were shaped by several traits (e.g., advanced cognitive abilities, consciousness) that they also admitted were not necessary for an animal to experience emotions. Ultimately, a large majority of researchers were optimistic that tools either currently exist or will exist in the future to rigorously address these questions (>85%) and that animal behavior, as a field, should do more to encourage emotions research (71%). We discuss implications of our findings for publication bias, ethical considerations, and identify an emergent consensus for the need of a functional definition of emotions to facilitate future work.

Scrutinizing the epigenetics revolution

Epigenetics is one of the most rapidly expanding fields in the life sciences. Its rise is frequently framed as a revolutionary turn that heralds a new epoch both for gene-based epistemology and for the wider discourse on life that pervades knowledge-intensive societies of the molecular age. The fundamentals of this revolution remain however to be scrutinized, and indeed the very contours of what counts as 'epigenetic' are often blurred. This is reflected also in the mounting discourse on the societal implications of epigenetics, in which vast expectations coexist with significant uncertainty about what aspects of this science are most relevant for politics or policy alike. This is therefore a suitable time to reflect on the directions that social theory could most productively take in the scrutiny of this revolution. Here we take this opportunity in both its scholarly and normative dimension, that is, proposing a roadmap for social theorizing on epigenetics that does not shy away from, and indeed hopefully guides, the framing of its most socially relevant outputs. To this end, we start with an epistemological reappraisal of epigenetic discourse that valorizes the blurring of meanings as a critical asset for the field and privileged analytical entry point. We then propose three paths of investigation. The first looks at the structuring elements of controversies and visions around epigenetics. The second probes the mutual constitution between the epigenetic reordering of living phenomena and the normative settlements that orient individual and collective responsibilities. The third highlights the material import of epigenetics and the molecularization of culture that it mediates. We suggest that these complementary strands provide both an epistemically and socially self-reflective framework to advance the study of epigenetics as a molecular juncture between nature and nurture and thus as the new critical frontier in the social studies of the life sciences.

The sociable gene

Finding a working metaphor to describe the function of genes in an organism might help to ease public fears and expectations of genomic research