The PHD Method for Psychotherapy: Integrating Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Psychodynamics

Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care

This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology's two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of "recovery," defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.

Phenomenology of psychiatric emergencies

Introduction

Psychiatric urgency is defined as a situation of serious mental suffering and behavioral alteration, which promptly requires adequate treatment; we talk about emergency when the condition can be life-threating. Even if until now neglected by phenomenological psychopathology, the emergency issue faces a clinical management challenge in which the phenomenological method becomes fundamental. The purpose of this manuscript is then to explore the phenomenological perspective of psychiatric emergencies. The manuscript is organized into four sections: the first deals with the encounter in clinical phenomenology, the second with the life-word of the crisis, the third with the atmosphere of emergency; finally, a final section on the importance of the phenomenological method for the clinician.

The encounter in clinical phenomenology

The centrality of the encounter in clinical phenomenology cannot be stressed enough. It is not just the encounter between doctor and patient, but also and above all the encounter between two men, between two subjects. And it is in the affective space between them, in the intersubjectivity and intercorporeality of their encounter, that the transformative power of understanding emerges and reverberates from both sides. The approach to the other must be respectful, along the lines of the ethics of approximation, it must recognize the other as other and not overwrite it with one's own prejudices. Otherwise, if clinicians are not sufficiently trained in the encounter, the risk is to get stuck in the anguish of the instant, to be absorbed by it, to become its tools. It is precisely the atmosphere of the emergency room that is full of expectations, haste, anxiety, which actually hinders the possibility of encountering. Instead, this possibility must be recovered, because the encounter is the founding aspect of every clinical interview, of every diagnostic suspicion, of every therapeutic resolution.

The life-word of the crisis

Seizing the encounter in its immediacy and in its totality, through the atmosphere that characterizes it, means for the clinician to position himself not outside the crisis, in an observational position in front of the patient, but to position himself next to him, to immerse himself in his life-world. Only then will the explosiveness of his symptoms appear to us not only as a symptomatic cascade to be contained and extinguished, but as the expression of a life-world in crisis. To use Ey's terminology, the madness of an instant must be placed within the madness of a lifetime. The patho-gnostic structures of the psychiatrist must tune into the structures of the life-world of the crisis, with the perspective of giving meaning, of helping the subject to re-inscribe the crisis within his history, and to overcome it.

The atmosphere of emergency

The experience of emergency is in fact detached from daily life of our being-in-the-world, both from the clinician's side and from that of the patient, who loses himself in this pathically charged and tense atmosphere and needs someone to walk alongside him to find the reins of his world. The context of the emergency room puts the clinician in the position of applying Strauss's sympathetic perception of the world, made up of atmospheres, sensations, profiles, and not of eidetic knowledge. The concept of atmosphere, inaugurated by Tellenbach and taken up in recent years by several authors, appears fundamental in understanding the amalgam of emotional tension, haste and immersiveness that characterizes the emergency room environment. An atmosphere that can become oppressive, if not thematized, and that can lead the clinician to defend himself in the haste and superficiality of the intervention.

The phenomenological method

Psychiatric crisis is always a situation in which we are thrown, perhaps to the highest degree, and the unfolding of references between the self and the world and between the self and the others becomes an essential skill. Even in the absence of an adequate setting, in the intersection between several pressures, the phenomenological method retains its panoramic gaze intact. We define it panoramic because it does not aim only at the observation and description of the present phenomena, which are generally characterized by violence, anguish, chaos. It is through the suspension of the epochè that the clinician can distance himself from the oppressive atmosphere of the crisis and grasp the coordinates of the patient's life-world. Only with this attitude does an authentic encounter become possible even in the difficult situation of emergency, paving the way for the challenge of care.

The Body in Question in the Existence of Hysteric Persons: A Phenomenological Perspective

The concept of hysteria, although apparently surpassed by contemporary nosographic classifications, continues to be talked about. Following Charbonneau's attempt to de-feminize and de-sexualize hysteria, clinical phenomenology can offer a perspective which, freed from stigma and prejudices through the suspension of judgement, allows us to understand hysteria not as a diagnostic category but as an existential position. In this sense, hysteria would be based on a hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self, which is not perceived as solid and continuous and needs external confirmations of its adequacy. According to the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion hypothesis, the hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self originates from the difficulty of experiencing one's body from the first-person perspective and from the consequent use of the gaze of others as a prosthesis to achieve a sense of selfhood and identity. Hysteric persons develop a mode of access to their corporeality mediated by visual representations - hence the theatricalization, centrality, and seductiveness of hysteric persons' behaviour. We suggest to call "figural body" the visual apprehension of one's body which tries to compensate for the weakness of coenaesthetic apprehension of the lived body. Over time, the figural body ends up superimposing itself on the immediate experience of the lived body. Placing itself on a representative register, this image conveys not only individual ghosts but also cultural aspects, social prejudices, gender stereotypes. Thus, the attempt to experience one's own body with the mediation of the other's gaze becomes an involuntary and unaware throwing of oneself into the meshes of representation that are necessarily alienating for the person. Hysterical persons remain stuck in their inability to access an experience of their body that is not figurative, alienating themselves in representations which always come from outside.

Bridging cognitive, phenomenological and psychodynamic approaches to eating disorders

Cognitive, psychodynamic, and phenomenological scholars converged their attention on abnormal bodily phenomena as the core psychopathological feature of eating disorders (EDs). While cognitive approaches focus their attention on a need for "objective" (i.e., observable, measurable) variables (including behaviours and distorted cognitions), the phenomenological exploration typically targets descriptions of persons' lived experience. According to a new emerging phenomenological perspective, the classic behavioural and cognitive symptoms of EDs should be considered as epiphenomena of a deeper core represented by a disorder of the embodiment. The cognitive-behavioural model is the most studied and, up till now, clinically efficacious treatment for EDs. However, as any coherent and scientifically grounded model, it presents some limitations in its application. Numerous patients report a chronic course, do not respond to treatment and develop a personality structure based on pathological eating behaviours, since "being anorexic" becomes a new identity for the person. Furthermore, the etiopathogenetic trajectory of EDs influences the treatment response: for example, patients reporting childhood abuse or maltreatment respond differently to cognitive-behavioural therapy. To obtain a deeper comprehension of these disorders, it seems important to shift attention from abnormal eating behaviours to more complex and subtle psycho(patho)logical features, especially experiential ones. This characterisation represents the unavoidable premise for the identification of new therapeutic targets and consequently for an improvement of the outcome of these severe disorders. Thus, the present review aims to provide an integrated view of cognitive, psychodynamic, and phenomenological perspectives on EDs, suggesting new therapeutic targets and intervention strategies based on this integrated model. Level of Evidence: Level V.Level of evidence Level V: Opinions of authorities, based on descriptive studies, narrative reviews, clinical experience, or reports of expert committees.

Let's Get Personal, Let's Get Physical: Approaching the Bodily Self in Clinical Interactions

Medicine usually looks at the body as a biochemical and physical apparatus - from a distant third-person perspective, with fragmented, reductionist positions, unidirectional causal models, and highly selective foci. Even psychiatrists and psychotherapists focus more and more on the brain as an organ, look at genes and colourful pictures. And just as biomedical medicine stares at physical and chemical facts and ignores the person, one could say that psychotherapy stares at personality, cognition, and behaviour and ignores the body. But the lowlands where being-a-person and having-a-body meetmatter a lot for becoming ill, staying, and getting well. What attitudes and what approaches can help us understand the bodily self? After very briefly summarizing current understandings of embodiment and enactivism, we will suggest some practical consequences for everyday clinical diagnostics.

The role of embodiment in the treatment of patients with anorexia and bulimia nervosa: a 2-year follow-up study proposing an integration between enhanced cognitive behavioural therapy and a phenomenological model of eating disorders

PURPOSE

Recent studies demonstrated that the embodiment disorder represents a core feature of eating disorders (EDs). The aim of this study was to evaluate the role of its variation as a possible mediator of the efficacy of enhanced cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT-E) on classic ED symptomatology, including body uneasiness.

METHODS

73 patients with anorexia nervosa and 68 with bulimia nervosa were treated with a multidisciplinary approach including CBT-E. Psychometric questionnaires were administered at baseline (T0) and after one (T1) and 2 years (T2) to evaluate general and ED-specific psychopathology, body uneasiness and the embodiment disorder. Data regarding diagnostic crossover and remission were also collected.

RESULTS

Longitudinal analysis showed an improvement of all psychopathological dimensions at T1, which remained stable at T2 (p < 0.05). Remission rate at T2 was 44.7%, and diagnostic crossover occurred in 17.0% of patients. Higher levels of embodiment disorder predicted increased diagnostic instability (OR: 1.80 [1.01-3.20], p = 0.045). The amelioration of the embodiment disorder mediated the decrease in both ED-specific psychopathology (indirect effect: 0.67 [0.46-0.92]) and body uneasiness (indirect effect: 0.43 [0.28-0.59]).

CONCLUSION

For the first time, these findings highlighted the role of the embodiment disorder as a maintaining factor of ED symptomatology, supporting the importance of integrating CBT-E with a phenomenological model of EDs.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level IV, longitudinal observational study (case series).

[Body Experience and Body Interaction in Psychotherapeutic Diagnostics]

Since they are core features of many mental and psychosomatic disorders, disturbances of body experience and body interaction are relevant to understand and treat a particular patient. There are several body-related constructs, standardized psychometric instruments and experiments, focusing on single facets and following categorized evaluation. However, there is a lack of terminology and methods to individually and situationally understand and use body experience and body interaction in everyday clinical psychotherapeutic diagnostics. Based on clinical experience and a broad, topic-focused literature research, this discussion agenda delineates their core dimensions - bodily perception, body language, bodily changes, body-related narratives and actions, bodily resonance - and how to approach them by observation, mentalization, and relatedness.

Values in persons with borderline personality disorder: their relevance for the therapeutic interview

This is an explorative study on values of 25 patients affected by borderline personality disorder interviewed in a clinical setting (phenomenological-dynamic psychotherapy) and re-classified following Consensual Qualitative Research. We identified three main categories of values: recognition (the importance for attention, acknowledgment, commendation and acceptance by the other), authenticity (the importance of absolute emotional fusion with the other), and immediacy (the importance of instantaneous, hic et nunc satisfaction of one's needs/desires). Each of these values expresses a kind of 'logic', namely the logic of intimacy (the other's closeness as indispensable for defining oneself and establish/reinforce one's selfhood and identity), spontaneity (over-reliance on feelings unrestricted by social norms undermining their intensity), and instantaneity (glorification of 'now-moments'/execration of procrastination draining the vitality of feelings). The borderline person lives an emotional normativity constituted by the intensity of feelings under the spell of a frustrated normativity since they enter into a collision with the hypocrisy of common-sense ethical norms and social rules and conventions, as well as by potential conflicts with the feelings of the other. Acknowledging the values affirmed by borderline persons may help to better understand their condition - that is, to grasp 'what it is like' and make sense of the phenomena that affect them - and particularly to find a logic in their otherwise irrational and incomprehensible self-defeating behavior.