More than Just Description: Phenomenology and Psychotherapy

"I don't wanna die, but my brain insists that I should": a big qualitative data approach to the lived experiences of suicidal thoughts

Introduction

There remains a dearth of knowledge concerning the phenomenology of suicidal thoughts, with research focusing on reasons for feeling suicidal rather than their mental expression. While clinical interviews remain the standard phenomenological approach, such exploration of lived experiences may prove challenging for this sensitive topic. As a complementary alternative, the use of naturally-occurring online data is opportune for capturing elaborations on tabooed phenomena.

Methods

In this phenomenological study, we present a thematic analysis on lived experiences of suicidal thoughts as spontaneously reported by non-identified users of a Reddit online board (r/Depression), collecting 668 posts using the search terms "suicidal ideation," "suicidal thoughts," and "suicide." Codes were grouped into descriptive categories summarizing the properties of thoughts, their effects, and their relation to suicide. Then, an interpretative synthesis yielded global themes connecting salient meanings on the experience of suicidal thoughts.

Results

With a long-term and recurring nature, thoughts of suicide appear in the form of vivid imagery and daydreaming's, initially bringing relief to adverse feelings but eventually becoming conditioned and all-consuming. Rather than a wonderment, they are experienced as intrusive thoughts by people struggling to make meaning of their occurrence. When conciliating the presence of unwanted thoughts, users express intricate relations to wishing or not to die, as well as varying perceptions of control over actions or fear of suicidal behavior.

Discussion

With an innovative application of big qualitative data into phenomenological analysis, this study contributes to an initial characterization of suicidal thoughts, uncovering findings that are not contemplated into current conceptualizations of suicidality. The analysis is limited by a restricted context of posts and unknown demographics, and further research with clinical interviews is warranted for in-depth exploration of suicidal thoughts.

Perception, experience and use of moments of change - a qualitative investigation

Objectives: In psychotherapeutic change processes, in addition to gradual changes, specific single special moments are described as a starting point for change. We investigated the perception of these moments of change (CMs) from the patient's perspective: What does each patient perceive and experience in a CM? Methods: A qualitative, explorative study of CMs was conducted by means of semi-structured questionnaires as well as qualitative interviews with patients (n = 12). Grounded theory was used for the analysis. Results: CMs were noticed by an "explicit mode of perception" based on physical, emotional and cognitive aspects. In addition, we found a "transcending mode of experience" that involved changes in consciousness and self-experience. CMs showed a "specific transformative pattern" and were preserved as "experience anchors". Conclusions: The intensification of consciousness, transformation of self-experience, and intense prototypical experience of a change process appeared particularly impressive. With the help of CMs, access could be gained to an embodied and implicit experience, which could subsequently be symbolised and used as an "experience anchor". This could be useful especially for the treatment of psychosomatic patients.

Phenomenology of psychiatric emergencies

Introduction

Psychiatric urgency is defined as a situation of serious mental suffering and behavioral alteration, which promptly requires adequate treatment; we talk about emergency when the condition can be life-threating. Even if until now neglected by phenomenological psychopathology, the emergency issue faces a clinical management challenge in which the phenomenological method becomes fundamental. The purpose of this manuscript is then to explore the phenomenological perspective of psychiatric emergencies. The manuscript is organized into four sections: the first deals with the encounter in clinical phenomenology, the second with the life-word of the crisis, the third with the atmosphere of emergency; finally, a final section on the importance of the phenomenological method for the clinician.

The encounter in clinical phenomenology

The centrality of the encounter in clinical phenomenology cannot be stressed enough. It is not just the encounter between doctor and patient, but also and above all the encounter between two men, between two subjects. And it is in the affective space between them, in the intersubjectivity and intercorporeality of their encounter, that the transformative power of understanding emerges and reverberates from both sides. The approach to the other must be respectful, along the lines of the ethics of approximation, it must recognize the other as other and not overwrite it with one's own prejudices. Otherwise, if clinicians are not sufficiently trained in the encounter, the risk is to get stuck in the anguish of the instant, to be absorbed by it, to become its tools. It is precisely the atmosphere of the emergency room that is full of expectations, haste, anxiety, which actually hinders the possibility of encountering. Instead, this possibility must be recovered, because the encounter is the founding aspect of every clinical interview, of every diagnostic suspicion, of every therapeutic resolution.

The life-word of the crisis

Seizing the encounter in its immediacy and in its totality, through the atmosphere that characterizes it, means for the clinician to position himself not outside the crisis, in an observational position in front of the patient, but to position himself next to him, to immerse himself in his life-world. Only then will the explosiveness of his symptoms appear to us not only as a symptomatic cascade to be contained and extinguished, but as the expression of a life-world in crisis. To use Ey's terminology, the madness of an instant must be placed within the madness of a lifetime. The patho-gnostic structures of the psychiatrist must tune into the structures of the life-world of the crisis, with the perspective of giving meaning, of helping the subject to re-inscribe the crisis within his history, and to overcome it.

The atmosphere of emergency

The experience of emergency is in fact detached from daily life of our being-in-the-world, both from the clinician's side and from that of the patient, who loses himself in this pathically charged and tense atmosphere and needs someone to walk alongside him to find the reins of his world. The context of the emergency room puts the clinician in the position of applying Strauss's sympathetic perception of the world, made up of atmospheres, sensations, profiles, and not of eidetic knowledge. The concept of atmosphere, inaugurated by Tellenbach and taken up in recent years by several authors, appears fundamental in understanding the amalgam of emotional tension, haste and immersiveness that characterizes the emergency room environment. An atmosphere that can become oppressive, if not thematized, and that can lead the clinician to defend himself in the haste and superficiality of the intervention.

The phenomenological method

Psychiatric crisis is always a situation in which we are thrown, perhaps to the highest degree, and the unfolding of references between the self and the world and between the self and the others becomes an essential skill. Even in the absence of an adequate setting, in the intersection between several pressures, the phenomenological method retains its panoramic gaze intact. We define it panoramic because it does not aim only at the observation and description of the present phenomena, which are generally characterized by violence, anguish, chaos. It is through the suspension of the epochè that the clinician can distance himself from the oppressive atmosphere of the crisis and grasp the coordinates of the patient's life-world. Only with this attitude does an authentic encounter become possible even in the difficult situation of emergency, paving the way for the challenge of care.

Abnormal global signal topography of self modulates emotion dysregulation in major depressive disorder

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a complex mental disorder featured by an increased focus on the self and emotion dysregulation whose interaction remains unclear, though. At the same time, various studies observed abnormal representation of global fMRI brain activity in specifically those regions, e.g., cortical midline structure (CMS) in MDD that are associated with the self. Are the self and its impact on emotion regulation related to global brain activity unevenly represented in CMS relative to non-CMS? Addressing this yet open question is the main goal of our study. We here investigate post-acute treatment responder MDD and healthy controls in fMRI during an emotion task involving both attention and reappraisal of negative and neutral stimuli. We first demonstrate abnormal emotion regulation with increased negative emotion severity on the behavioral level. Next, focusing on a recently established three-layer topography of self, we show increased representation of global fMRI brain activity in specifically those regions mediating the mental (CMS) and exteroceptive (Right temporo-parietal junction and mPFC) self in post-acute MDD during the emotion task. Applying a complex statistical model, namely multinomial regression analyses, we show that increased global infra-slow neural activity in the regions of the mental and exteroceptive self modulates the behavioral measures of specifically negative emotion regulation (emotion attention and reappraisal/suppression). Together, we demonstrate increased representation of global brain activity in regions of the mental and exteroceptive self, including their modulation of negative emotion dysregulation in specifically the infra-slow frequency range (0.01 to 0.1 Hz) of post-acute MDD. These findings support the assumption that the global infra-slow neural basis of the increased self-focus in MDD may take on the role as basic disturbance in that it generates the abnormal regulation of negative emotions.

Forcing an Effortless Stance: The Lived Body in Social Anxiety Disorder

INTRODUCTION

The fear of scrutiny central in social anxiety disorder (SAD) points to a problem of the interpersonally perceivable body. Whereas the predominant cognitive-behavioral (CBT) account of the disorder understands this as a problem of excessive self-focused attention, the phenomenological literature reveals it as a sign of a fundamental transformation of body experience. The lived body absent from experience becomes the object body at the forefront of it. The present paper contributes to this literature by refining and grounding these notions in first-person descriptions of concrete experiences of social anxiety.

METHOD

Repeated interviews were conducted with eight informants struggling with social anxiety and collected personal diaries. The interviews were informed by phenomenological concepts and a specific line of inquiry on body experiences. The analysis tested iteratively a set of phenomenologically grounded hypotheses of altered body experience against the first-person descriptions.

RESULTS

A concept of bodily instrumentalization is developed which accounts for the tendency of self-directed attention and behavior central to the disorder. That is, the socially anxious patient experiences their body as entrapped by the Other and thus unable to act freely among them. This felt bodily self-enslavement for the Other shows itself in efforts to conceal the body from the others and to puppeteer it for them.

DISCUSSION

The notion of bodily enslavement captures a central aspect of the suffering experienced by patients with SAD that exceeds the capability of the CBT language. Additionally, the social nature of the bodily instrumentalization that is constitutive of this suffering means that psychotherapy should not treat SAD as a cognitive disorder, but rather as an interpersonal disorder. Specifically, psychotherapy should offer patients shared interpersonal experiences in which they forget their bodily presence.

Grounding co-writing: An analysis of the theoretical basis of a new approach in mental health care

This contribution aims to highlight the theoretical and epistemological premises of the co-writing experience, a practice where a clinician and a patient are mutually engaged in jointly or collaboratively writing a narrative related to the patient's experience. Unlike a typical set of therapeutic techniques, co-writing is based on sharing perspectives and meanings about the experience of crisis, recovery, and the therapeutic process. The paper identifies and briefly describes four non-clinical epistemological paradigms on which it is grounded: ethnography, values-based practice, narrative care, and phenomenology. Although they differ in several ways, at the same time, they seem to share some common features that the paper investigates and comments. For clinicians, nurses, researchers and Mental Health Service managers, attention to the users and to the improvement of their active roles represents not only a strategy for the empowerment of results, but also the access door to a different perspective which relies on a renewed conceptualization of the mental disease nature that may lead to overcoming the epistemic asymmetry between the 'expert' and the 'other' in favor of intersubjective dialogue.

Phenomenology as a resource for translational research in mental health: methodological trends, challenges and new directions

This editorial reflects on current methodological trends in translational research in mental health. It aims to build a bridge between two fields that are frequently siloed off from each other: interventional research and phenomenologically informed research. Recent years have witnessed a revival of phenomenological approaches in mental health, often - but not only - as a means of connecting the subjective character of experience with neurobiological explanatory accounts of illness. Rich phenomenological knowledge accrued in schizophrenia, and wider psychosis research, has opened up new opportunities for improving prediction, early detection, diagnosis, prognostic stratification, treatment and ethics of care. Novel qualitative studies of delusions and hallucinations have challenged longstanding assumptions about their nature and meaning, uncovering highly complex subjective dimensions that are not adequately captured by quantitative methodologies. Interdisciplinary and participatory research efforts, informed by phenomenological insights, have prompted revisions of pre-established narratives of mental disorder dominated by a dysfunction framework and by researcher-centric outcome measures. Despite these recent advances, there has been relatively little effort to integrate and translate phenomenological insights across applied clinical research, with the goal of producing more meaningful, patient-valued results. It is our contention that phenomenological psychopathology - as the basic science of psychiatry - represents an important methodology for advancing evidence-based practices in mental health, and ultimately improving real-world outcomes. Setting this project into motion requires a greater emphasis on subjectivity and the structures of experience, more attention to the quality and patient-centredness of outcome measures, and the identification of treatment targets that matter most to patients.

More phenomenology in psychiatry? Applied ontology as a method towards integration

There have been renewed calls to use phenomenology in psychiatry to improve knowledge about causation, diagnostics, and treatment of mental health conditions. A phenomenological approach aims to elucidate the subjective experiences of mental health, which its advocates claim have been largely neglected by current diagnostic frameworks in psychiatry (eg, DSM-5). The consequence of neglecting rich phenomenological information is a comparatively more constrained approach to theory development, empirical research, and care programmes. Although calls for more phenomenology in psychiatry have been met with enthusiasm, there is still relatively little information on how to practically facilitate this integration. In this Personal View, we argue that phenomenological approaches need a shared semantic framework to drive their innovative potential, thus enabling consistent data capture, exchange, and interoperability with current mental health data and informatics approaches (eg, the Research Domain Criteria project). We show how an applied ontology of phenomenological psychopathology offers a suitable method to address these challenges.

Affective Instability and Emotion Dysregulation as a Social Impairment

Borderline personality disorder is a complex psychopathological phenomenon. It is usually thought to consist in a vast instability of different aspects that are central to our experience of the world, and to manifest as “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity” [American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013, p. 663]. Typically, of the instability triad—instability in (1) self, (2) affect and emotion, and (3) interpersonal relationships—only the first two are described, examined, and conceptualized from an experiential point of view. In this context, disorders of self have often motivated analyses of self-experience and the sense of self, affective disorders have been frequently considered in the light of emotional experience and its phenomenological structure. Patterns in the phenomenology of social experience have found comparatively little traction when it comes to the conceptualization of the interpersonal disturbances in borderline. In this paper, I argue that interpersonal instability in borderline consists in much more than fragile and shifting relationships but, most importantly, also involves certain styles in experiencing others. These styles, I suggest, may play an explanatory role for the borderline-typical patterns of interpersonal turmoil and so deserve more attention. To better describe and understand these styles, I explore the phenomenological structure of borderline affective instability and discuss the implications it might have for how a person experiences and relates to other people. Considering core aspects of borderline affective instability, such as alexithymia, emotional contagion, emotion dysregulation, and chronic emptiness, I propose borderline can be interpreted as a disturbance of interaffective exchange, which gives rise to certain ways of experiencing others that imply a social impairment.

The Dialectics of Altered Experience: How to Validly Construct a Phenomenologically Based Diagnosis in Psychiatry

In this paper, we present how a dialectical perspective on phenomenological psychopathology, called Dialectical Phenomenology (DPh), can contribute to current needs of psychiatric diagnosis. We propose a three-stage diagnostic methodology: first- and second-person stages, and synthetic hermeneutics stage. The first two stages are divided into a pre-dialectical and a dialectical phase. The diagnostic process progresses in a trajectory of increasing complexity, in which knowledge obtained at one level is dialectically absorbed and intertwined into the next levels. Throughout the article, we offer some examples of each step. In overall, the method starts off from the patient's own narrative, proceeds to two stages of phenomenological reduction designed to guarantee the scientific validity of the object, and concludes with a hermeneutical narrative synthesis that is dialectically composed of the patient's and psychopathologist's shared narratives. At the end of this process, the initial first-person narrative is transformed into a specific scientific object, a full dialectical phenomenological psychiatric diagnosis. This form of diagnosis constitutes a comprehensive alternative for an integral assessment of the complexities of human psychological alteration, bringing together both the interpretation of the suffering person and the scientific categories of psychiatry.

Framing a Phenomenological Mixed Method: From Inspiration to Guidance

Despite a long history of researchers who combine phenomenology with qualitative or quantitative methods, there are only few examples of working with a phenomenological mixed method—a method where phenomenology informs both qualitative and quantitative data generation, analysis, and interpretation. Researchers have argued that in working with a phenomenological mixed method, there should be mutual constraint and enlightenment between the qualitative (first-person, subjective) and quantitative (third-person, objective) methods for studying consciousness. In this article, we discuss what a framework for phenomenological mixed methods could look like and we aim to provide guidance of how to work within such framework. We are inspired by resources coming from research in mixed methods and existing examples of phenomenological mixed-method research. We also present three cases of phenomenological mixed methods where we study complex social phenomena and discuss the process of how we conducted the studies. From both the research inspiration and our own studies, we depict the landscape of possibilities available for those interested in mixing phenomenology with qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as the challenges and common pitfalls that researchers face. To navigate in this landscape, we develop a three-fold structure, focusing on (1) the phenomenological frame, (2) the phenomenologically informed generation of qualitative and quantitative data (tier one), and (3) the phenomenologically informed analysis and interpretation of data (tier two).

A values-based phenomenology for substance use disorder: a new approach for clinical decision-making

Abstract Phenomenological psychopathology has been defined as a human science that is concerned with the object on which clinical psychology and psychiatry act. How psychopathological experiences are understood is an important factor determining decision-making in clinical care. An accurate understanding of psychopathology is fundamental to the effectiveness of mental health treatments. This is even more important in a field such as substance use disorders in which social and cultural values influence both diagnosis and decision-making. In this article, we offer a contribution to clinical decision-making in substance use disorders by suggesting the association of Phenomenological Psychopathology and Values-Based Practice, constituting a Values-based Phenomenology We present a fictitious clinical case (to preserve confidentiality), illustrating a three-step practical application of Values-based Phenomenology. We conclude that although still a nascent discipline, Values-based Phenomenology offers a promising approach to reducing the gap between services and patients’ needs in clinical decision-making, and thus to improving clinical care in substance use disorders.

A Phenomenological Paradigm for Empirical Research in Psychiatry and Psychology: Open Questions

This article seeks to clarify the way in which phenomenology is conceptualized and applied in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, emphasizing the suitability of qualitative research. It will address the “What,” “Why,” and “How” of phenomenological interviews, providing not only preliminary answers but also a critical analysis and pointing to future directions for research. The questions it asks are: First, what makes an interview phenomenological? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology? Second, why do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to do justice to the patients’ involvement? Third, how should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology? In its conclusion, the article attempts to go a step beyond these methodological questions, highlighting the “bigger picture”: namely, the phenomenological scientific paradigm and its core philosophical claim of reality as mind-dependent.

Imagination and Self Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Review

Anomalies of imagination are frequent and handicapping in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSDs) but neglected in psychopathology due to the lack of a conceptual framework to model disorders of imagination. Recently, the link between minimal self disorders and pathology of imagination has been emphasized. The aim of the present article is to discuss this initiative by stressing their paradigm drawing on the recent imaginary turn in phenomenological research. Although this field of research is currently very active in philosophy, there are very few translational approaches in psychopathology or cognitive sciences. In this paper, we examine how contemporary research concerning fantasy and imagination can lead to the elaboration of an epistemological and phenomenological framework for schizophrenia research. We first examine the psychopathological literature on anomalous fantasy and imagination in SSDs. Then we propose an exhaustive overview of the imaginary turn of philosophical phenomenology. Further, we examine the theoretical and practical implications of such a recasting of phenomenological research. We show how fantasy and imagination are involved in the embodiment process, and how identity and imagination are interlinked. Finally, we propose an overview of the possible implications for the understanding of psychotherapeutic processes and recovery strategies.