Psychotherapist perceptions of engagement-building behaviours with youth clients across developmental levels

Building a positive therapeutic relationship is a challenging, yet critical, first step in conducting youth psychotherapy. A number of studies in the youth treatment literature have indicated that a positive therapeutic alliance is related to increased treatment attendance, participation, and outcome. Some research has examined therapist behaviours for engaging therapy clients; however, developmental differences in alliance formation have had limited exploration. The current study surveyed clinicians about their use of specific engagement strategies and the developmental stage of their youth clients. It was hypothesised that participants would differentially rate the importance of different aspects of therapeutic engagement based upon a youth client's developmental stage and that these would correspond with differences in specific engagement strategies. A total of 64 clinicians with experience treating youth completed the study. The participants completed a questionnaire administered online that asked them to rate the importance of developmental differences to forming a therapeutic relationship and provide example client behaviours from their clinical experience for each developmental stage. Results showed clinicians felt the relative importance of collaboration, advocacy, and trustworthiness increased with age. These differences were also evidenced in the specific strategies clinicians endorsed in relation to each engagement factor across developmental stages. This program of research will eventually aid in the development of new guidelines for engaging clients in youth psychotherapy. In addition, the results may be used to enhance psychotherapy training for those working with children and adolescents.

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates

The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.

The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? 'Simpler' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.

Current Understanding of the "Insight" Phenomenon Across Disciplines

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.

Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions

Over the past two decades, Ginsburg and Jablonka have developed a novel approach to studying the evolutionary origins of consciousness: the Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) framework. The central idea is that there is a distinctive type of learning that can serve as a transition marker for the evolutionary transition from non-conscious to conscious life. The goal of this paper is to stimulate discussion of the framework by providing a primer on its key claims (Part I) and a clear statement of its main empirical predictions (Part II).

How experimental neuroscientists can fix the hard problem of consciousness

For the materialist, the hard problem is fundamentally an explanatory problem. Solving it requires explaining why the relationship between brain and experience is the way it is and not some other way. We use the tools of the interventionist theory of explanation to show how a systematic experimental project could help move beyond the hard problem. Key to this project is the development of second-order interventions and invariant generalizations. Such interventions played a crucial scientific role in untangling other scientific mysteries, and we suggest that the same will be true of consciousness. We further suggest that the capacity for safe and reliable self-intervention will play a key role in overcoming both the hard and meta-problems of consciousness. Finally, we evaluate current strategies for intervention, with an eye to how they might be improved.

Phylogenetic origins of biological cognition: convergent patterns in the early evolution of learning

Various forms of elementary learning have recently been discovered in organisms lacking a nervous system, such as protists, fungi and plants. This finding has fundamental implications for how we view the role of convergent evolution in biological cognition. In this article, I first review the evidence for basic forms of learning in aneural organisms, focusing particularly on habituation and classical conditioning and considering the plausibility for convergent evolution of these capacities. Next, I examine the possible role of convergent evolution regarding these basic learning abilities during the early evolution of nervous systems. The evolution of nervous systems set the stage for at least two major events relevant to convergent evolution that are central to biological cognition: (i) nervous systems evolved, perhaps more than once, because of strong selection pressures for sustaining sensorimotor strategies in increasingly larger multicellular organisms and (ii) associative learning was a subsequent adaptation that evolved multiple times within the neuralia. Although convergent evolution of basic forms of learning among distantly related organisms such as protists, plants and neuralia is highly plausible, more research is needed to verify whether these forms of learning within the neuralia arose through convergent or parallel evolution.

The mind of plants: Thinking the unthinkable

Across all species, individuals thrive in complex ecological systems, which they rarely have complete knowledge of. To cope with this uncertainty and still make good choices while avoiding costly errors, organisms have developed the ability to exploit key features associated with their environment. That through experience, humans and other animals are quick at learning to associate specific cues with particular places, events and circumstances has long been known; the idea that plants are also capable of learning by association had never been proven until now. Here I comment on the recent paper that experimentally demonstrated associative learning in plants, thus qualifying them as proper subjects of cognitive research. Additionally, I make the point that the current fundamental premise in cognitive science—that we must understanding the precise neural underpinning of a given cognitive feature in order to understand the evolution of cognition and behavior—needs to be reimagined.

The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning

The minimal state of consciousness is sentience. This includes any phenomenal sensory experience - exteroceptive, such as vision and olfaction; interoceptive, such as pain and hunger; or proprioceptive, such as the sense of bodily position and movement. We propose unlimited associative learning (UAL) as the marker of the evolutionary transition to minimal consciousness (or sentience), its phylogenetically earliest sustainable manifestation and the driver of its evolution. We define and describe UAL at the behavioral and functional level and argue that the structural-anatomical implementations of this mode of learning in different taxa entail subjective feelings (sentience). We end with a discussion of the implications of our proposal for the distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom, suggesting testable predictions, and revisiting the ongoing debate about the function of minimal consciousness in light of our approach.

What kind of memory has evolution wrought? Introductory article for the special issue of memory: adaptive memory: the emergence and nature of proximate mechanisms

It is without question that our memory system evolved through a process of natural selection. However, basic research into the evolutionary foundations of memory has begun in earnest only recently. This is quite peculiar as the majority, perhaps even all, of memory research relates to whether memory is adaptive or not. In this Special Issue of Memory we have assembled a variety of papers that represent the cutting edge in research on the evolution of memory. These papers are centred on issues about the ultimate and proximate explanations of memory, the development of the adaptive functions of memory, as well as the positive consequences that arise from the current evolutionary form that our memory has taken. In this introductory article we briefly outline these different areas and indicate why they are vital for a more complete theory of memory. Further we argue that, by adopting a more applied stance in the area of the evolution of memory, one of the many future directions in this field could be a new branch of psychology that addresses questions in evolutionary legal psychology.

Scaffolding emotions and evolving language

We suggest that, in animals, the core-affect system is linked to partially assimilated behavioral dispositions that act as developmental scaffolds for the ontogenetic construction of emotions. We also propose that in humans the evolution of language altered the control of emotions, leading to categories that can be adequately captured only by emotion-words.

Evolutionary radiation and the spectrum of consciousness

Evolution is littered with polyphyletic parallelism: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose consciousness embodies one such example, and represent it here with an equivalence class structure that factors the broad realm of necessary conditions information theoretic realizations of Baars' global workspace model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, highly tunable, and even simultaneous temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, in fact, expressing different forms of the same underlying phenomenon. The variety of possibilities suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations--bush phylogenies of consciousness pruned by selection and chance extinction. Although few traces of the radiations may be found in the fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind.