Synthetic biology as a technoscience: The case of minimal genomes and essential genes

This article examines how minimal genome research mobilizes philosophical concepts such as minimality and essentiality. Following a historical approach the article aims to uncover what function this terminology plays and which problems are raised by them. Specifically, four historical moments are examined, linked to the work of Harold J. Morowitz, Mitsuhiro Itaya, Eugene Koonin and Arcady Mushegian, and J. Craig Venter. What this survey shows is a historical shift away from historical questions about life or descriptive questions about specific organisms towards questions that explore biological possibilities: what are possible forms of minimal genomes, regardless of whether they exist in nature? Moreover, it highlights a fundamental ambiguity at work in minimal genome research between a universality claim and a standardization claim: does a minimal genome refer to the minimal gene set for any organism whatsoever? Or does it refer rather to a gene set that will provide stable, robust and predictable behaviour, suited for biotechnological applications? Two diagnoses are proposed for this ambiguity: a philosophical diagnosis of how minimal genome research either misunderstands the ontology of biological entities or philosophically misarticulates scientific practice. Secondly, a historical diagnosis that suggests that this ambiguity is part of a broader shift towards technoscience.

Could We Really Be Made of Swiss Cheese? Xenobiology as an Engineering Epistemology for Biological Realization

Besides having potential medical and biosafety applications, as well as challenging the foundations of biological engineering, xenobiology can also shed light on the epistemological and metaphysical questions that puzzle philosophers of science. This paper reviews this philosophical aspect of xenobiology, focusing on the possible multiple realizability of life. According to this hypothesis, what ultimately matters in understanding life is its function, not its particular building blocks. This is because there should, in theory, be many different ways to build the same function. The possibility of multiple realizability was originally raised in the context of AI's hypothesized capacity to realize mental functions. Because we still do not have any incontrovertible examples of digital minds, not to mention alien life of foreign biochemistry, the best way to test this philosophical idea is to examine the recent results and practices of synthetic biology and xenobiology.

What is Proof of Concept Research and how does it Generate Epistemic and Ethical Categories for Future Scientific Practice?

"Proof of concept" is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program announcements, in experimental studies, and in the marketing of new technologies. It is often coupled with either a short definition or none at all, its meaning assumed to be fully understood. This is problematic. As a phrase with potential implications for research and technology, its assumed meaning requires some analysis to avoid it becoming a descriptive category that refers to all things scientifically exciting. I provide a short analysis of proof of concept research and offer an example of it within synthetic biology. I suggest that not only are there activities that circumscribe new epistemological categories but there are also associated normative ethical categories or principles linked to the research. I examine these and provide an outline for an alternative ethical account to describe these activities that I refer to as "extended agency ethics". This view is used to explain how the type of research described as proof of concept also provides an attendant proof of principle that is the result of decision-making that extends across practitioners, their tools, techniques, and the problem solving activities of other research groups.

Models and the mosaic of scientific knowledge. The case of immunology

A survey of models in immunology is conducted and distinct kinds of models are characterized based on whether models are material or conceptual, the distinctiveness of their epistemic purpose, and the criteria for evaluating the goodness of a model relative to its intended purpose. I argue that the diversity of models in interdisciplinary fields such as immunology reflects the fact that information about the phenomena of interest is gathered from different sources using multiple methods of investigation. To each model is attached a description specifying how information about a phenomenon of interest has been acquired, highlighting points of commonality and difference between the methodological and epistemic histories of the information encapsulated in different models. These points of commonality and difference allow investigators to integrate findings from different models into more comprehensive explanatory accounts, as well as to troubleshoot anomalies and faulty accounts by going back to the original building blocks.

From bricolage to BioBricks™: Synthetic biology and rational design

Synthetic biology is often described as a project that applies rational design methods to the organic world. Although humans have influenced organic lineages in many ways, it is nonetheless reasonable to place synthetic biology towards one end of a continuum between purely 'blind' processes of organic modification at one extreme, and wholly rational, design-led processes at the other. An example from evolutionary electronics illustrates some of the constraints imposed by the rational design methodology itself. These constraints reinforce the limitations of the synthetic biology ideal, limitations that are often freely acknowledged by synthetic biology's own practitioners. The synthetic biology methodology reflects a series of constraints imposed on finite human designers who wish, as far as is practicable, to communicate with each other and to intervene in nature in reasonably targeted and well-understood ways. This is better understood as indicative of an underlying awareness of human limitations, rather than as expressive of an objectionable impulse to mastery over nature.

Engineering Biology and Society: Reflections on Synthetic Biology

Synthetic biology, according to some definitions, is the attempt to make biology into an engineering discipline. I ask what is meant by this objective, which seems to have excited and energised many people and encouraged them to start working in the field. I show how synthetic biologists make a point of distinguishing their work from previous genetic ‘engineering’, which is described as bespoke and artisan. I examine synthetic biologists’ accounts of the differences between biology and engineering, which often oppose comprehension to construction. I argue that synthetic biology, like other branches of engineering, aims to meet recognised needs, and to make the world more manipulable and controllable. But there are tensions within the field—some synthetic biologists have reservations about the extent to which biology can be engineered, and ask whether it is necessary to develop a new type of engineering when working with living systems. After exploring these debates, I turn to some of the broader consequences of making biology easier to engineer, particularly the deskilling and democratisation of the technology. I end by arguing that because synthetic biologists are skilled at bringing together both technical and social forces, they are appropriately described as ‘heterogeneous engineers’.

Evolutionary developmental biology its roots and characteristics

The rise of evolutionary developmental biology was not the progressive isolation and characterization of developmental genes and gene networks. Many obstacles had to be overcome: the idea that all genes were more or less involved in development; the evidence that developmental processes in insects had nothing in common with those of vertebrates. Different lines of research converged toward the creation of evolutionary developmental biology, giving this field of research its present heterogeneity. This does not prevent all those working in the field from sharing the conviction that a precise characterization of evolutionary variations is required to fully understand the evolutionary process. Some evolutionary developmental biologists directly challenge the Modern Synthesis. I propose some ways to reconcile these apparently opposed visions of evolution. The turbulence seen in evolutionary developmental biology reflects the present entry of history into biology.

What will result from the interaction between functional and evolutionary biology?

The modern synthesis has been considered to be wrongly called a "synthesis", since it had completely excluded embryology, and many other disciplines. The recent developments of Evo-Devo have been seen as a step in the right direction, as complementing the modern synthesis, and probably leading to a "new synthesis". My argument is that the absence of embryology from the modern synthesis was the visible sign of a more profound lack: the absence of functional biology in the evolutionary synthesis. I will consider the reasons for this absence, as well as the recent transformations which favoured a closer interaction between these two branches of biology. Then I will describe two examples of recent work in which functional and evolutionary questioning were tightly linked. The most significant part of the paper will be devoted to the transformation of evolutionary theory that can be expected from this encounter: a deep transformation, or simply an experimental confirmation of this theory? I will not choose between these two different possibilities, but will discuss some of the difficulties which make the choice problematic.