Magnetoencephalography recordings reveal the neural mechanisms of auditory contributions to improved visual detection

Sounds enhance the detection of visual stimuli while concurrently biasing an observer's decisions. To investigate the neural mechanisms that underlie such multisensory interactions, we decoded time-resolved Signal Detection Theory sensitivity and criterion parameters from magneto-encephalographic recordings of participants that performed a visual detection task. We found that sounds improved visual detection sensitivity by enhancing the accumulation and maintenance of perceptual evidence over time. Meanwhile, criterion decoding analyses revealed that sounds induced brain activity patterns that resembled the patterns evoked by an actual visual stimulus. These two complementary mechanisms of audiovisual interplay differed in terms of their automaticity: Whereas the sound-induced enhancement in visual sensitivity depended on participants being actively engaged in a detection task, we found that sounds activated the visual cortex irrespective of task demands, potentially inducing visual illusory percepts. These results challenge the classical assumption that sound-induced increases in false alarms exclusively correspond to decision-level biases.

Naturalistic stimuli reveal a sensitive period in cross modal responses of visual cortex: Evidence from adult-onset blindness

How do life experiences impact cortical function? In people who are born blind, the "visual" cortices are recruited during nonvisual tasks, such as Braille reading and sound localization. Do visual cortices have a latent capacity to respond to nonvisual information throughout the lifespan? Alternatively, is there a sensitive period of heightened plasticity that makes visual cortex repurposing especially possible during childhood? To gain insight into these questions, we leveraged meaningful naturalistic auditory stimuli to simultaneously engage a broad range of cognitive domains and quantify cross-modal responses across congenitally blind (n = 22), adult-onset blind (vision loss >18 years-of-age, n = 14) and sighted (n = 22) individuals. During fMRI scanning, participants listened to two types of meaningful naturalistic auditory stimuli: excerpts from movies and a spoken narrative. As controls, participants heard the same narrative with the sentences shuffled and the narrative played backwards (i.e., meaningless sounds). We correlated the voxel-wise timecourses of different participants within condition and group. For all groups, all stimulus conditions induced synchrony in auditory cortex while only the narrative stimuli synchronized responses in higher-cognitive fronto-parietal and temporal regions. As previously reported, inter-subject synchrony in visual cortices was higher in congenitally blind than sighted blindfolded participants and this between-group difference was particularly pronounced for meaningful stimuli (movies and narrative). Critically, visual cortex synchrony was no higher in adult-onset blind than sighted blindfolded participants and did not increase with blindness duration. Sensitive period plasticity enables cross-modal repurposing in visual cortices.

Spared perilesional V1 activity underlies training-induced recovery of luminance detection sensitivity in cortically-blind patients

Damage to the primary visual cortex (V1) causes homonymous visual-field loss long considered intractable. Multiple studies now show that perceptual training can restore visual functions in chronic cortically-induced blindness (CB). A popular hypothesis is that training can harness residual visual functions by recruiting intact extrageniculostriate pathways. Training may also induce plastic changes within spared regions of the damaged V1. Here, we link changes in luminance detection sensitivity with retinotopic fMRI activity before and after visual discrimination training in eleven patients with chronic, stroke-induced CB. We show that spared V1 activity representing perimetrically-blind locations prior to training predicts the amount of training-induced recovery of luminance detection sensitivity. Additionally, training results in an enlargement of population receptive fields in perilesional V1, which increases blind-field coverage and may support further recovery with subsequent training. These findings uncover fundamental changes in perilesional V1 cortex underlying training-induced restoration of conscious luminance detection sensitivity in CB.

In humans, stroke damage to V1 causes large visual field defects. Spared V1 activity prior to training predicts the amount of training-induced recovery in luminance detection sensitivity. Moreover, visual training changes population receptive field properties within residual V1 circuits.

To look or not to look: dissociating presaccadic and covert spatial attention

Attention is a central neural process that enables selective and efficient processing of visual information. Individuals can attend to specific visual information either overtly, by making an eye movement to an object of interest, or covertly, without moving their eyes. We review behavioral, neuropsychological, neurophysiological, and computational evidence of presaccadic attentional modulations that occur while preparing saccadic eye movements, and highlight their differences from those of covert spatial endogenous (voluntary) and exogenous (involuntary) attention. We discuss recent studies and experimental procedures on how these different types of attention impact visual performance, alter appearance, differentially modulate the featural representation of basic visual dimensions (orientation and spatial frequency), engage different neural computations, and recruit partially distinct neural substrates. We conclude that presaccadic attention and covert attention are dissociable.

Differential impact of endogenous and exogenous attention on activity in human visual cortex

How do endogenous (voluntary) and exogenous (involuntary) attention modulate activity in visual cortex? Using ROI-based fMRI analysis, we measured fMRI activity for valid and invalid trials (target at cued/un-cued location, respectively), pre- or post-cueing endogenous or exogenous attention, while participants performed the same orientation discrimination task. We found stronger modulation in contralateral than ipsilateral visual regions, and higher activity in valid- than invalid-trials. For endogenous attention, modulation of stimulus-evoked activity due to a pre-cue increased along the visual hierarchy, but was constant due to a post-cue. For exogenous attention, modulation of stimulus-evoked activity due to a pre-cue was constant along the visual hierarchy, but was not modulated due to a post-cue. These findings reveal that endogenous and exogenous attention distinctly modulate activity in visuo-occipital areas during orienting and reorienting; endogenous attention facilitates both the encoding and the readout of visual information whereas exogenous attention only facilitates the encoding of information.

All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception

Is consciousness a continuous stream of percepts or is it discrete, occurring only at certain moments in time? This question has puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists for centuries. Both hypotheses have fallen repeatedly in and out of favor. Here, we review recent studies exploring long-lasting postdictive effects and show that the results favor a two-stage discrete model, in which substantial periods of continuous unconscious processing precede discrete conscious percepts. We propose that such a model marries the advantages of both continuous and discrete models and resolves centuries old debates about perception and consciousness.

The offline stream of conscious representations

When do we become conscious of a stimulus after its presentation? We would all agree that this necessarily takes time and that it is not instantaneous. Here, I would like to propose not only that conscious access is delayed relative to the external stimulation, but also that it can flexibly desynchronize from external stimulation; it can process some information 'offline', if and when it becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast with initial sensory processing, conscious experience might not strictly follow the sequence of events in the environment. In this article, I will review gathering evidence in favour of this proposition. I will argue that it offers a coherent framework for explaining a great variety of observations in the domain of perception, sensory memory and working memory: the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, post-dictive phenomena, iconic memory, latent working memory and the newly described retro-perception phenomenon. I will integrate this proposition to the global neuronal workspace model and consider possible underlying brain mechanisms. Finally, I will argue that this capacity to process information 'offline' might have made conscious processing evolutionarily advantageous in spite of its sluggishness and capacity limitations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

A colorful advantage in iconic memory

Synesthesia is a benign neurodevelopmental condition in which stimulation of one sensory modality evokes experiences in a second, unstimulated modality (Simner and Hubbard, 2013). In grapheme-color synesthesia (GCS), which is experienced by 1-2% of adults, synesthetes reliably and involuntarily experience specific colors when viewing blackand-white graphemes. Previous case-studies have identified synesthetes with spectacular memory (Luria, 1968; Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2001) and group studies have found advantages for synesthetes compared to nonsynesthetes in long-term memory (Rothen, Meier, & Ward, 2012). Here, we tested whether similar advantages are also present in earlier stages of memory. We tested visual iconic memory-the sensory store for vision-which has a very large capacity, but decays approximately 1000 ms after stimulus offset (Chow, 1985; Sergent et al., 2013; Sperling, 1960). We tested 20 synesthetes and 20 nonsynesthetes in a direct replication of the Sperling (1960) Partial Report Paradigm using letters (Experiment 1) and non-alphanumeric symbols (Experiment 2) as stimuli. Overall, synesthetes had a greater iconic memory capacity than nonsynesthetes when presented with synesthesia-inducing letter stimuli. This advantage was reduced when they were presented with non-synesthesia inducing symbol stimuli. Critically this advantage was most prominent when memory was stressed by asking participants to remember large arrays. Our results demonstrate that synesthetic memory advantages extend to the earliest stages of memory, and suggest that advantages in later stages of memory may arise from these earlier advantages.

Neural Correlates of Conscious Motion Perception

The nature of the proper neural signature of conscious perception remains a topic of active debate. Theoretical support from integrative theories of consciousness is consistent with such signature being P3b, one of the main candidates in the literature. Recent work has also put forward a mid-latency and more localized component, the Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN), as a proper Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC). Early local components like P1 have also been proposed. However, experiments exploring visual NCCs are conducted almost exclusively using static images as the content to be consciously perceived, favoring ventral stream processing, therefore limiting the scope of the NCCs that have been identified. Here we explored the visual NCCs isolating local motion, a dorsally processed feature, as the primary feature being consciously perceived. Physical equality between Seen and Unseen conditions in addition to a minimal contrast difference between target and no-target displays was employed. In agreement with previous literature, we found a P3b with a wide centro-parietal distribution that strongly correlated with the detection of the stimuli. P3b magnitude was larger for Seen vs. Unseen conditions, a result that was consistently observed at the single subject level. In contrast, we were unable to detect VAN in our data, regardless of whether the subject perceived or not the stimuli. In the 200-300 ms time window we found a N2pc component, consistent with the high attentional demands of our task. Early components like P1 were not observed in our data, in agreement with their proposed role in the processing of visual features, but not as proper NCCs. Our results extend the role of P3b as a content independent NCC to conscious visual motion perception.

A Normalization Framework for Emotional Attention

The normalization model of attention proposes that attention can affect performance by response- or contrast-gain changes, depending on the size of the stimulus and attention field. Here, we manipulated the attention field by emotional valence, negative faces versus positive faces, while holding stimulus size constant in a spatial cueing task. We observed changes in the cueing effect consonant with changes in response gain for negative faces and contrast gain for positive faces. Neuroimaging experiments confirmed that subjects’ attention fields were narrowed for negative faces and broadened for positive faces. Importantly, across subjects, the self-reported emotional strength of negative faces and positive faces correlated, respectively, both with response- and contrast-gain changes and with primary visual cortex (V1) narrowed and broadened attention fields. Effective connectivity analysis showed that the emotional valence-dependent attention field was closely associated with feedback from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to V1. These findings indicate a crucial involvement of DLPFC in the normalization processes of emotional attention.

Using a combination of psychophysics and functional MRI, this study reveals that emotional attention interacts with normalization processes depending on emotional valence (positive or negative faces), best explained by feedback modulation from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Attentional selection is the mechanism by which the subset of incoming information is preferentially processed at the expense of distractors. The normalization model of attention suggests that attention-triggered modulatory effects on sensory responses in the visual cortex depend on two factors: the stimulus size and the attention field size. However, little is known regarding whether emotional attention shapes perception by means of the normalization framework. To test this hypothesis, we manipulated the attention field by emotional valence—negative faces versus positive faces—while holding the stimulus size constant in a spatial cueing task. We observed that attention increased response gain for negative faces, with the largest cueing effects occurring at high contrasts and little to no effect at low and mid-contrasts; however, attention increased contrast gain for positive faces, with the largest cueing effects occurring at mid-contrasts and little to no effect at low and high contrasts. A complementary neuroimaging experiment confirmed that subjects' attention fields were narrowed for negative faces and broadened for positive faces. Across subjects, the self-reported emotional strength of negative faces and positive faces correlated, respectively, both with response-gain and contrast-gain changes and with narrowed and broadened attention fields in the primary visual cortex. Mechanistically, we found that the emotional valence-dependent attention field was closely associated with feedback from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the primary visual cortex. Our findings provide evidence for a normalization framework for emotional attention and for the critical role of feedback from the prefrontal cortex to the early visual cortex in this normalization.

Unconscious semantic processing of polysemous words is not automatic

Semantic processing of visually presented words can be identified both on behavioral and neurophysiological evidence. One of the major discoveries of the last decades is the demonstration that these signatures of semantic processing, initially observed for consciously perceived words, can also be detected for masked words inaccessible to conscious reports. In this context, the distinction between conscious and unconscious verbal semantic processing constitutes a challenging scientific issue. A prominent view considered that while conscious representations are subject to executive control, unconscious ones would operate automatically in a modular way, independent from control and top-down influences. Recent findings challenged this view by revealing that endogenous attention and task-setting can have a strong influence on unconscious processing. However, one of the major arguments supporting the automaticity of unconscious semantic processing still stands, stemming from a seminal observation reported by Marcel in 1980 about polysemous words. In the present study we reexamined this evidence. We present a combination of behavioral and event-related-potentials (ERPs) results that refute this view by showing that the current conscious semantic context has a major and similar influence on the semantic processing of both visible and masked polysemous words. In a classical lexical decision task, a polysemous word was preceded by a word which defined the current semantic context. Crucially, this context was associated with only one of the two meanings of the polysemous word, and was followed by a word/pseudo-word target. Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence of semantic priming of target words by masked polysemous words was strongly dependent on the conscious context. Moreover, we describe a new type of influence related to the response-code used to answer for target words in the lexical decision task: unconscious semantic priming constrained by the conscious context was present both in behavior and ERPs exclusively when right-handed subjects were instructed to respond to words with their right hand. The strong and respective influences of conscious context and response-code on semantic processing of masked polysemous words demonstrate that unconscious verbal semantic representations are not automatic.

Neural Correlates of Perceived Confidence in a Partial Report Paradigm

Confidence judgments are often severely distorted: People may feel underconfident when responding correctly or, conversely, overconfident in erred responses. Our aim here was to identify the timing of brain processes that lead to variations in objective performance and subjective judgments of confidence. We capitalized on the Partial Report Paradigm [Sperling, G. The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74, 1, 1960], which allowed us to separate experimentally the moment of encoding of information from that of its retrieval [Zylberberg, A., Dehaene, S., Mindlin, G. B., & Sigman, M. Neurophysiological bases of exponential sensory decay and top–down memory retrieval: A model. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 3, 2009]. We observed that the level of subjective confidence is indexed by two very specific evoked potentials at latencies of about 400 and 600 msec during the retrieval stage and by a stationary measure of intensity of the alpha band during the encoding period. When factoring out the effect of confidence, objective performance shows a weak effect during the encoding and retrieval periods. These results have relevant implications for theories of decision-making and confidence, suggesting that confidence is not constructed online as evidence is accumulated toward a decision. Instead, confidence attributions are more consistent with a retrospective mechanism that monitors the entire decision process.

Encoding of graded changes in spatial specificity of prior cues in human visual cortex

Prior information about the relevance of spatial locations can vary in specificity; a single location, a subset of locations, or all locations may be of potential importance. Using a contrast-discrimination task with four possible targets, we asked whether performance benefits are graded with the spatial specificity of a prior cue and whether we could quantitatively account for behavioral performance with cortical activity changes measured by blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) imaging. Thus we changed the prior probability that each location contained the target from 100 to 50 to 25% by cueing in advance 1, 2, or 4 of the possible locations. We found that behavioral performance (discrimination thresholds) improved in a graded fashion with spatial specificity. However, concurrently measured cortical responses from retinotopically defined visual areas were not strictly graded; response magnitude decreased when all 4 locations were cued (25% prior probability) relative to the 100 and 50% prior probability conditions, but no significant difference in response magnitude was found between the 100 and 50% prior probability conditions for either cued or uncued locations. Also, although cueing locations increased responses relative to noncueing, this cue sensitivity was not graded with prior probability. Furthermore, contrast sensitivity of cortical responses, which could improve contrast discrimination performance, was not graded. Instead, an efficient-selection model showed that even if sensory responses do not strictly scale with prior probability, selection of sensory responses by weighting larger responses more can result in graded behavioral performance benefits with increasing spatial specificity of prior information.

Neural correlates of consciousness

Jon Driver's scientific work was characterized by an innovative combination of new methods for studying mental processes in the human brain in an integrative manner. In our collaborative work, he applied this approach to the study of attention and awareness, and their relationship to neural activity in the human brain. Here I review Jon's scientific work that relates to the neural basis of human consciousness, relating our collaborative work to a broader scientific context. I seek to show how his insights led to a deeper understanding of the causal connections between distant brain structures that are now believed to characterize the neural underpinnings of human consciousness.

Early and late stages of working-memory maintenance contribute differentially to long-term memory formation

The present paper investigated the role of early and late stages of working-memory maintenance, which have been suggested to differentially contribute to long-term memory formation. In experiment 1, we administered a delayed-match-to-sample task, requiring participants to remember line drawings of non-sense three-dimensional stimuli. In the delay phase, participants were either presented with a fixation cross (for 2 or 9s) or with one of two different interference tasks, varying in visual overlap with the target. The interference task was presented 1.5, 4.5 or 7.5s after target offset. Early interfering and early probing disproportionately affected performance on an unexpected subsequent recognition-memory task compared to later interference or probing. This was not modulated by the type of interference task. In Experiment 2, we examined whether the formation of a holistic internal code of the target may be a gradual process. An analogous delayed-match-to-sample task was administered, with interference after 0.5, 2.5 or 4.5s after target offset. The early and middle interference condition similarly disproportionately affected performance compared to later interference. Hence, the present results support the view of a functional dissociation between early and late stages of working-memory maintenance and that early working-memory processes contribute particularly to long-term memory formation.

Anticipation increases tactile stimulus processing in the ipsilateral primary somatosensory cortex

Stimulus anticipation improves perception. To account for this improvement, we investigated how stimulus processing is altered by anticipation. In contrast to a large body of previous work, we employed a demanding perceptual task and investigated sensory responses that occur beyond early evoked activity in contralateral primary sensory areas: Stimulus-induced modulations of neural oscillations. For this, we recorded magnetoencephalography in 19 humans while they performed a cued tactile identification task involving the identification of either a proximal or a distal stimulation on the fingertips. We varied the cue-target interval between 0 and 1000 ms such that tactile targets occurred at various degrees of anticipation. This allowed us to investigate the influence of anticipation on stimulus processing in a parametric fashion. We observed that anticipation increases the stimulus-induced response (suppression of beta-band oscillations) originating from the ipsilateral primary somatosensory cortex. This occurs in the period in which the tactile memory trace is analyzed and is correlated with the anticipation-induced improvement in tactile perception. We propose that this ipsilateral response indicates distributed processing across bilateral primary sensory cortices, of which the extent increases with anticipation. This constitutes a new and potentially important mechanism contributing to perception and its improvement following anticipation.

The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Control: Successful Remembering and Intentional Forgetting

The ability to control how we process information by remembering that which is important and forgetting that which is irrelevant is essential to maintain accurate, up-to-date memories. As such, memory success is predicated on both successful intentional encoding and successful intentional forgetting. The current study used an item-method directed forgetting paradigm to elucidate the cognitive and neural processes that underlie both processes while also examining the relationship between them to understand how the two may work together. Results indicated that encoding-related processes in the left inferior PFC and medial-temporal lobe (MTL) contribute to subsequent memory success, whereas inhibitory processes in the right superior frontal gyrus and right inferior parietal lobe contribute to subsequent forgetting success. Furthermore, connectivity analyses found a negative correlation between activity in the right superior frontal cortex and activity in the left MTL during successful intentional forgetting but not during successful encoding, incidental forgetting, or incidental encoding. Results support the theory that intentional forgetting is mediated by inhibition-related activity in the right frontal cortex and the interaction of this activity with that of encoding-related activity in the MTL. Further support for this inhibitory-related account was found through a clear dissociation between intentional and incidental forgetting, such that intentional forgetting was associated with regions shown to support inhibition, whereas incidental forgetting was associated with regions supporting encoding.

Cueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious perception

Is our perceptual experience of a stimulus entirely determined during the early buildup of the sensory representation, within 100 to 150 ms following stimulation? Or can later influences, such as sensory reactivation, still determine whether we become conscious of a stimulus? Late visual reactivation can be experimentally induced by postcueing attention after visual stimulus offset. In a contrary approach from previous work on postcued attention and visual short-term memory, which used multiple item displays, we tested the influence of postcued attention on perception, using a single visual stimulus (Gabor patch) at threshold contrast. We showed that attracting attention to the stimulus location 100 to 400 ms after presentation still drastically improved the viewers' objective capacity to detect its presence and to discriminate its orientation, along with drastic increase in subjective visibility. This retroperception effect demonstrates that postcued attention can retrospectively trigger the conscious perception of a stimulus that would otherwise have escaped consciousness. It was known that poststimulus events could either suppress consciousness, as in masking, or alter conscious content, as in the flash-lag illusion. Our results show that conscious perception can also be triggered by an external event several hundred ms after stimulus offset, underlining unsuspected temporal flexibility in conscious perception.

Prepared or not prepared: top-down modulation on memory of features and feature bindings

Orienting attention to the to-be-tested representations can enhance representations and protect them from interference. Previous studies have found that this effect on feature and bound representations was comparable despite their difference in stability. This may have occurred because participants were tested in a block design, which is susceptible to participants' effective top-down control on the cued representations based on the predictability of the design. In this study, we investigated how the foreknowledge of when and what to expect would affect visual representations in a change-detection task. Cue onset time was either early or late; changes included either features or feature bindings. When predictability was maximized via a block design (Experiments 1, 5, and 6), early cues equally facilitated both representations while late cues did not affect either representation. When either cue onset time (Experiment 2) or change type (Experiment 3) was unpredictable, early cues consistently facilitated feature representations, while bound representations were enhanced only when cue onset time was predictable. Additionally, late cuing only cost bound representations. Finally, when both factors were no longer predictable via an intermixed design (Experiment 4), early-cuing benefit was eliminated, with a late cuing cost for the bound representations. These results highlight the critical role of effective top-down control in memory maintenance for visual representations.

Visual short-term memory: activity supporting encoding and maintenance in retinotopic visual cortex

Recent studies have demonstrated that retinotopic cortex maintains information about visual stimuli during retention intervals. However, the process by which transient stimulus-evoked sensory responses are transformed into enduring memory representations is unknown. Here, using fMRI and short-term visual memory tasks optimized for univariate and multivariate analysis approaches, we report differential involvement of human retinotopic areas during memory encoding of the low-level visual feature orientation. All visual areas show weaker responses when memory encoding processes are interrupted, possibly due to effects in orientation-sensitive primary visual cortex (V1) propagating across extrastriate areas. Furthermore, intermediate areas in both dorsal (V3a/b) and ventral (LO1/2) streams are significantly more active during memory encoding compared with non-memory (active and passive) processing of the same stimulus material. These effects in intermediate visual cortex are also observed during memory encoding of a different stimulus feature (spatial frequency), suggesting that these areas are involved in encoding processes on a higher level of representation. Using pattern-classification techniques to probe the representational content in visual cortex during delay periods, we further demonstrate that simply initiating memory encoding is not sufficient to produce long-lasting memory traces. Rather, active maintenance appears to underlie the observed memory-specific patterns of information in retinotopic cortex.

Iconic memory requires attention

Two experiments investigated whether attention plays a role in iconic memory, employing either a change detection paradigm (Experiment 1) or a partial-report paradigm (Experiment 2). In each experiment, attention was taxed during initial display presentation, focusing the manipulation on consolidation of information into iconic memory, prior to transfer into working memory. Observers were able to maintain high levels of performance (accuracy of change detection or categorization) even when concurrently performing an easy visual search task (low load). However, when the concurrent search was made difficult (high load), observers' performance dropped to almost chance levels, while search accuracy held at single-task levels. The effects of attentional load remained the same across paradigms. The results suggest that, without attention, participants consolidate in iconic memory only gross representations of the visual scene, information too impoverished for successful detection of perceptual change or categorization of features.

Attentional enhancement via selection and pooling of early sensory responses in human visual cortex

The computational processes by which attention improves behavioral performance were characterized by measuring visual cortical activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging as humans performed a contrast-discrimination task with focal and distributed attention. Focal attention yielded robust improvements in behavioral performance accompanied by increases in cortical responses. Quantitative analysis revealed that if performance were limited only by the sensitivity of the measured sensory signals, the improvements in behavioral performance would have corresponded to an unrealistically large reduction in response variability. Instead, behavioral performance was well characterized by a pooling and selection process for which the largest sensory responses, those most strongly modulated by attention, dominated the perceptual decision. This characterization predicts that high-contrast distracters that evoke large responses should negatively impact behavioral performance. We tested and confirmed this prediction. We conclude that attention enhanced behavioral performance predominantly by enabling efficient selection of the behaviorally relevant sensory signals.

On the neural mechanisms subserving consciousness and attention

Consciousness, as described in the experimental literature, is a multi-faceted phenomenon, that impinges on other well-studied concepts such as attention and control. Do consciousness and attention refer to different aspects of the same core phenomenon, or do they correspond to distinct functions? One possibility to address this question is to examine the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness and attention. If consciousness and attention pertain to the same concept, they should rely on shared neural mechanisms. Conversely, if their underlying mechanisms are distinct, then consciousness and attention should be considered as distinct entities. This paper therefore reviews neurophysiological facts arguing in favor or against a tight relationship between consciousness and attention. Three neural mechanisms that have been associated with both attention and consciousness are examined (neural amplification, involvement of the fronto-parietal network, and oscillatory synchrony), to conclude that the commonalities between attention and consciousness at the neural level may have been overestimated. Last but not least, experiments in which both attention and consciousness were probed at the neural level point toward a dissociation between the two concepts. It therefore appears from this review that consciousness and attention rely on distinct neural properties, although they can interact at the behavioral level. It is proposed that a “cumulative influence model,” in which attention and consciousness correspond to distinct neural mechanisms feeding a single decisional process leading to behavior, fits best with available neural and behavioral data. In this view, consciousness should not be considered as a top-level executive function but should rather be defined by its experiential properties.

Functional connectivity during top-down modulation of visual short-term memory representations

Recent evidence has revealed that short-lived internal representations held in visual short-term memory (VSTM) can be modulated by top-down control via retrospective attention which impacts subsequent behavioral performance. However, the functional inter-regional interactions underlying these top-down modulatory effects are not fully characterized. Here we used event-related functional magnetic imaging to investigate whether the strength of functional connectivity between the frontal cortex and posterior visual areas varies with the efficacy of top-down modulation of memory traces. Top-down modulation was manipulated by the timing of retro-cuing (early or late) in a VSTM task. Univariate analyses revealed that more effective top-down modulation (early cueing vs. late cueing) increased activity in early visual areas. Importantly, coherency analyses revealed that top-down modulation produced stronger functional connectivity between frontal and posterior occipital regions. Also, participants with stronger functional connectivity exhibit better memory performance. These results suggest that augmented functional connectivity between frontal and posterior visual areas strengthens the VSTM representations of importance to behavioral goals.