Nonmotor aspects of action concepts

An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation

We advance a novel active inference model of the cognitive processing that underlies the acquisition of a hierarchical action repertoire and its use for observation, understanding and imitation. We illustrate the model in four simulations of a tennis learner who observes a teacher performing tennis shots, forms hierarchical representations of the observed actions, and imitates them. Our simulations show that the agent's oculomotor activity implements an active information sampling strategy that permits inferring the kinematic aspects of the observed movement, which lie at the lowest level of the action hierarchy. In turn, this low-level kinematic inference supports higher-level inferences about deeper aspects of the observed actions: proximal goals and intentions. Finally, the inferred action representations can steer imitative responses, but interfere with the execution of different actions. Our simulations show that hierarchical active inference provides a unified account of action observation, understanding, learning and imitation and helps explain the neurobiological underpinnings of visuomotor cognition, including the multiple routes for action understanding in the dorsal and ventral streams and mirror mechanisms.

Two 'what' pathways for action and object recognition

The ventral visual stream is conceived as a pathway for object recognition. However, we also recognize the actions an object can be involved in. Here, we show that action recognition critically depends on a pathway in lateral occipitotemporal cortex, partially overlapping and topographically aligned with object representations that are precursors for action recognition. By contrast, object features that are more relevant for object recognition, such as color and texture, are typically found in ventral occipitotemporal cortex. We argue that occipitotemporal cortex contains similarly organized lateral and ventral 'what' pathways for action and object recognition, respectively. This account explains a number of observed phenomena, such as the duplication of object domains and the specific representational profiles in lateral and ventral cortex.

Sociality and interaction envelope organize visual action representations

Humans observe a wide range of actions in their surroundings. How is the visual cortex organized to process this diverse input? Using functional neuroimaging, we measured brain responses while participants viewed short videos of everyday actions, then probed the structure in these responses using voxel-wise encoding modeling. Responses are well fit by feature spaces that capture the body parts involved in an action and the action’s targets (i.e. whether the action was directed at an object, another person, the actor, and space). Clustering analyses reveal five large-scale networks that summarize the voxel tuning: one related to social aspects of an action, and four related to the scale of the interaction envelope, ranging from fine-scale manipulations directed at objects, to large-scale whole-body movements directed at distant locations. We propose that these networks reveal the major representational joints in how actions are processed by visual regions of the brain.

How is action perception organized in the brain? Here, the authors report evidence for five networks tuned to actions’ social content and the scale of their effect on the world and propose that sociality and interaction envelope are organizing dimensions of visual action representation.

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to "embodiment" or "grounding." We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations "interact," and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized-the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to "grounding." Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations-conceptual vs. sensory-motor-from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of "grounding" or "embodiment," because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.

Semantics of the Visual Environment Encoded in Parahippocampal Cortex

Semantic representations capture the statistics of experience and store this information in memory. A fundamental component of this memory system is knowledge of the visual environment, including knowledge of objects and their associations. Visual semantic information underlies a range of behaviors, from perceptual categorization to cognitive processes such as language and reasoning. Here we examine the neuroanatomic system that encodes visual semantics. Across three experiments, we found converging evidence indicating that knowledge of verbally mediated visual concepts relies on information encoded in a region of the ventral-medial temporal lobe centered on parahippocampal cortex. In an fMRI study, this region was strongly engaged by the processing of concepts relying on visual knowledge but not by concepts relying on other sensory modalities. In a study of patients with the semantic variant of primary progressive aphasia (semantic dementia), atrophy that encompassed this region was associated with a specific impairment in verbally mediated visual semantic knowledge. Finally, in a structural study of healthy adults from the fMRI experiment, gray matter density in this region related to individual variability in the processing of visual concepts. The anatomic location of these findings aligns with recent work linking the ventral-medial temporal lobe with high-level visual representation, contextual associations, and reasoning through imagination. Together, this work suggests a critical role for parahippocampal cortex in linking the visual environment with knowledge systems in the human brain.