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Ben-Artzi I, Kessler Y, Nicenboim B, Shahar N. Computational mechanisms underlying latent value updating of unchosen actions. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2023; 9:eadi2704. [PMID: 37862419 PMCID: PMC10588947 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adi2704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/16/2023] [Accepted: 09/20/2023] [Indexed: 10/22/2023]
Abstract
Current studies suggest that individuals estimate the value of their choices based on observed feedback. Here, we ask whether individuals also update the value of their unchosen actions, even when the associated feedback remains unknown. One hundred seventy-eight individuals completed a multi-armed bandit task, making choices to gain rewards. We found robust evidence suggesting latent value updating of unchosen actions based on the chosen action's outcome. Computational modeling results suggested that this effect is mainly explained by a value updating mechanism whereby individuals integrate the outcome history for choosing an option with that of rejecting the alternative. Properties of the deliberation (i.e., duration/difficulty) did not moderate the latent value updating of unchosen actions, suggesting that memory traces generated during deliberation might take a smaller role in this specific phenomenon than previously thought. We discuss the mechanisms facilitating credit assignment to unchosen actions and their implications for human decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ido Ben-Artzi
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Minducate Science of Learning Research and Innovation Center of the Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Yoav Kessler
- Department of Psychology and School of Brain Sciences and Cognition, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel
| | - Bruno Nicenboim
- Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
| | - Nitzan Shahar
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
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Cheng S, Zhao M, Tang N, Zhao Y, Zhou J, Shen M, Gao T. Intention beyond desire: Spontaneous intentional commitment regulates conflicting desires. Cognition 2023; 238:105513. [PMID: 37331323 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105513] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2023] [Revised: 05/30/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 06/20/2023]
Abstract
The human mind is a mosaic composed of multiple selves with conflicting desires. How can coherent actions emerge from such conflicts? Classical desire theory argues that rational action depends on maximizing the expected utilities evaluated by all desires. In contrast, intention theory suggests that humans regulate conflicting desires with an intentional commitment that constrains action planning towards a fixed goal. Here, we designed a series of 2D navigation games in which participants were instructed to navigate to two equally desirable destinations. We focused on the critical moments in navigation to test whether humans spontaneously commit to an intention and take actions that would be qualitatively different from those of a purely desire-driven agent. Across four experiments, we found three distinctive signatures of intentional commitment that only exist in human actions: "goal perseverance" as the persistent pursuit of an original intention despite unexpected drift making the intention suboptimal; "self-binding" as the proactive binding of oneself to a committed future by avoiding a path that could lead to many futures; and "temporal leap" as the commitment to a distant future even before reaching the proximal one. These results suggest that humans spontaneously form an intention with a committed plan to quarantine conflicting desires from actions, supporting intention as a distinctive mental state beyond desire. Additionally, our findings shed light on the possible functions of intention, such as reducing computational load and making one's actions more predictable in the eyes of a third-party observer.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shaozhe Cheng
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | | | - Ning Tang
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | - Yang Zhao
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | - Jifan Zhou
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China.
| | - Mowei Shen
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China.
| | - Tao Gao
- Department of Communication, UCLA, USA; Department of Statistics, UCLA, USA; Department of Psychology, UCLA, USA.
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Cracco E, Bernardet U, Sevenhant R, Vandenhouwe N, Copman F, Durnez W, Bombeke K, Brass M. Evidence for a two-step model of social group influence. iScience 2022; 25:104891. [PMID: 36051185 PMCID: PMC9424596 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2022.104891] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2022] [Revised: 05/11/2022] [Accepted: 08/03/2022] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Social group influence plays an important role in societally relevant phenomena such as rioting and mass panic. One way through which groups influence individuals is by directing their gaze. Evidence that gaze following increases with group size has typically been explained in terms of strategic processes. Here, we tested the role of reflexive processes. In an ecologically valid virtual reality task, we found that participants were more likely to follow the group’s gaze when more people looked, even though they knew the group provided no relevant information. Interestingly, participants also sometimes changed their mind after starting to follow the gaze of the group, indicating that automatic imitation can be overruled by strategic processes. This suggests that social group influence is best explained by a two-step model in which bottom-up imitative processes first elicit a reflexive tendency to imitate, before top-down strategic processes determine whether to execute or inhibit this reflex. Groups influence human behavior in two stages First, groups elicit a reflexive tendency to imitate Second, strategic processes decide to execute or inhibit this reflex Social group conformity may be more automatic than previously thought
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van Schie HT, Iotchev IB, Compen FR. Free will strikes back: Steady-state movement-related cortical potentials are modulated by cognitive control. Conscious Cogn 2022; 104:103382. [PMID: 35914430 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103382] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2022] [Accepted: 07/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
In psychology and neuroscience, opposition to free will has asserted that any degree of perceived self-control or choice is a mere epiphenomenon which provides no meaningful influence on action. The present research tested the validity of this conclusion by designing a paradigm in which the potential effect of self-monitoring on motor output could be investigated. Using a repetitive finger tapping task that evokes automatic patterns in participants tapping responses, we have obtained evidence that (1) participants may voluntarily reduce the predictability of their tapping patterns (2) by exercising cognitive control that (3) modulates response-locked steady-state movement-related potentials over primary and supplementary motor areas. These findings challenge the most radical accounts of the nonexistence of free will and instead provide support for a more balanced model of human behaviour in which cognitive control may constrain automatic response tendencies in response preparation and action execution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hein Thomas van Schie
- Radboud University Behavioural Science Institute, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
| | | | - Félix René Compen
- Department of Psychiatry, Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Center, P.O. Box 9104 / 966, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Radboud University Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, P.O. Box 9010, 6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
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Free will without consciousness? Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:555-566. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2021] [Revised: 02/17/2022] [Accepted: 03/15/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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Furstenberg A, Dewar CD, Sompolinsky H, Knight RT, Deouell LY. Effect of Aging on Change of Intention. Front Hum Neurosci 2019; 13:264. [PMID: 31417383 PMCID: PMC6685419 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2019.00264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/06/2019] [Accepted: 07/15/2019] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Decision making often requires making arbitrary choices ("picking") between alternatives that make no difference to the agent, that are equally desirable, or when the potential reward is unknown. Using event-related potentials we tested the effect of age on this common type of decision making. We compared two age groups: ages 18-25, and ages 41-67 on a masked-priming paradigm while recording EEG and EMG. Participants pressed a right or left button following either an instructive arrow cue or a neutral free-choice picking cue, both preceded by a masked arrow or neutral prime. The prime affected the behavior on the Instructed and the Free-choice picking conditions both in the younger and older groups. Moreover, electrophysiological "Change of Intention" (ChoI) was observed via lateralized readiness potential (LRP) in both age groups - the polarity of the LRP indicated first preparation to move the primed hand and then preparation to move the other hand. However, the older participants were more conservative in responding to the instructive cue, exhibiting a speed-accuracy trade-off, with slower response times, less errors in incongruent trials, and reduced probability of EMG activity in the non-responding hand. Additionally, "Change of Intention" was observed in both age groups in slow RT trials with a neutral prime as a result of an endogenous early intention to respond in a direction opposite the eventual instructing arrow cue. We conclude that the basic behavioral and electrophysiological signatures of implicit ChoI are common to a wide range of ages. However, older subjects, despite showing a similar dynamic decision trajectory as younger adults, are slower, more prudent and finalize the decision making process before letting the information affect the peripheral motor system. In contrast, the flow of information in younger subjects occurs in parallel to the decision process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ariel Furstenberg
- Racah Institute of Physics, Faculty of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Callum D. Dewar
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
- College of Medicine, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Haim Sompolinsky
- Racah Institute of Physics, Faculty of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
- Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Robert T. Knight
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
| | - Leon Y. Deouell
- Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
- Psychology Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
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Brass M, Furstenberg A, Mele AR. Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2019; 102:251-263. [PMID: 31059730 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2019] [Revised: 04/30/2019] [Accepted: 04/30/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marcel Brass
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, Ghent, 9000, Belgium.
| | - Ariel Furstenberg
- Racah Institute of Physics, Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Edmond J. Safra Campus, Jerusalem, 9190401, Israel.
| | - Alfred R Mele
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, 32306-1500, USA.
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Khalighinejad N, Schurger A, Desantis A, Zmigrod L, Haggard P. Precursor processes of human self-initiated action. Neuroimage 2017; 165:35-47. [PMID: 28966084 PMCID: PMC5737384 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.09.057] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2017] [Revised: 08/28/2017] [Accepted: 09/26/2017] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
A gradual buildup of electrical potential over motor areas precedes self-initiated movements. Recently, such “readiness potentials” (RPs) were attributed to stochastic fluctuations in neural activity. We developed a new experimental paradigm that operationalized self-initiated actions as endogenous ‘skip’ responses while waiting for target stimuli in a perceptual decision task. We compared these to a block of trials where participants could not choose when to skip, but were instead instructed to skip. Frequency and timing of motor action were therefore balanced across blocks, so that conditions differed only in how the timing of skip decisions was generated. We reasoned that across-trial variability of EEG could carry as much information about the source of skip decisions as the mean RP. EEG variability decreased more markedly prior to self-initiated compared to externally-triggered skip actions. This convergence suggests a consistent preparatory process prior to self-initiated action. A leaky stochastic accumulator model could reproduce this convergence given the additional assumption of a systematic decrease in input noise prior to self-initiated actions. Our results may provide a novel neurophysiological perspective on the topical debate regarding whether self-initiated actions arise from a deterministic neurocognitive process, or from neural stochasticity. We suggest that the key precursor of self-initiated action may manifest as a reduction in neural noise. Self-initiated action was operationalized in a novel perceptual decision making task. EEG variability decreased prior to self-initiated action. These findings could be accounted for by a leaky stochastic accumulator model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nima Khalighinejad
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Aaron Schurger
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, CEA DRF/I2BM, INSERM, Université Paris-Sud, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, 91191 Gif/Yvette, France
| | - Andrea Desantis
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Leor Zmigrod
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK
| | - Patrick Haggard
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK.
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