Distinct roles of the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, and dopamine neurons in counterfactual thinking of decision outcomes

Individuals often assess past decisions by comparing what was gained with what would have been gained had they acted differently. Thoughts of past alternatives that counter what actually happened are called "counterfactuals." Recent theories emphasize the role of the prefrontal cortex in processing counterfactual outcomes in decision-making, although how subcortical regions contribute to this process remains to be elucidated. Here we report a clear distinction among the roles of the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum and midbrain dopamine neurons in processing counterfactual outcomes in monkeys. Our findings suggest that actually gained and counterfactual outcome signals are both processed in the cortico-subcortical network constituted by these regions but in distinct manners and integrated only in the orbitofrontal cortex in a way to compare these outcomes. This study extends the prefrontal theory of counterfactual thinking and provides key insights regarding how the prefrontal cortex cooperates with subcortical regions to make decisions using counterfactual information.

Dissociated deficits of anticipated and experienced regret in at-risk suicidal individuals

Backgrounds

Decision-making deficits have been reported as trans-diagnostic characteristics of vulnerability to suicidal behaviors, independent of co-existing psychiatric disorders. Individuals with suicidal behaviors often regret their decision to attempt suicide and may have impairments in future-oriented processing. However, it is not clear how people with suicidal dispositions use future-oriented cognition and past experience of regret to guide decision-making. Here, we examined the processes of regret anticipation and experience in subclinical youth with and without suicidal ideation during value-based decision-making.

Methods

In total, 80 young adults with suicidal ideation and 79 healthy controls completed a computational counterfactual thinking task and self-reported measures of suicidal behaviors, depression, anxiety, impulsivity, rumination, hopelessness, and childhood maltreatment.

Results

Individuals with suicidal ideation showed a reduced ability to anticipate regret compared to healthy controls. Specifically, suicidal ideators’ experience of regret/relief was significantly different from that of healthy controls upon obtained outcomes, while their disappointment/pleasure experience was not significantly different from healthy controls.

Conclusion

These findings suggest that young adults with suicidal ideation have difficulty predicting the consequences or the future value of their behavior. Individuals with suicidal ideation showed impairments in value comparison and flat affect to retrospective rewards, whereas individuals with high suicidality showed blunted affect to immediate rewards. Identifying the counterfactual decision-making characteristics of at-risk suicidal individuals may help to elucidate measurable markers of suicidal vulnerability and identify future intervention targets.

Cognitive and neural principles of a memory bias on preferential choices

Value-based decisions depend on different forms of memory. However, the respective roles of memory and valuation processes that give rise to these decisions are often vaguely described and have rarely been investigated jointly. In this review article, we address the problem of memory-based decision making from a neuroeconomic perspective. We first describe the neural and cognitive processes involved in decisions requiring memory processes, with a focus on episodic memory. Based on the results of a systematic research program, we then spotlight the phenomenon of the memory bias, a general preference for choice options that can be retrieved from episodic memory more successfully. Our findings indicate that failed memory recall biases neural valuation processes as indicated by altered effective connectivity between the hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This bias can be attributed to meta-cognitive beliefs about the relationship between subjective value and memory as well as to uncertainty aversion. After summarizing the findings, we outline potential future research endeavors to integrate the two research traditions of memory and decision making.

Neural Substrates of the Drift-Diffusion Model in Brain Disorders

Many studies on the drift-diffusion model (DDM) explain decision-making based on a unified analysis of both accuracy and response times. This review provides an in-depth account of the recent advances in DDM research which ground different DDM parameters on several brain areas, including the cortex and basal ganglia. Furthermore, we discuss the changes in DDM parameters due to structural and functional impairments in several clinical disorders, including Parkinson's disease, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and schizophrenia. This review thus uses DDM to provide a theoretical understanding of different brain disorders.

Temporal Junctures in the Mind

Humans can imagine what happened in the past and what will happen in the future, but also what did not happen and what might happen. We reflect on envisioned events from alternative timelines, while knowing that we only ever live on one timeline. Considering alternative timelines rests on representations of temporal junctures, or points in time at which possible versions of reality diverge. These representations become increasingly sophisticated over childhood, first enabling preparation for mutually exclusive future possibilities and later the experience of counterfactual emotions like regret. By contrast, it remains unclear whether non-human animals represent temporal junctures at all. The emergence of these representations may have been a prime mover in human evolution.