Synesthesia as (Multimodal) Mental Imagery

Sensory translation between audition and vision

Across the millennia, and across a range of disciplines, there has been a widespread desire to connect, or translate between, the senses in a manner that is meaningful, rather than arbitrary. Early examples were often inspired by the vivid, yet mostly idiosyncratic, crossmodal matches expressed by synaesthetes, often exploited for aesthetic purposes by writers, artists, and composers. A separate approach comes from those academic commentators who have attempted to translate between structurally similar dimensions of perceptual experience (such as pitch and colour). However, neither approach has succeeded in delivering consensually agreed crossmodal matches. As such, an alternative approach to sensory translation is needed. In this narrative historical review, focusing on the translation between audition and vision, we attempt to shed light on the topic by addressing the following three questions: (1) How is the topic of sensory translation related to synaesthesia, multisensory integration, and crossmodal associations? (2) Are there common processing mechanisms across the senses that can help to guarantee the success of sensory translation, or, rather, is mapping among the senses mediated by allegedly universal (e.g., amodal) stimulus dimensions? (3) Is the term 'translation' in the context of cross-sensory mappings used metaphorically or literally? Given the general mechanisms and concepts discussed throughout the review, the answers we come to regarding the nature of audio-visual translation are likely to apply to the translation between other perhaps less-frequently studied modality pairings as well.

A case study in phenomenology of visual experience with retinal prosthesis versus visual-to-auditory sensory substitution

The phenomenology of the blind has provided an age-old, unparalleled means of exploring the enigmatic link between the brain and mind. This paper delves into the unique phenomenological experience of a man who became blind in adulthood. He subsequently underwent both an Argus II retinal prosthesis implant and training, and extensive training on the EyeMusic visual to auditory sensory substitution device (SSD), thereby becoming the first reported case to date of dual proficiency with both devices. He offers a firsthand account into what he considers the great potential of combining sensory substitution devices with visual prostheses as part of a complete visual restoration protocol. While the Argus II retinal prosthesis alone provided him with immediate visual percepts by way of electrically stimulated phosphenes elicited by the device, the EyeMusic SSD requires extensive training from the onset. Yet following the extensive training program with the EyeMusic sensory substitution device, our subject reports that the sensory substitution device allowed him to experience a richer, more complex perceptual experience, that felt more "second nature" to him, while the Argus II prosthesis (which also requires training) did not allow him to achieve the same levels of automaticity and transparency. Following long-term use of the EyeMusic SSD, our subject reported that visual percepts representing mainly, but not limited to, colors portrayed by the EyeMusic SSD are elicited in association with auditory stimuli, indicating the acquisition of a high level of automaticity. Finally, the case study indicates an additive benefit to the combination of both devices on the user's subjective phenomenological visual experience.

Amodal completion and relationalism

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.