Time dilation effect in an active observer and virtual environment requires apparent motion: No dilation for retinal- or world-motion alone

Can cognitive neuroscience solve the lab-dilemma by going wild?

Reproducibility, measurability, and refutability are the foundation of the scientific method applied to empirical work. In the study of animal and human behavior, experimental protocols conducted in the lab are the most reliable means by which scientists can operationalize behaviors using controlled and parameterized setups. However, whether observations in the lab fully generalize in the real world remain legitimately disputed. The notion of "experimental design" was originally intended to ensure the generalizability of experimental findings to real-world situations. Experiments in the wild are more frequently explored and significant technological advances have been made allowing mobile neuroimaging. Yet some methodological limitations remain when testing scientific hypotheses in ecological conditions. Herein, we discuss the limitations of inferential processes derive from empirical observations in the wild. The multi-causal property of an ecological situation often lacks controls, and this major concern may prevent the replication and the reliability of behavioral observations. We discuss the epistemological and historical grounds of the induction process for behavioral and cognitive neurosciences and provide some possible heuristics for In situ experimental designs compatible with psychophysics in the wild.

Is Consciousness First in Virtual Reality?

The prevailing scientific paradigm is that matter is primary and everything, including consciousness can be derived from the laws governing matter. Although the scientific explanation of consciousness on these lines has not been realized, in this view it is only a matter of time before consciousness will be explained through neurobiological activity in the brain, and nothing else. There is an alternative view that holds that it is fundamentally impossible to explain how subjectivity can arise solely out of material processes-"the hard problem of consciousness"-and instead consciousness should be regarded in itself as a primary force in nature. This view attempts to derive, for example, the laws of physics from models of consciousness, instead of the other way around. While as scientists we can understand and have an intuition for the first paradigm, it is very difficult to understand what "consciousness is primary" might mean since it has no intuitive scientific grounding. Here we show that worlds experienced through virtual reality (VR) are such that consciousness is a first order phenomenon. We discuss the Interface Theory of Perception which claims that in physical reality perceptions are not veridical and that we do not see the "truth" but that perception is based on evolutionary payoffs. We show that this theory may provide an accurate description of perception and consciousness within VR, and we put forward an experimental study that could throw light on this. We conclude that VR does offer an experimental frame that provides intuition with respect to the idea that "consciousness is first" and what this might mean regarding the perceived world. However, we do not draw any conclusions about the veracity of this notion with respect to physical reality or question the emergence of consciousness from brain function.

Time to imagine moving: Simulated motor activity affects time perception

Sensing the passage of time is important for countless daily tasks, yet time perception is easily influenced by perception, cognition, and emotion. Mechanistic accounts of time perception have traditionally regarded time perception as part of central cognition. Since proprioception, action execution, and sensorimotor contingencies also affect time perception, perception-action integration theories suggest motor processes are central to the experience of the passage of time. We investigated whether sensory information and motor activity may interactively affect the perception of the passage of time. Two prospective timing tasks involved timing a visual stimulus display conveying optical flow at increasing or decreasing velocity. While doing the timing tasks, participants were instructed to imagine themselves moving at increasing or decreasing speed, independently of the optical flow. In the direct-estimation task, the duration of the visual display was explicitly judged in seconds while in the motor-timing task, participants were asked to keep a constant pace of tapping. The direct-estimation task showed imagining accelerating movement resulted in relative overestimation of time, or time dilation, while decelerating movement elicited relative underestimation, or time compression. In the motor-timing task, imagined accelerating movement also accelerated tapping speed, replicating the time-dilation effect. The experiments show imagined movement affects time perception, suggesting a causal role of simulated motor activity. We argue that imagined movements and optical flow are integrated by temporal unfolding of sensorimotor contingencies. Consequently, as physical time is relative to spatial motion, so too is perception of time relative to imaginary motion.