The insanity defense before 1800

Re-wiring Guilt: How Advancing Neuroscience Encourages Strategic Interventions Over Retributive Justice

The increasing visibility of neuroscience employed in legal contexts has rightfully prompted critical discourse regarding the boundaries of its utility. High profile debates include some extreme positions that either undermine the relevance of neuroscience or overstate its role in determining legal responsibility. Here we adopt a conciliatory attitude, reaffirming the current value of neuroscience in jurisprudence and addressing its role in shifting normative attitudes about culpability. Adopting a balanced perspective about the interaction between two dynamic fields (science and law) allows for more fruitful consideration of practical changes likely to improve the way we engage in legal decision-making. Neuroscience provides a useful platform for addressing nuanced and multifaceted deterministic factors promoting antisocial behavior. Ultimately, we suggest that shifting normative attitudes about culpability vis-à-vis advancing neuroscience are not likely to promote major changes in the way we assign legal responsibility. Rather, it helps us to shed our harshest retributivist instincts in favor of more pragmatic strategies for combating the most conspicuous patterns promoting mass incarceration and recidivism.

Medical diagnosis of legal culpability: the impact of early psychiatric testimony in the 19th century English criminal trial

Fast-paced developments in psychiatry, neuroscience and emerging neuroimaging technologies place continual pressure on the legal recognition of mental illness and disease across jurisdictional boundaries. Nevertheless, the Canadian legal definition of exculpatory mental disease in the context of criminal liability has remained largely static, sheltered from the immediate influence of medical theory and advancements. In order to effectively reflect on the intersection of mental health and criminal justice systems in this area, it is important to understand its historical development and the English common law origins of the current approach. Specifically turning to the early 19th century, documented history and accounts of early medical witness testimony on the mental state of the accused provide a unique opportunity to understand the initial collision between fundamental concepts of moral and legal culpability and new scientific understandings of mental function and disease. In this article, I suggest that early psychiatric testimony to the accused's mental state challenged the evolving criminal law of 19th century England to reconcile its restrictive definition of "insanity" with expanding scientific reasoning and accounts of mental disease. The trial of Edward Oxford, an attempted royal assassination case of 1840, is examined as a symbolic height in this conflict prior to the first common law pronouncement of the current approach in 1843. As debate continues on the role of medical advancement in the identification of exculpatory medical disorders in law, this historical perspective may serve as a touchstone in balancing the enforcement of legal culpability with our society's greater appreciation for mental illness.