German Pharmaceutical Pricing: Lessons for the United States

How Do the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review's Assessments of Comparative Effectiveness Compare With the German Federal Joint Committee's Assessments of Added Benefit? A Qualitative Study

OBJECTIVES

We compared the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review's (ICER) ratings of comparative clinical effectiveness with the German Federal Joint Committee's (G-BA) added benefit ratings, and explored what factors may explain the disagreement between the 2 organizations.

METHODS

We included drugs if they were assessed by ICER under its 2020 to 2023 Value Assessment Framework and had a corresponding assessment by G-BA as of January 2024 for the same indication, patient population, and comparator drug. To compare assessments, we modified ICER's proposed crosswalk between G-BA and ICER benefit ratings to account for G-BA's certainty ratings. We also determined whether each pair was based on similar evidence. Assessment pairs exhibiting disagreement based on the modified crosswalk despite a similar evidence base were qualitatively analyzed to identify reasons for disagreement.

RESULTS

Out of 15 drug assessment pairs matched on indication, patient subgroup, and comparator, none showed agreement in their assessments when based on similar evidence. Disagreement was attributed to differences in evidence evaluation, including evaluations of safety, generalizability, and study design, as well as G-BA's rejection of the available evidence in 4 cases as unsuitable.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings demonstrate that even under conditions where populations and comparators are identical and the evidence base is consistent, different assessors may arrive at divergent conclusions about comparative effectiveness, thus underscoring the presence of value judgments within assessments of clinical effectiveness. To support initiatives that seek to facilitate the exchange of value assessments between countries, these value judgments should always be transparently presented and justified in assessment summaries.

Drug pricing and transparency in Europe and the United States: what is it and how does it work?

INTRODUCTION

As drug prices are viewed to be opaque, there have been increasing societal demands on policy and decision makers to implement initiatives that promote drug price transparency.

AREAS COVERED

This Perspective discusses what drug price transparency is and how it works in theory and in practice.

EXPERT OPINION

Transparency on drug prices may target payers, patients and health care professionals; and may relate to prices at each stage in a drug's distribution system. Although proponents claim that drug price transparency will reduce prices and increase patient access, others expect the opposite effect. Nevertheless, a number of international organizations, countries and consumer groups have taken steps to enhance drug price transparency. This has occurred despite a lack of theoretical clarity and of evidence about its likely impact. Policy and decision makers need to consider how payers and pharmaceutical companies are likely to react to drug price transparency and need to be aware that transparency may produce different effects depending on the country to which it is applied. Even though we believe that full drug price transparency is elusive, various incremental measures can be taken to move toward it.

Assessing clinical benefit in the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program: A 2-step approach for improving transparency, consistency, and meaningful patient engagement

In early 2024, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will send initial price offers to the manufacturers of the first 10 drugs selected for the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, established under the Inflation Reduction Act. However, CMS has not specified exactly how it will adjust the starting point for an initial price offer based on assessment of a drug's clinical benefit. This article addresses unanswered questions relating to CMS' methods for assessing clinical benefit. Specifically, we address how CMS can weigh various measures of evidence, ensure transparency and consistency, meaningfully incorporate patient and other stakeholder perspectives, and support addressing evidence gaps. We propose a 2-step approach for assessing the overall clinical benefit of a selected drug compared with its therapeutic alternatives that builds on the framework outlined by CMS. In step 1, CMS would evaluate conventional clinical benefit, defined in terms of outcomes commonly used in clinical studies for the selected drug and indications. In step 2, CMS would evaluate other outcomes broadly related to patient experience that are not adequately represented in the clinical literature. Overall, our approach incorporates the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to value assessment and decision-making. We describe a set of loose decision rules to improve transparency and consistency, recommend incorporating ranks and weights to signal to researchers and manufacturers which elements of clinical benefit and sources of data are the most important, and center meaningful deliberation with clinical experts, patients, and caregivers.

Alternative approaches to measuring value: an update on innovative methods in the context of the United States Medicare drug price negotiation program

INTRODUCTION

The United States has begun assessing the value of pharmaceuticals to inform negotiated prices in the Medicare program. Given strong political objections in the United States to the use of QALYs, Medicare will need to adopt an alternative approach to measuring value.

AREAS COVERED

In this narrative review, we identified six alternative approaches to measuring value (equal value life-years, health years in total, generalized risk-adjusted cost-effectiveness, severity weighting based on absolute or proportional shortfall, comparative effectiveness based on conventional clinical endpoints, and comparative effectiveness based on both conventional endpoints and patient-centric value elements) and five criteria for assessing these approaches (responsiveness to concerns about discrimination, feasibility, transparency, flexibility, and the ability to incorporate factors beyond traditional value elements).

EXPERT OPINION

Four of the alternatives are broadly aligned with the cost-effectiveness framework, but none fully addresses all aspects of the stated concerns that QALYs may be used to unintentionally implement discrimination. We note, however, that the extent to which these concerns lead to discrimination in practice is unknown. Finally, we recommend an approach for measuring value in terms of comparative effectiveness that combines quantitative ranking and weighting of distinct criteria (including patient-centric value elements) with deliberation.

Estimated Savings From Using Added Therapeutic Benefit and Therapeutic Reference Pricing in United States Medicare Drug Price Negotiations

OBJECTIVES

US Medicare will begin negotiating prices for top-selling drugs in 2023. This study describes and estimates potential savings from a therapeutic reference pricing approach, linking comparative effectiveness with the costs of existing therapeutic alternatives, that Medicare could use to adjust the starting point for price negotiations.

METHODS

First, we identified target drugs likely to be selected for Medicare negotiation. Second, we identified comparative effectiveness ratings for target drugs based on French Haute Autorité de Santé reports. For target drugs with minor or no added benefit, we identified therapeutic alternatives based on the French reports and US clinical guidelines. For each target drug with minor or no added benefit, we computed the difference between spending based on the drug's estimated statutory ceiling price and spending based on the weighted average cost of therapeutic alternatives or the lowest cost therapeutic alternative. Finally, we calculated potential annual savings from using a starting point in negotiations based on costs of therapeutic alternatives.

RESULTS

Potential drug-level savings to Medicare from using a starting point in negotiations based on average spending across therapeutic alternatives, compared with using the statutory ceiling price alone, ranged from $186 541 340 to $2 173 441 197. Potential savings from using a starting point based on the lowest cost alternative ranged from $199 872 163 to $3 605 904 765.

CONCLUSIONS

Although we do not expect Medicare to rely on French comparative effectiveness assessments, this study demonstrates the potential for additional savings when using comparative effectiveness and costs of therapeutic alternatives to inform the starting price for negotiations.

Incorporating Added Therapeutic Benefit and Domestic Reference Pricing Into Medicare Payment for Expensive Part B Drugs

OBJECTIVES

Identify expensive Part B drugs and evidence for each drug's added benefit and model a reimbursement policy for Medicare that integrates added benefit assessment and domestic reference pricing.

METHODS

A retrospective analysis using a 20% nationally representative sample of 2015 to 2019 traditional Medicare Part B claims. Expensive drugs were defined as having average annual spending per beneficiary exceeding the average annual social security benefit ($17 532 in 2019). For expensive drugs identified in 2019, added benefit assessments conducted by the French Haute Autorité de Santé were collected. For expensive drugs with a low added benefit rating, comparator drugs were identified in French Haute Autorité de Santé reports. For each comparator, average annual spending per beneficiary in Part B was computed. Potential savings from 2 reference pricing scenarios were calculated: reimbursing expensive Part B drugs with low added benefit at the level of each drug's (1) lowest cost comparator and (2) beneficiary-weighted-average cost of all comparators.

RESULTS

The number of expensive Part B drugs grew from 56 in 2015 to 92 in 2019. Of the 92 expensive drugs in 2019, 34 offer low added benefit. Implementing reference pricing for these expensive drugs with low added benefit could have saved an estimated $2.1 billion if prices were set based on spending for their lowest cost comparator, or $1 billion if prices were set based on the weighted average of spending for comparators.

CONCLUSION

Reference pricing based on added benefit assessment could be used to address the launch prices for expensive Part B drugs with low added benefit.

Assessing US Pharmaceutical Policy and Pricing Reform Legislation in Light of European Price and Cost Control Strategies

This article compares the pharmaceutical pricing policies employed by public and private insurers in the United States with seven price and spending control strategies employed in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Differences between American and European policies explain why American pharmaceutical prices and per capita spending are higher than in European nations. The article then analyzes two recent bills as examples of significant American reform ideas-H.R. 3, the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (introduced in 2019) and the Build Back Better Act (BBBA, introduced in 2021)-and compares them with European cost control strategies. Key drug price provisions of the BBBA were incorporated into the recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). H.R. 3 would have used an international (mostly European) price index to cap U.S. prices; the BBBA would cap Medicare prices at a discount from average U.S. market prices. Neither bill would employ the key cost control strategies that European nations do. Both bills would have significantly less impact on prices than legislation that employs European-style cost controls. This article proposes steps that Congress could take in line with European strategies to lower purchase prices and costs for patients. These measures would have to overcome political obstacles that currently stymie reform.

A Proposal to Increase Value and Equity in the Development and Distribution of New Pharmaceuticals

The process of developing and marketing new pharmaceuticals in the United States is driven by a need to maximize returns to shareholders. This results all too often in the production of new medications that are expensive and of marginal value to patients and society. In line with our heightened awareness of the importance of social justice and public health-and in light of our government's alliance with private companies in bringing us COVID-19 vaccines-we need to reconsider how new pharmaceuticals are developed and distributed. Accordingly, we propose the creation of a new agency of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that would direct the whole process. This agency would fund the research and development of high-value medications, closely monitor the clinical studies of these new drugs, and manage their distribution at prices that are value-based, fair, and equitable.