The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting Deception: The Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect

Autistic Adults May Be Erroneously Perceived as Deceptive and Lacking Credibility

We hypothesized that autistic adults may be erroneously judged as deceptive or lacking credibility due to demonstrating unexpected and atypical behaviors. Thirty autistic and 29 neurotypical individuals participated in video-recorded interviews, and we measured their demonstration of gaze aversion, repetitive body movements, literal interpretation of figurative language, poor reciprocity, and flat affect. Participants (N = 1410) viewed one of these videos and rated their perception of the individual's truthfulness or credibility. The hypothesis was partially supported, with autistic individuals perceived as more deceptive and less credible than neurotypical individuals when telling the truth. However, this relationship was not influenced by the presence of any of the target behaviors, but instead, by the individual's overall presentation.

The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants’ judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Approach, Avoidance, and the Perception of Credibility

Based on a functional approach to credibility judgments, the authors hypothesize that receivers’ judgments of senders’ credibility involve an evaluative dimension (i.e., good–bad) and are associated with approach and avoidance tendencies. In three experiments (total N = 645), participants (receivers) judged the credibility of suspects (senders) denying involvement in a mock theft. While watching or reading the message, receivers performed an approach-related (arm flexion) or an avoidance-related (arm extension) motor action. Although receivers’ affective evaluations of senders (good–bad) correlated strongly with credibility judgments in all three experiments, the results of the arm position manipulation were mixed. In Experiment 1, receivers in an arm flexion (vs. arm extension) state judged the sender as more credible, but only when informed beforehand about the upcoming credibility judgment. In Experiment 2 and 3, however, there was no evidence of an arm position effect on credibility judgments. A cross-experimental meta-analysis revealed that the effect of the manipulation was statistically indistinguishable from zero, Hedges’ g = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.22], and provided strong support for the null hypothesis. Multiple interpretations of the results are discussed.

T-Pattern Analysis and Cognitive Load Manipulation to Detect Low-Stake Lies: An Exploratory Study

Deception has evolved to become a fundamental aspect of human interaction. Despite the prolonged efforts in many disciplines, there has been no definite finding of a univocally "deceptive" signal. This work proposes an approach to deception detection combining cognitive load manipulation and T-pattern methodology with the objective of: (a) testing the efficacy of dual task-procedure in enhancing differences between truth tellers and liars in a low-stakes situation; (b) exploring the efficacy of T-pattern methodology in discriminating truthful reports from deceitful ones in a low-stakes situation; (c) setting the experimental design and procedure for following research. We manipulated cognitive load to enhance differences between truth tellers and liars, because of the low-stakes lies involved in our experiment. We conducted an experimental study with a convenience sample of 40 students. We carried out a first analysis on the behaviors' frequencies coded through the observation software, using SPSS (22). The aim was to describe shape and characteristics of behavior's distributions and explore differences between groups. Datasets were then analyzed with Theme 6.0 software which detects repeated patterns (T-patterns) of coded events (non-verbal behaviors) that regularly or irregularly occur within a period of observation. A descriptive analysis on T-pattern frequencies was carried out to explore differences between groups. An in-depth analysis on more complex patterns was performed to get qualitative information on the behavior structure expressed by the participants. Results show that the dual-task procedure enhances differences observed between liars and truth tellers with T-pattern methodology; moreover, T-pattern detection reveals a higher variety and complexity of behavior in truth tellers than in liars. These findings support the combination of cognitive load manipulation and T-pattern methodology for deception detection in low-stakes situations, suggesting the testing of directional hypothesis on a larger probabilistic sample of population.

The Effect of Senders’ Perceived Ability to Control Emotion on Raters’ Deception Judgments

Abstract. The present studies aimed to examine whether the raters’ impressions of the senders’ ability to control emotion could influence the raters’ judgments of deceit and to explore the underlying mechanism. It was proposed that perceived emotional control ability would influence individuals’ deception judgments either by itself or by interacting with actual lie-related behaviors. Two experiments were conducted to examine our hypotheses. The results revealed that if participants were informed that the sender had a higher emotional control ability, they would judge the sender as less truthful in an actual deception judgment task (Study 1). It was also found that perceived emotional control ability did interact with actual lie-related behaviors: participants judged behaviors violating expectations or social norms as more deceptive (Study 2).

Accuracy of Deception Judgments

We analyze the accuracy of deception judgments, synthesizing research results from 206 documents and 24,483 judges. In relevant studies, people attempt to discriminate lies from truths in real time with no special aids or training. In these circumstances, people achieve an average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive. Relative to cross-judge differences in accuracy, mean lie-truth discrimination abilities are nontrivial, with a mean accuracy d of roughly .40. This produces an effect that is at roughly the 60th percentile in size, relative to others that have been meta-analyzed by social psychologists. Alternative indexes of lie-truth discrimination accuracy correlate highly with percentage correct, and rates of lie detection vary little from study to study. Our meta-analyses reveal that people are more accurate in judging audible than visible lies, that people appear deceptive when motivated to be believed, and that individuals regard their interaction partners as honest. We propose that people judge others' deceptions more harshly than their own and that this double standard in evaluating deceit can explain much of the accumulated literature.

Violating Equality in Social Dilemmas: Emotional and Retributive Reactions as a Function of Trust, Attribution, and Honesty

In social dilemmas, equality is an important coordination rule. When equality is violated, people seek explanations. In Experiment 1, the authors assessed dispositional trust and found that especially high trusters were affected by the given explanation. High trusters reacted less negatively to external than internal explanations. Experiment 2, using a manipulation of trust in others, revealed a similar pattern across a wider range of negative emotions. In Experiment 3, the authors only induced high trust and showed that when the external explanation turned out to be a lie, emotional and retributive reactions became more negative. Moreover, attribution information did not influence reactions when participants realized that the information was dishonest.

Are Computers Effective Lie Detectors? A Meta-Analysis of Linguistic Cues to Deception

This meta-analysis investigates linguistic cues to deception and whether these cues can be detected with computer programs. We integrated operational definitions for 79 cues from 44 studies where software had been used to identify linguistic deception cues. These cues were allocated to six research questions. As expected, the meta-analyses demonstrated that, relative to truth-tellers, liars experienced greater cognitive load, expressed more negative emotions, distanced themselves more from events, expressed fewer sensory–perceptual words, and referred less often to cognitive processes. However, liars were not more uncertain than truth-tellers. These effects were moderated by event type, involvement, emotional valence, intensity of interaction, motivation, and other moderators. Although the overall effect size was small, theory-driven predictions for certain cues received support. These findings not only further our knowledge about the usefulness of linguistic cues to detect deception with computers in applied settings but also elucidate the relationship between language and deception.

Motivational cues: the role of perceived senders' self-control ability in raters' deception judgements

Previous studies have found that senders' personal traits may be used by others to make judgements about the senders' truthfulness. Two studies were conducted to examine whether perceived self-control ability has an effect on deception judgement. Perceived self-control was hypothesized to act as a motivational cue that participants would use to assess the sender's motivation to lie, which in turn would influence their deception judgement. Results revealed that when participants assessed the sender as having higher self-control ability, they would consider the sender to be less motivated to lie in daily life (Study 1), and judge the sender more truthful in a text-based deception judgement task (Study 2). However, the effect of perceived self-control ability disappeared in a video-based task (Study 2), likely due to the multitude of various cues available in audio-visual stimuli. The theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.

Temporal view of the costs and benefits of self-deception

Researchers have documented many cases in which individuals rationalize their regrettable actions. Four experiments examine situations in which people go beyond merely explaining away their misconduct to actively deceiving themselves. We find that those who exploit opportunities to cheat on tests are likely to engage in self-deception, inferring that their elevated performance is a sign of intelligence. This short-term psychological benefit of self-deception, however, can come with longer-term costs: when predicting future performance, participants expect to perform equally well-a lack of awareness that persists even when these inflated expectations prove costly. We show that although people expect to cheat, they do not foresee self-deception, and that factors that reinforce the benefits of cheating enhance self-deception. More broadly, the findings of these experiments offer evidence that debates about the relative costs and benefits of self-deception are informed by adopting a temporal view that assesses the cumulative impact of self-deception over time.

Good Liars

A neglected area in deception research is what constitutes a good liar. On the basis of deception theory, people's views about how liars respond, impression formation theory, and persuasion theory, we describe eighteen attributes which in our view are present in a good liar. Insight into these characteristics will help law enforcement personnel in two ways: It provides insight into who would be suitable for undercover operations, and it may help lie detectors, because one reason why people make errors in lie detection is that they do not take the full complexity of deception into account and seem to have limited knowledge about what is actually going on in a liar's mind.

Content Versus Source Cue Information as a Basis for Credibility Judgments

Basic assumptions of dual-process theories are used to explain the process of credibility attribution. Three experiments test the assumption that high task involvement leads to intensive processing of content information, whereas low task involvement leads to the use of noncontent information like source cues when people make credibility judgments. In Experiment 1, as predicted, when task involvement is low, only source attractiveness influences credibility attributions; when task involvement is high, content information also influences credibility attributions. Experiments 2 and 3 replicate these results with different source cue and message content manipulations. These findings demonstrate the fruitfulness of applying basic assumptions of dual-process theories to the field of deceptive communication research. Practical implications for forensic credibility assessment are outlined.

Heuristic versus systematic processing of information in detecting deception: questioning the truth bias

Research on nonverbal detection of deception has normally been conducted by asking observers to judge the veracity of a number of videotaped communications. These video clips have typically been very short. Observers have a tendency to judge most of these statements as truthful. An experiment was conducted in which 52 participants (44 women, 8 men; M age = 22.2 yr., SD = 2.2) who were taking a psychology and law course were requested to make judgments of credibility at different points of the senders' statements. A strong truth bias was apparent when judgments were made at the beginning of the statements, suggesting that when exposed to brief communications, the observers make heuristic judgments. Over time, a decrease in the truth bias and an increase in overall accuracy were found, suggesting that later judgments were increasingly based on systematic information processing. These results suggest that the truth bias that has been found in previous deception research may be a result of having used very brief and uninformative behavioral samples as stimuli.

You want to know the truth? Then don't mimic!

Mimicry facilitates the ability to understand what other people are feeling. The present research investigated whether this is also true when the expressions that are being mimicked do not reflect the other person's true emotions. In interactions, targets either lied or told the truth, while observers mimicked or did not mimic the targets' facial and behavioral movements. Detection of deception was measured directly by observers' judgments of the extent to which they thought the targets were telling the truth and indirectly by observers' assessment of targets' emotions. The results demonstrated that nonmimickers were more accurate than mimickers in their estimations of targets' truthfulness and of targets' experienced emotions. The results contradict the view that mimicry facilitates the understanding of people's felt emotions. In the case of deceptive messages, mimicry hinders this emotional understanding.

Unicorns or Tiger Woods: are lie detection experts myths or rarities? A response to on lie detection "wizards" by Bond and Uysal

Bond and Uysal (this issue) complain that expert lie detectors identified by O'Sullivan and Ekman (2004) are statistical flukes. They ignore one class of experts we have identified and misrepresent the procedures we use to identify the others. They also question the psychometric validity of the measures and protocol used. Many of their points are addressed in the chapter they criticize. The fruitfulness of the O'Sullivan-Ekman protocol is illustrated with respect to improved identification of expert lie detectors, as well as a replicated pattern of errors made by experts from different professional groups. The statistical arguments offered confuse the theoretical use of the binomial with the empirical use of the normal distribution. Data are provided that may clarify this distinction.

On lie detection "wizards"

M. O'Sullivan and P. Ekman (2004) claim to have discovered 29 wizards of deception detection. The present commentary offers a statistical critique of the evidence for this claim. Analyses reveal that chance can explain results that the authors attribute to wizardry. Thus, by the usual statistical logic of psychological research, O'Sullivan and Ekman's claims about wizardry are gratuitous. Even so, there may be individuals whose wizardry remains to be uncovered. Thus, the commentary outlines forms of evidence that are (and are not) capable of diagnosing lie detection wizardry.