Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation

Individual differences in naturally occurring affect predict conceptual breadth: evidence for the importance of arousal by valence interactions

Several studies have investigated the effect of induced mood state on conceptual breadth (breadth and flexibility of thought). Early studies concluded that inducing a positive mood state broadened cognition, while inducing a negative mood state narrowed cognition. However, recent reports have suggested that valence and arousal can each influence conceptual breadth. Individual differences in affective dispositions may bias perceptions, thoughts, and behaviors and, in turn, may be biased by them. Here, we examine whether individual differences in valence and arousal dimensions of self-reported, naturally occurring affect relate to conceptual breadth (using the Remote Associates Test, the Object Categorization Task, and the Alternative Uses Task), with no mood manipulations or cues. The three conceptual breadth tasks loaded onto a latent conceptual breadth factor that was predicted significantly by the interaction of valence and arousal. For participants low in arousal, greater positive affect was associated with greater conceptual breadth. For participants high in arousal, greater positive affect was associated with reduced conceptual breadth. In contrast to most existing theories of conceptual breadth that highlight the importance of valence or arousal alone, the present results suggest that the interaction between arousal and valence is key to predicting individual differences in conceptual breadth. We posit that positive mood states predict greater conceptual breadth in the presence of low versus high arousal due to a relaxation of cognitive control under low arousal.

“In-emotional blindness”? Lower detection rates for unexpected stimuli in negative compared to positive emotions

Determining how emotional experience influences attention is a long standing goal of cognitive psychologists. Emotion is often broken down into two main dimensions, arousal and valence. While many theories focus more on the influence of one dimension than the other, the systematic investigation of the independent influences of the two dimensions of emotion on attention has been slow. In order to examine the relevance of both aspects of emotion, and their interplay on attention simultaneously, in the current experiment we induced low (satisfaction) and high (happiness) arousal positive emotions and low (sadness) and high (anger) arousal negative emotions in subjects before having them complete an inattentional blindness (IB) test. In line with theories that focus on the role of valence, we found that negative emotions led to more IB than positive emotions, and that arousal did not influence attention. Implications of the results for the theoretical contributions of the dimensions of emotion to visual attention are discussed.

Happy Hour? A Preliminary Study of the Effect of Induced Joviality and Sadness on Beer Perception

Our emotions influence our perception. In order to determine whether emotion influences the perception of beer, 32 participants watched either a scene from the movie Wall-E to induce joviality, or a short clip from the Shawshank Redemption to induce sadness. The participants were then required to sample up to 250 mL of Yenda Pale Ale beer and rate it on a variety of taste and flavor characteristics (e.g., bitterness), before completing the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-X (PANAS-X). The data were analyzed using Bayesian t-tests and Null Hypothesis Significance Tests (NHSTs). After applying conservative corrections for multiple comparisons, NHSTs failed to reach statistical significance. However, the effect sizes suggested that inducing joviality, relative to inducing sadness, resulted in the beer being rated as (a) tasting more pleasant, (b) tasting sweeter, and (c) being of higher quality. Following the induction of joviality, participants were also willing to pay more for the beer. The Bayesian analyses indicated that induced emotion can influence flavor perception for complex taste stimuli. The effect sizes and Bayesian analyses are interpreted in terms of Feelings-as-Information theory. These preliminary findings can tentatively be applied to real-world environments such as venues that serve and/or market alcohol.

Mood and restrained eating moderate food-associated response inhibition in obese individuals with binge eating disorder

Recent research suggests that obese individuals with binge eating disorder (BED) show deficits in response inhibition, but findings are not consistent, especially when food-associated stimuli are presented. The aim of the present study was to assess the role of moderating factors by taking into account restrained eating and mood. Seventeen obese women with BED, 20 obese women without BED and 20 normal-weight controls (NW) were recruited. A go/no-go task with food-associated and control stimuli and questionnaires were administered. Obese BED showed less impairment of response inhibition to food-associated than to control stimuli, while this pattern was reversed in NW; no differences were observed for obese participants. Interestingly, group differences were moderated by the interaction of restrained eating and mood, and obese BED made the most commission errors to food-associated stimuli when they were restrained eaters and in a very positive mood at the time of testing. Our results might explain why some studies did not observe deficits in response inhibition to food-associated cues in BED.

Internal valence modulates the speed of object recognition

Brain regions that process affect are strongly connected with visual regions, but the functional consequences of this structural organization have been relatively unexplored. How does the momentary affect of an observer influence perception? We induced either pleasant or unpleasant affect in participants and then recorded their neural activity using magnetoencephalography while they completed an object recognition task. We hypothesized, and found, that affect influenced the speed of object recognition by modulating the speed and amplitude of evoked responses in occipitotemporal cortex and regions important for representing affect. Furthermore, affect modulated functional interactions between affective and perceptual regions early during perceptual processing. These findings indicate that affect can serve as an important contextual influence on object recognition processes.

Power boosts reliance on preferred processing styles

A significant amount of research has proposed that power leads to heuristic and category based information processing, however, the evidence is often contradictory. We propose the novel idea that power magnifies chronically accessible information processing styles which can contribute to either systematic or heuristic processing. We examine heuristic (vs. systematic) processing in association with the need for closure. The results of three studies and a meta-analysis supported these claims. Power increased heuristic information processing, manifested in the recognition of schema consistent information, in the use of stereotypical information to form impressions and decreased the complexity of categorical representations, but only for those participants who, by default, processed information according to simplified heuristics, i.e., are high in need for closure. For those who prefer this processing style less, i.e., low in need for closure, power led to the opposite effects. These findings suggest that power licenses individuals to rely on their dominant information processing strategies, and that power increases interpersonal variability.

The Impact of Affect on Out-Group Judgments Depends on Dominant Information-Processing Styles: Evidence From Incidental and Integral Affect Paradigms

Two studies tested the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model, in which positive and negative affective states are not uniquely associated with particular processing styles, but rather serve as feedback about currently accessible processing styles. The studies extend existing work by investigating (a) both incidental and integral affect, (b) out-group judgments, and (c) downstream consequences. We manipulated processing styles and either incidental (Study 1) or integral (Study 2) affect and measured perceptions of out-group homogeneity. Positive (relative to negative) affect increased out-group homogeneity judgments when global processing was primed, but under local priming, the effect reversed (Studies 1 and 2). A similar interactive effect emerged on attributions, which had downstream consequences for behavioral intentions (Study 2). These results demonstrate that both incidental and integral affect do not directly produce specific processing styles, but rather influence thinking by providing feedback about currently accessible processing styles.

What is in the feedback? Effect of induced happiness vs. sadness on probabilistic learning with vs. without exploration

According to dominant neuropsychological theories of affect, emotions signal salience of events and in turn facilitate a wide spectrum of response options or action tendencies. Valence of an emotional experience is pivotal here, as it alters reward and punishment processing, as well as the balance between safety and risk taking, which can be translated into changes in the exploration-exploitation trade-off during reinforcement learning (RL). To test this idea, we compared the behavioral performance of three groups of participants that all completed a variant of a standard probabilistic learning task, but who differed regarding which mood state was actually induced and maintained (happy, sad or neutral). To foster a change from an exploration to an exploitation-based mode, we removed feedback information once learning was reliably established. Although changes in mood were successful, learning performance was balanced between the three groups. Critically, when focusing on exploitation-driven learning only, they did not differ either. Moreover, mood valence did not alter the learning rate or exploration per se, when titrated using complementing computational modeling. By comparing systematically these results to our previous study (Bakic et al., 2014), we found that arousal levels did differ between studies, which might account for limited modulatory effects of (positive) mood on RL in the present case. These results challenge the assumption that mood valence alone is enough to create strong shifts in the way exploitation or exploration is eventually carried out during (probabilistic) learning. In this context, we discuss the possibility that both valence and arousal are actually necessary components of the emotional mood state to yield changes in the use and exploration of incentives cues during RL.

The effect of observers' mood on the local processing of emotional faces: evidence from short-lived and prolonged mood States

We examined the effect of induced mood, varying in valence and longevity, on local processing of emotional faces. It was found that negative facial expression conveyed by the global level of the face interferes with efficient processing of the local features. The results also showed that the duration of involvement with a mood influenced the local processing. We observed that attending to the local level of faces is not different in short-lived happy and sad mood states. However, as the mood state is experienced for a longer period, local processing was impaired in happy mood compared to sad mood. Taken together, we concluded that both facial expressions and affective states influence processing of the local parts of faces. Moreover, we suggest that mediating factors like the duration of involvement with the mood play a role in the interrelation between mood, attention, and perception.

Recognizing the bank robber and spotting the difference: emotional state and global vs. local attentional set

In two experiments (161 participants in total), we investigated how current mood influences processing styles (global vs. local). Participants watched a video of a bank robbery before receiving a positive, negative or neutral induction, and they performed two tasks: a face-recognition task about the bank robber as global processing measure, and a spot-the-difference task using neutral pictures (Experiment-1) or emotional scenes (Experiment-2) as local processing measure. Results showed that positive mood induction favoured a global processing style, enhancing participants' ability to correctly identify a face even when they watched the video before the mood-induction. This shows that, besides influencing encoding processes, mood state can be also related to retrieval processes. On the contrary, negative mood induction enhanced a local processing style, making easier and faster the detection of differences between nearly identical pictures, independently of their valence. This dissociation supports the hypothesis that current mood modulates processing through activation of different cognitive styles.

Change and status quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of incidental emotions depends on the type of default

Affective states can change how people react to measures aimed at influencing their decisions such as providing a default option. Previous research has shown that when defaults maintain the status quo positive mood increases reliance on the default and negative mood decreases it. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that positive mood enhances the preference for inaction. We extend this research by investigating how mood states influence reliance on the default if the default leads to a change, thus pitting preference for status quo against a preference for inaction. Specifically, we tested in an online study how happiness and sadness influenced reliance on two types of default (1) a default maintaining status quo and (2) a default inducing change. Our results suggest that the effect of emotions depends on the type of default: people in a happy mood were more likely than sad people to follow a default when it maintained status quo but less likely to follow a default when it introduced change. These results are in line with mood maintenance theory.

(The Feeling of) Meaning-as-Information

The desire for meaning is recognized as a central human motive. Yet, knowing that people want meaning does not explain its function. What adaptive problem does this experience solve? Drawing on the feelings-as-information hypothesis, we propose that the feeling of meaning provides information about the presence of reliable patterns and coherence in the environment, information that is not provided by affect. We review research demonstrating that manipulations of stimulus coherence influence subjective reports of meaning in life but not affect. We demonstrate that manipulations that foster an associative mindset enhance meaning. The meaning-as-information perspective embeds meaning in a network of foundational functions including associative learning, perception, cognition, and neural processing. This approach challenges assumptions about meaning, including its motivational appeal, the roles of expectancies and novelty in this experience, and the notion that meaning is inherently constructed. Implications for constructed meaning and existential meanings are discussed.