A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.

Untested assumptions perpetuate stereotyping: Learning in the absence of evidence

In the present work, we set out to assess whether and how much people learn in response to their stereotypic assumptions being confirmed, being disconfirmed, or remaining untested. In Study 1, participants made a series of judgments that could be influenced by stereotypes and received feedback that confirmed stereotypes the majority of the time, feedback that disconfirmed stereotypes the majority of the time, or no feedback on their judgments. Replicating past work on confirmation bias, patterns in the conditions with feedback indicated that pieces of stereotype-confirming evidence exerted more influence than stereotype-disconfirming evidence. Participants in the Stereotype-Confirming condition stereotyped more over time, but rates of stereotyping for participants in the Stereotype-Disconfirming condition remained unchanged. Participants who received no feedback, and thus no evidence, stereotyped more over time, indicating that, matching our core hypothesis, they learned from their own untested assumptions. Study 2 provided a direct replication of Study 1. In Study 3, we extended our assessment to memory. Participants made judgments and received a mix of confirmatory, disconfirmatory, and no feedback and were subsequently asked to remember the feedback they received on each trial, if any. Memory tests for the no feedback trials revealed that participants often misremembered that their untested assumptions were confirmed. Supplementing null hypothesis significance testing, Bayes Factor analyses indicated the data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 provided moderate-to-extreme evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Discussion focuses on the challenges these learning patterns create for efforts to reduce stereotyping.

Attitudes as propositional representations

Attitudes are mental representations that help to explain why stimuli evoke positive or negative responses. Until recently, attitudes were often thought of as associations in memory. This idea inspired extensive research on evaluative conditioning (EC) and implicit evaluation. However, attitudes can also be seen as propositional representations, which, unlike associations, specify relational information and have a truth value. We review research on EC and implicit evaluation that tested the basic tenets of the propositional perspective on attitudes. In line with this perspective, studies show that both phenomena are moderated by relational and truth information. We discuss implications for the prediction and influencing of seemingly irrational behavior such as excessive alcohol intake and implicit racial bias.

The role of recoding in implicit social cognition: Investigating the scope and interpretation of the ReAL model for the implicit association test

The ReAL model is a multinomial processing tree model that quantifies the contribution of three qualitatively distinct processes–recoding, associations, and accuracy–to responses on the implicit association test (IAT), but has only been validated on a modified version of the IAT procedure. The initial goal of the present research was to validate an abbreviated version of the ReAL model (i.e., the Brief ReAL model) on the standard IAT procedure. Two experiments replicated previous validity evidence for the ReAL model on the modified IAT procedure, but did not produce valid parameter estimates for the Brief ReAL model on the standard IAT procedure. A third, pre-registered experiment systematically manipulated all of the task procedures that vary between the standard and modified IAT procedures–response deadline, number of trials, trial constraints–to determine the conditions under which the Brief ReAL model can be validly applied to the IAT. The Brief ReAL model estimated theoretically-interpretable parameters only under a narrow range of IAT conditions, but the ReAL model generally estimated theoretically-interpretable parameters under most IAT conditions. We discuss the application of these findings to implicit social cognition research, and their implications to social cognitive theory.