Temporal Stability of Moral Dilemma Judgments: A Longitudinal Analysis Using the CNI Model

Cross-cultural differences in prefrontal cortex activity in moral judgment: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study based on the CNI model

BACKGROUND

In the past, comparative cultural neurological studies of moral judgments have mainly focused on Eastern and Western groups. We initially examined Japanese and Chinese groups, both East Asian cultures. We utilized a recently proposed polynomial model known as the "consequences, norms, and generalized inaction" (CNI) model to investigate the variations in the overall prefrontal cortex activity between these two groups during moral judgment.

METHODS

We employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to analyze the prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity within a CNI model of moral judgment among 23 healthy Japanese and 26 healthy Chinese adults.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our study revealed significant differences in the PFC activation between Japanese and Chinese individuals in the CNI moral judgment task context. Specifically, during the CNI task, Chinese men exhibited higher right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (R-DLPFC) activity than Chinese women. In contrast, Japanese women showed greater left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (L-DLPFC) activity than Japanese men. In an international comparison, R-DLPFC activity was higher in Chinese men than in Japanese men. Conversely, the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex activity was higher in Japanese men compared to Chinese men. Additionally, among women, the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity was higher in Japanese women than in Chinese women. In conclusion, our findings support the perspective of cultural psychology and identify cultural and sex differences in PFC activity between Japanese and Chinese individuals.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Thinking About Reasons for One's Choices Increases Sensitivity to Moral Norms in Moral-Dilemma Judgments

Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.

Exploring cultural and gender differences in moral judgment: A cross-cultural study based on the CNI model

Recently, researchers have proposed a polynomial model called the "consequences, norms, generalized inaction" (CNI) model for researching moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the model can be used to explore cultural differences in moral judgment. In this study, we investigated the applicability of the CNI model of moral judgment to East Asian groups, and subsequently explored cultural and gender differences in moral judgment between East Asian (i.e., Japan, n = 211; China, n = 200) and Western (i.e., USA, n = 201) groups. The CNI model was proposed by Gawronski et al., and it can quantify individuals' sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and their general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that the CNI model fits well for Japanese and Chinese individuals. Both East Asian women and Western women were significantly more sensitive to moral norms than men in their respective countries. In the international comparison, Westerners were more sensitive to moral norms. The Japanese groups, for both men and women, were most biased towards inaction. Regarding sensitivity towards consequences, no differences were observed in the comparison between Eastern and Western male groups, whereas poor sensitivity was observed among women. By using this new model, this study provides new insights into the differences of cultural and gender in moral judgment.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6.