The Interplay of Subjective Essentialism and Entitativity in the Formation of Stereotypes

In line with our subjective essentialist view of stereotypes (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), we propose that two classes of factors that mutually reinforce each other influence the perception of groups. The perception of a strong level of similarity and organization among group members (i.e., group entitativity) suggests the existence of a deep essence that would account for the detected regularities. Conversely, the existence of naïve theories regarding the presence of an underlying core encourages the search for resemblances and connections within the group. After a short presentation of the recent literature dealing with the concepts of entitativity and essentialism, we review a series of studies from our laboratory showing the impact of entitativity on essentialism as well as the influence of essentialism on entitativity. We also provide empirical evidence for this bidirectional process from both the outsider and the insider perspective. Finally, we examine the potential role of cultural differences both in the ascription of a fundamental nature to an entitative assembly of people and in the use of a priori naïve theories to create surface similarity among group members. As a set, these efforts point to the importance of taking into account the constant dialogue between perceiver's theory-based explanations and group member's perceptual characteristics if one wishes to understand group stereotypes.

Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions

Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines.

Illusory Correlations in Patient Stereotyping

Two experiments document one basis of patient stereotyping: the relative frequency of people’s contact with medical patients. Experiment 1 demonstrated that illusory correlations formed based on the infrequency of target patients and their non-cooperative behaviors. Participants read about two groups of patients with two similar diseases (labelled A and B). One group appeared less often than the other and performed fewer non-cooperative behaviors; however, the proportion of non-cooperative and cooperative behaviors was the same for both groups. Participants overestimated the number of non-cooperative behaviors performed by the infrequently appearing group, evaluated the group negatively and believed that these patients would be unlikely to cooperate in the future. Experiment 2 attempted to address the relationship between illusory correlations and memory for the infrequent group’s non-cooperative behaviors. Implications for how people perceive medical non-adherence in patients with stigmatized medical conditions were discussed.

Effects of the Difference in the Amount of Group Preferential Information on Illusory Correlation

This article examined the effects of the difference between the amount of information preferential to Group A (A+ minus A-) and information preferential to Group B (B+ minus B-) on illusory correlation. In Experiment 1, participants rated Group A (majority) more positively and Group B (minority) more negatively in the condition in which the difference in the amount of preferential information between the groups was larger, even when the distinctiveness of the infrequent information of the minority group was the same. Furthermore, illusory correlation in the frequency estimation and cued-recall tasks was found to be more significant in the larger difference condition. In Experiment 2, greater cognitive load did not increase illusory correlation given that the difference in the amount of group preferential information was equal. In Experiment 3, even when the exact ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors of both groups was completely made known through a summary table, participants made differential group evaluations based on the difference in the amount of group preferential information. Such results imply that the difference in the amount of group preferential information serves as the minimum requirement in the formation of differential impressions of groups in an illusory correlation paradigm.

Identity motives and in-group favouritism: A new approach to individual differences in intergroup discrimination

Theories suggest that identity motives for self-esteem, meaning, distinctiveness and belonging are implicated in intergroup discrimination. Experimental studies have supported predictions, but correlational tests have been hindered by methodological problems. Using a new approach to measuring identity motives, we compared predictions of individual differences in in-group favouritism. Seventy British adults completed measures of identity motives, British identification and positive and negative trait typicality ratings of British and German nationalities. With greater identification, the strength of motives for distinctiveness and belonging increasingly predicted in-group favouritism: consistent with optimal distinctiveness theory, the belonging motive predicted positive ratings of the national in-group, whereas the distinctiveness motive predicted negative ratings of the national out-group. Results show the value of disentangling measures of motive strength from measures of motive satisfaction.

Illusory Correlations: A Simple Associative Algorithm Provides a Convergent Account of Seemingly Divergent Paradigms

Subjective correlations that exaggerate objectively presented contingencies are usually referred to as illusory correlations. An empirical review reveals 3 major paradigms of illusory correlations, drawing on 2 prominent but conflicting gestalt principles, congruency and distinctiveness. Congruency accounts for expectancy-based illusory correlations, whereas distinctiveness is relevant to illusions resulting from the asymmetry of positive and negative attributes and from infrequency. The congruency principle implies a processing advantage for expected stimuli, whereas distinctiveness assumes enhanced processing of unexpected events. This apparent conflict is resolved, and an integrative account is offered within a simple connectionist framework (BIAS) of correlation assessment. The basic algorithm is outlined, empirical findings are simulated, new theoretical distinctions are introduced, and analogies to related paradigms are explained.