Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability

Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no "unified" theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still "don't get it" in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private "feeling of being conscious", despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? "Multistability" refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain "interprets" sensorial input in a "constructive" way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the "local" states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.

Perceptual Difficulty Persistently Increases Dominance in Binocular Rivalry-Even Without a Task

A major objective of perception is the reduction of uncertainty about the outside world. Eye-movement research has demonstrated that attention and oculomotor control can subserve the function of decreasing uncertainty in vision. Here, we ask whether a similar effect exists for awareness in binocular rivalry, when two distinct stimuli presented to the two eyes compete for awareness. We tested whether this competition can be biased by uncertainty about the stimuli and their relevance for a perceptual task. Specifically, we have stimuli that are perceptually difficult (i.e., carry high perceptual uncertainty) compete with stimuli that are perceptually easy (low perceptual uncertainty). Using a no-report paradigm and reading the dominant stimulus continuously from the observers' eye movements, we find that the perceptually difficult stimulus becomes more dominant than the easy stimulus. This difference is enhanced by the stimuli's relevance for the task. In trials with task, the difference in dominance emerges quickly, peaks before the response, and then persists throughout the trial (further 10 s). However, the difference is already present in blocks before task instruction and still observable when the stimuli have ceased to be task relevant. This shows that perceptual uncertainty persistently increases perceptual dominance, and this is magnified by task relevance.