Processing biological samples from simulated radiological terrorist events using Rapid DNA instruments

Two commercially available portable Rapid DNA instruments were evaluated for their ability to process 1 µL and 10 µL saliva samples deposited on metal and plastic surfaces and contaminated with surrogates of cesium (Cs)-137, strontium (Sr)-90 and cobalt (Co)-60; radioactive materials potentially released during a nuclear weapon accident or a radiological dispersal device detonation. A comparable success rate was noted for both Rapid DNA instruments when considering the number of complete and balanced DNA profiles, the number of profiles with a minimum of 10 autosomal STR loci (out of 23 [FlexPlex™ 27] or 21 [GlobalFiler™ Express]), and the possibility to search a national DNA database in Canada and the United States. Cobalt had an adverse impact on the quality of the megaplex short tandem repeat (STR) DNA profiles derived on each instrument for two of the three contamination levels tested in this study, i.e., 0.05 M and 0.1 M as reflected by a reduced number of detected alleles and decreased profile peak heights. Strontium exhibited some adverse effect on the Rapid DNA results when used at the highest contamination level (0.1 M) whereas cesium had none. No new artifacts were observed in the Rapid DNA profiles of samples spiked with the non-radiogenic surrogates. Importantly, in the context of a radiological/nuclear (RN) event, the ANDE™ 6C offers the possibility to dispose of all radioactive materials associated with contaminated samples quickly using a chip on which all steps of the Rapid DNA process are performed whereas the RapidHIT™ ID accumulates radioactive materials for many days before disposal. An individual handling 25 samples in a week (5 per day) on the RapidHIT™ ID at a 30.5 cm distance with a 5 min exposure to the radioactive source estimated at every run would exceed the 0.042 µSv/5 min limit with gamma dose rates for Cs at 0.13 mSv and for Co at 3.8 mSv. Beta dose rates calculated for the surrogate isotopes at the three concentrations tested were also above the recommended radiation exposure limit of 1 mSv/yr (0.042 µSv/5 min). Various potential mechanisms of action behind the interference noted for Sr and Co at high concentrations are presented. These elements may play a role in the steps prior to PCR (at the DNA molecule by binding to bases or to phosphate groups), during PCR (at the DNA polymerase as cofactors for catalytic sites), or even during amplified DNA fragment detection (as fluorescence quenchers).

Radiobiological and social considerations following a radiological terrorist attack; mechanisms, detection and mitigation: review of new research developments

PURPOSE

This review focuses on recent research in understanding the different aspects of what society should expect from a radiological attack. Although some scenarios of a radiologic event can be impossible to be prepared for, the effort put toward educating and better preparing for these types of events can help minimize some of the issues. The different areas discussed in this review include radioisotopes of concern, detection of radiation dose, biological effects of ionizing radiation exposures, low dose effects, targeted and non-targeted effects (NTE), psychological effects, mitigations, with a brief mention of other considerations such as medical preparedness, communication, policy implications and ethical issues. This review also discusses solutions to rectify the issues faced at hand that may come up in the event of a radiologic terrorist attack.

CONCLUSIONS

A review of recent work in the area shows that a multi-layered and interdisciplinary approach is needed to prepare for a radiological terrorist attack. As well as medical preparedness, the approach needs to include sociological and psychological planning as well as an understanding of ethical issues. Since the likely 'dirty bomb' scenarios may involve low dose exposures to high numbers of people, a much better theoretical and practical understanding of low dose radiobiology and the development of robust low dose exposure biomarkers is needed as part of an integrated plan.

Evolving societal risks and necessary precautions in the age of nuclear power and therapeutic radiation: an American perspective

Terrorism involving nuclear or radiologic weapons can devastate populations, city infrastructures, and entire sociopolitical systems. In our age of nuclear medicine and therapeutic radiation delivery, the unauthorized and illegal acquisition of radioactive materials needed for such an attack is always a possibility and risk. Physicians handling high-energy isotopes for medical radiotherapy must be aware of the basic security requirements as outlined by the Nuclear Regulation Commission, which include background checks and authorized access, physical protection during radionuclide use, and physical protection during its transit. The Leksell Gamma Knife and its Category 1 cobalt-60 radioactive source are discussed because of their significant potential for deployment in a weaponized device. Although this article presents a perspective relating to American rules and regulations, these precautions are applicable anywhere that similar situations exist. Understanding these materials and the security they require is essential to preventing the disastrous outcomes should these isotopes fall into terrorists' hands.