Making It Harder to "See" Meaning: The More You See Something, the More Its Conceptual Representation Is Susceptible to Visual Interference

Is time an embodied property of concepts?

A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this "time-to-perceive" a part of the representation of concepts like haircut? Across three experiments testing lexical decision, word recognition, and semantic decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive a concept in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how confusable a concept is with other, similar concepts, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of a concept can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when reading words. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.

The Influence of Emotional Experience on Semantic Processing of Concrete Concepts

Introduction

Parallel distributed processing theory (PDP theory) holds that all brain regions involved in conceptual representation perform a series of activities at the same time. However, the role of emotional experience information in concrete conceptual representation is still unknown. This study further explores whether the emotional experience will also affect the semantic processing of concrete concept representations.

Methods

This study used the emotion priming paradigm and semantic judgment task to explore whether emotion priming impacts the processing of animal concepts with different emotional experiences through two experiments. In Experiments 1a and 1b, pleasant or disgusted faces were used as emotional priming stimuli to explore whether the explicit processing of emotions would affect the semantic processing of animal concepts. Experiments 2a and 2b used positive or negative scenery pictures as emotional priming stimuli to explore whether the implicit processing of emotions would affect the semantic processing of animal concepts.

Results

The Experiment 1 results showed that the perception of faces promotes the processing of animal words, showing the "word-emotion congruence effect". Experiment 2a did not show the expected results, while Experiment 2b showed that the general negative perception of scenery pictures could significantly promote the processing of disgusted animal words. The results further proved the "word-emotion congruence effect" shown in the results of Experiment 1 from the perspective of implicit emotion processing. Combining the results of two experiments, it can be proven that emotional experience affects the semantic processing process of concrete concepts.

Discussion

Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2b of this study show the "word-emotion congruence effect". PDP theory believes that conceptual representation is represented by the activity patterns of billions of neurons distributed in many areas of the brain, and related semantic processing and sensory processing will occur simultaneously. The results of this experiment well support PDP theory.

Motor features of abstract verbs determine their representations in the motor system

Embodied cognition theory posits that concept representations inherently rely on sensorimotor experiences that accompany their acquisitions. This is well established through concrete concepts. However, it is debatable whether representations of abstract concepts are based on sensorimotor representations. This study investigated the causal role of associated motor experiences that accompany concept acquisition in the involvement of the motor system in the abstract verb processing. Through two experiments, we examined the action–sentence compatibility effect, in the test phase after an increase in motor features during the learning phase for abstract verbs with low motor features (Experiment 1) or novel words with no conceptual features at all (Experiment 2). After associated motor experiences were added in the word learning phase, action–sentence compatibility effect was found in the semantic processing tasks during the test phase for abstract verbs (Experiment 1a) and novel words (Experiment 2). This was lacking in the word font color judgment task requiring no semantic processing (Experiment 1b). Coupled with our previous study, these findings suggest that motor features formed during word learning could causally affect embodiment in the motor system for abstract verbs, and reactivation of motor experiences in abstract verb processing depends on a given task’s demands. Our study supports the view that conceptual representations, even abstract concepts, can be grounded in sensorimotor experiences.

Autism-spectrum traits in neurotypicals predict the embodiment of manipulation knowledge about object concepts: Evidence from eyetracking

Sensorimotor-based theories of cognition predict that even subtle developmental motor differences, such as those characterizing autism spectrum disorder (ASD), impact how we represent the meaning of manipulable objects (e.g., faucet). Here, we test 85 neurotypical participants, who varied widely on the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure intended to capture variability in ASD characteristics in the general adult population (participant scores were all below the clinical threshold for autism). Participants completed a visual world eyetracking task designed to assess the activation of conceptual representations of manipulable objects. Participants heard words referring to manually manipulable objects (e.g., faucet) while we recorded their eye movements to arrays of four objects: the named object, a related object typically manipulated similarly (e.g., jar), and two unrelated objects. Consistent with prior work, we observed more looks to the related object than to the unrelated ones (i.e., a manipulation-relatedness effect). This effect likely reflects the overlapping conceptual representations of objects sharing manipulation characteristics (e.g., faucet and jar), due to embodied sensorimotor properties being part of their representations. Critically, we observed-among typically developed young adults-that as AQ scores increased, manipulation-relatedness effects decreased. In contrast, in a visual control condition, in which a target object was paired with related objects of a similar shape (e.g., snake and rope), relatedness effects increased with AQ scores. The results show that AQ scores can predict variation in how object-concept representations are activated for typically developed individuals. More speculatively, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in individuals with ASD, differences in object-concept representations emerge at least in part via differences in sensorimotor experience.

Simulating background settings during spoken and written sentence comprehension

Previous findings from the sentence-picture verification task demonstrated that comprehenders simulate visual information about intrinsic attributes of described objects. Of interest is whether comprehenders may also simulate the setting in which an event takes place, such as, for example, the light information. To address this question, four experiments were conducted in which participants (total N = 412) either listened to (Experiment 1) or read (Experiment 3) sentences like “The sun is shining onto a bench” followed by a picture with the matching object (bench) and either the matching lighting condition of the scene (sunlit bench against the sunlit background) or the mismatching one (moonlit bench against the moonlit background). In both experiments, response times (RTs) were shorter when the lighting condition of the pictured scene matched the one implied in the sentence. However, no difference in RTs was observed when the processing of spoken sentences was interfered with visual noise (Experiment 2). Specifically, the results showed that visual interference disrupted incongruent visual content activated by listening to the sentences, as evidenced by faster responses on mismatching trials. Similarly, no difference in RTs was observed when the lighting condition of the pictured scene matched sentence context, but the target object presented for verification mismatched sentence context (Experiment 4). Thus, the locus of simulation effect is on the lighting representation of the target object rather than the lighting representation of the background. These findings support embodied and situated accounts of cognition, suggesting that comprehenders do not simulate objects independently of background settings.

Articulatory suppression delays processing of abstract words: The role of inner speech

Compared to concrete concepts, like "book," abstract concepts expressed by words like "justice" are more detached from sensorial experiences, even though they are also grounded in sensorial modalities. Abstract concepts lack a single object as referent and are characterised by higher variability both within and across participants. According to the Word as Social Tool (WAT) proposal, owing to their complexity, abstract concepts need to be processed with the help of inner language. Inner language can namely help participants to re-explain to themselves the meaning of the word, to keep information active in working memory, and to prepare themselves to ask information from more competent people. While previous studies have demonstrated that the mouth is involved during abstract concepts' processing, both the functional role and the mechanisms underlying this involvement still need to be clarified. We report an experiment in which participants were required to evaluate whether 78 words were abstract or concrete by pressing two different pedals. During the judgement task, they were submitted, in different blocks, to a baseline, an articulatory suppression, and a manipulation condition. In the last two conditions, they had to repeat a syllable continually and to manipulate a softball with their dominant hand. Results showed that articulatory suppression slowed down the processing of abstract more than that of concrete words. Overall results confirm the WAT proposal's hypothesis that abstract concepts processing involves the mouth motor system and specifically inner speech. We discuss the implications for current theories of conceptual representation.

Visual recognition of words learned with gestures induces motor resonance in the forearm muscles

According to theories of Embodied Cognition, memory for words is related to sensorimotor experiences collected during learning. At a neural level, words encoded with self-performed gestures are represented in distributed sensorimotor networks that resonate during word recognition. Here, we ask whether muscles involved in gesture execution also resonate during word recognition. Native German speakers encoded words by reading them (baseline condition) or by reading them in tandem with picture observation, gesture observation, or gesture observation and execution. Surface electromyogram (EMG) activity from both arms was recorded during the word recognition task and responses were detected using eye-tracking. The recognition of words encoded with self-performed gestures coincided with an increase in arm muscle EMG activity compared to the recognition of words learned under other conditions. This finding suggests that sensorimotor networks resonate into the periphery and provides new evidence for a strongly embodied view of recognition memory.

Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience

Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory-perceptual and distributional-linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience-based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory-perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain.

Towards Strong Inference in Research on Embodiment - Possibilities and Limitations of Causal Paradigms

A central question in the cognitive sciences is which role embodiment plays for high-level cognitive functions, such as conceptual processing. Here, we propose that one reason why progress regarding this question has been slow is a lacking focus on what Platt (1964) called “strong inference”. Strong inference is possible when results from an experimental paradigm are not merely consistent with a hypothesis, but they provide decisive evidence for one particular hypothesis compared to competing hypotheses. We discuss how causal paradigms, which test the functional relevance of sensory-motor processes for high-level cognitive functions, can move the field forward. In particular, we explore how congenital sensory-motor disorders, acquired sensory-motor deficits, and interference paradigms with healthy participants can be utilized as an opportunity to better understand the role of sensory experience in conceptual processing. Whereas all three approaches can bring about valuable insights, we highlight that the study of congenitally and acquired sensorimotor disorders is particularly effective in the case of conceptual domains with strong unimodal basis (e.g., colors), whereas interference paradigms with healthy participants have a broader application, avoid many of the practical and interpretational limitations of patient studies, and allow a systematic and step-wise progressive inference approach to causal mechanisms.