Dissociable effects of perceived control on reward-related neural dynamics under risk and ambiguity

Perceived control plays a crucial role in risk-taking behavior, but its neural effect on reward dynamics in risky and ambiguous decision making remains unclear. Here, we addressed this issue by measuring participants' (N = 40) EEG activity while they were performing a wheel-of-fortune task. Participants either made choices themselves (a high control condition) or followed the computer's choice (a low control condition) under risky or ambiguous decision contexts. Behavioral and rating data showed a stronger control effect in the risky compared to the ambiguous decision context. In parallel, we found an effect of perceived control on choice evaluation (indexed by the cue-P3) in the risky but not ambiguous context. However, the control effect was more pronounced during feedback anticipation (indexed by the stimulus-preceding negativity) and outcome appraisal (indexed by delta oscillation) in the ambiguous context compared to the risky context. Together, our findings suggest that experiencing control alters reward dynamics in uncertain decision making, with dissociable effects between risk and ambiguity.

A neurocomputational account of multi-line electronic gambling machines

Multi-line electronic gambling machines (EGMs) are strongly associated with problem gambling. Dopamine (DA) plays a central role in substance-use disorders, which share clinical and behavioral features with disordered gambling. The structural design features of multi-line EGMs likely lead to the elicitation of various dopaminergic effects within their nested anticipation-outcome structure. The present account draws an analogy between EGM gambling and latent state inference accounts of conditioning, and links maladaptive gambling-related beliefs and expectancies to a process of erroneous latent state inference that may be exacerbated by EGM design features and associated dopaminergic processes. Over the course of repeated exposure to gambling, these processes may foster the emergence of maladaptive state priors, which clinically manifest as gambling-related cognitions, beliefs, and expectancies.

Neural dynamics underlying the illusion of control during reward processing

The illusion of control refers to a behavioral bias in which people believe they have greater control over completely stochastic events than they actually do, leading to an inflated estimate of reward probability than objective probability warrants. In this study, we examined how reward system is modulated by the illusion of control through the lens of neural dynamics. Participants in a behavioral task exhibited a classical illusion of control, assigning a higher value to the gambling wheels they picked themselves than to those given randomly. An event-related potential study of the same task revealed that this behavioral bias is associated with reduced reward anticipation, as indexed by the stimulus-preceding negativity, diminished positive prediction error signals, as reflected by the reward positivity, and enhanced motivational salience, as revealed by the P300. Our findings offer a mechanistic understanding of the illusion of control in terms of reward dynamics.

Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible

Can we feel that an unrealized outcome nearly happened if it was never possible in the first place? People often consider counterfactual events that did not happen, and some counterfactuals seem so close to reality that people say they "almost" or "easily could have" happened. Across four preregistered experiments (total N = 1,228), we investigated how judgments of counterfactual closeness depend on possibility, and whether this varies across two kinds of close counterfactuals. In judging whether outcomes almost happened, participants were more strongly impacted by possibility than by incremental manipulations of probability. In contrast, when judging whether outcomes easily could have happened, participants treated the distinction between impossible and possible like any other variation in probability. Both kinds of judgments were also impacted by propensity, though these effects were comparatively small. Together, these findings reveal novel differences between the two kinds of close counterfactuals and suggest that while possibility is privileged when judging what almost happened, probability is the focus when judging what easily could have happened.

Communication networks and team performance: selecting members to network positions

This study examines how individuals come to occupy communication network positions and the effect of selection processes on group performance. Drawing on the Carnegie perspective and research on communication networks, we compare the performance of groups whose members receive their choice of who occupies which network position to the performance of groups whose members do not receive their choice. We integrate ideas from the Carnegie perspective with the social psychological literature on the recognition of expertise to theorize that when group members choose who occupies which network positions, individuals select themselves and others into network positions that best suit their skillsets. The selection process allows groups to match individual member expertise to network position, thereby improving performance. We test this hypothesis in a laboratory study manipulating how members are assigned to positions in a centralized communication network. We find individuals who communicate more during training are more likely to be chosen as the central member, and that their communication activity explains the effect of choosing the central member on performance. Supplemental analyses suggest that groups allowed to select their central member performed as well as, and often better than, groups whose central member was randomly assigned. Our results contribute to the Carnegie perspective by demonstrating that the intra-team processes that develop a team's network help explain their performance.

Self-interest is intuitive during opportunity (in)equity: Evidence from multivariate pattern analysis of electroencephalography data

Fairness is a remarkable preference for human society, involving both outcome and opportunity equity. Most previous studies have explored whether fairness itself or self-interest is intuitive during outcome (in)equity. However, intuition during outcome (in)equity can be affected by both fairness level and actual payoff. Since opportunity (in)equity is only affected by the fairness level, we explored only intuition during fairness by measuring event-related potential responses to opportunity (in)equity. Participants played a social non-competitive two-person choice game with advantage opportunity inequity (AI), opportunity equity (OE), and disadvantage opportunity inequity (DI). The behavioral results suggested an opportunity inequity bias, with greater feelings of fairness and pleasantness during OE than during AI and DI. However, multivariate pattern analysis of the event-related potential (ERP) data suggested that AI, OE, and DI can be significantly distinguished from each other in relatively early windows overlapping with early positive negativity (EPN), and AI and DI can be significantly further distinguished during a relatively late window overlapping with late positive potential (LPP). Moreover, the conventional ERP analysis found that EPN amplitudes were more negative for AI than for OE and DI, as well as for OE than for DI, suggesting a pleasure bias for increased self-interest. LPP amplitudes were greater for DI than for AI and OE, suggesting enhanced sensitivity to DI. These results suggest that self-interest is intuitive during opportunity (in)equity.

Choosing to choose or not

To what degree do people prefer to choose for themselves and what drives this preference? Is it memory-based and results from a life-long association between choices and better outcomes, or is the process of choice itself reinforcing? In a new paradigm, across 6 experiments, participants experienced both ’Own Choice’ and ’Computer Picks’ conditions with identical outcomes before selecting which condition to re-experience in the final part of the experiment. Consistent with previous work, an overwhelming majority ( 83%) preferred own-choice. Several variations of the paradigm reveal that (1) Preference For Choice (PFC) is reduced when thinking about the task without actually choosing in it, (2) PFC is substantially reduced by choice-unrelated cognitive load, and (3) Preference For Choice is further diminished when selection is based on criteria other than one’s preferences. Across experiments, participants’ self-rated enjoyment predicted a significant portion of their PFC, while their perceived gains had little to no predictive value. If PFC stems solely from past reinforcement learning (i.e., memory) then neither performing another few scores of choices nor adding cognitive load to that sequence of choices would be expected to dramatically affect it. Hence, our findings suggest that a significant part of this preference stems from the process of choice itself, and that the experience it confers can itself be reinforcing. We discuss the implications of the proposed mechanism for PFC, which leads us to the prediction that PFC may be muted or even reversed under specific conditions and what this means for when the ‘opposite’ effect – sticking with the default – will occur.

The choice levels modulate outcome processing during outcome independent of behavior selection: Evidence from event-related potentials

Having a choice is a basic demand to influence human behavior. However, how various choice levels modulate outcome processing when the outcome is independent of the choices remains unclear. In this event-related potential (ERP) study, thirty-seven participants were instructed to perform a one-person choice task in which they were required to choose one card from 1 (no-choice level), 2 (medium-choice level), and 8 cards (high-choice level) to win a reward, with a 50% chance. Behavioral results indicated that pleasure and perceived control rating scores were linearly promoted with increased choice levels. ERP results revealed that having choices (medium- and high-choice level) elicited greater original-RewP and PCA-RewP amplitudes than having no choice (no-choice level), suggesting the amplification of the reward prediction error by quickly detecting whether there is a choice or not. Moreover, ERP results revealed that the original-P300 amplitudes were linearly enhanced with increased choice levels, suggesting the increased attentional allocation based on the motivational and emotional significance, due to advanced processing of the value of choice levels. Therefore, these results suggest that choice levels can modulate outcome processing, even when the outcome is independent of the choices, and provide further evidence to support the intrinsic value of having choices.