Belief revision and delusions: how do patients with schizophrenia take advice?

The dominant cognitive model that accounts for the persistence of delusional beliefs in schizophrenia postulates that patients suffer from a general deficit in belief revision. It is generally assumed that this deficit is a consequence of impaired reasoning skills. However, the possibility that such inflexibility affects the entire system of a patient's beliefs has rarely been empirically tested. Using delusion-neutral material in a well-documented advice-taking task, the present study reports that patients with schizophrenia: 1) revise their beliefs, 2) take into account socially provided information to do so, 3) are not overconfident about their judgments, and 4) show less egocentric advice-discounting than controls. This study thus shows that delusional patients' difficulty in revising beliefs is more selective than had been previously assumed. The specificities of the task and the implications for a theory of delusion formation are discussed.

Mentalizing under influence: abnormal dependence on prior expectations in patients with schizophrenia

An impaired ability to appreciate other people's mental states is a well-established and stable cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, which might explain some aspects of patients' social dysfunction. Yet, despite a wealth of literature on this topic, the basic mechanisms underlying these impairments are still poorly understood, and their links with the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia remain unclear. The present study aimed to investigate the extent to which patients' impaired ability to appreciate other people's intentions (known as mentalizing) may be accounted for by abnormal interaction between the two types of information that contribute to this ability: (i) the sensory evidence conveyed by movement kinematics; and (ii) the observer's prior expectations. We hypothesized that this is not a generalized impairment, but one confined to certain types of intentions. To test this assumption, we designed four tasks in which participants were required to infer either: (i) basic intentions (i.e. the simple goal of a motor act); (ii) superordinate intentions (i.e. the general goal of a sequence of motor acts); (iii) social basic; or (iv) social superordinate intentions (i.e. simple or general goals achieved within the context of a reciprocal interaction). In each of these tasks, both prior expectations and sensory information were manipulated. We found that patients correctly inferred non-social, basic intentions, but experienced difficulties when inferring non-social superordinate intentions and both basic and superordinate social intentions. These poor performances were associated with two abnormal patterns of interaction between prior expectations and sensory evidence. In the non-social superordinate condition, patients relied heavily on their prior expectations, while disregarding sensory evidence. This pattern of interaction predicted the severity of 'positive' symptoms. Social conditions prompted exactly the opposite pattern of interaction: patients exhibited weaker dependence on prior expectations while relying strongly on sensory evidence, and this predicted the severity of 'negative' symptoms. We suggest both these patterns can be accounted for by a disturbance in the Bayesian inferential mechanism that integrates sensory evidence (conveyed by movement kinematics) into prior beliefs (about others' mental states and attitudes) to produce accurate inferences about other people's intentions.

Self-face recognition and theory of mind in patients with schizophrenia and first-degree relatives

OBJECTIVE

The hypothesized relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and self-face recognition as well as its potential genetic associations has not been previously explored in patients with schizophrenia and in first-degree relatives with schizotypal personality traits.

METHOD

Ten patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, 10 of their first-degree relatives and 10 healthy controls were included. To assess self-face recognition (SFR), participants were presented images of faces of themselves and others and asked to make rapid 'unfamiliar', 'familiar' and 'self' judgments. As a measure of ToM, subjects were administered the Revised Mind in the Eyes Test (MET [Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I., 2001. The "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Test revised version: a study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J Child Psychol Psychiatry 42(2), 241-251.]). Schizotypal characteristics in relatives and controls were assessed using a modified version of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ [Raine, A., 1991. The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality based on DSM-III-R criteria. Schizophrenia Bulletin 17(4), 555-564.]).

RESULTS

Patients took longer and were less accurate on the SFR task than their relatives who in turn performed worse than healthy controls. Specific ToM deficits in schizophrenia were replicated. There was a relationship between accuracy rates on the MET and SFR tasks. High levels of schizotypal traits such as social anxiety, constricted affect and no close friends were important for both tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

Face recognition deficits and ToM deficits in schizophrenia are apparent. The critical influence of high levels of select schizotypal traits is also highlighted. A deficit in relatives of schizophrenia patients raises the possibility that ToM and face recognition deficits may be candidate endophenotypes for schizophrenia. Support for the hypothesized link between ToM and face recognition is provided.