Action-selection perseveration in young children: Advances of a dynamic model

This study presents an empirical test and dynamic model of perseverative limb selection in children of 14-, 24-, and 36-months old (N = 66 in total). In the experiment, children repeatedly grasped a spoon with a single hand. In two separate conditions, the spoon was presented either four times on their right side or four times on their left side. In both conditions, following this training, the spoon was presented on midline for two more trials. This setup enabled us to determine whether children's limb selection was influenced by their prior choices in the task (i.e., perseveration). Individual children's handedness was determined in a third condition consisting of nine object presentations (laterally or on midline). A dynamic model for limb selection is presented combining external input, motor memory, and preferences. The model was used to simulate the experiment and reproduced the results, including the age-related changes.

Low vision aids for visually impaired children: a perception-action perspective

It is a widely accepted belief in clinical practice that children with a visual impairment can profit from the use of a low vision aid (LVA). However, we found a considerable gap in our scientific understanding of LVA use, particularly in young children. This is the reason for the analysis presented in this paper. A selected overview of LVA use in adults is given, from which valuable insights are taken. Additionally, an action perspective for analysing LVA use is discussed as well as the results of tool-use studies in children. Mainly based on these three ingredients, we developed a conceptual framework for LVA use. The framework consists of three interacting relations between LVA, child and task. Performance of a particular child on a specific task with a certain LVA is constrained by the following three reciprocal and dynamic relations: the Child-to-Task relation (related to goal-information), the Child-to-LVA relation (related to control-information), and the LVA-to-Task relation (related to topology information).

Special Section: Can There Be Such a Thing as Embodied Embedded Cognitive Neuroscience?

Contemporary cognitive neuroscience, for the most part, aims to figure out how cognitive processes are realized in the brain. This research goal betrays the field's commitment to the philosophical position that cognizing is something that the brain does. Since the 1990s, philosophers and cognitive scientists have started to question this position, arguing that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This latter position we refer to as embodied embedded cognition (EEC). Although cognitive neuroscience's research practice and EEC do not seem to fit well together at present, it is pertinent to ask if a variant of cognitive neuroscience can be developed that sets itself research goals that are more congenial to the EEC view. In this paper we investigate this possibility. We put forth a new guiding metaphor of the role of the brain in cognitive behavior to replace the current cognitivist metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device. We also identify a research agenda that naturally arises from our metaphor. In this way we hope to provide an impetus for cognitive neuroscientists to pursue an EEC-inspired research program.

Special Section: Is Cognitive Science Changing its Mind?

Embodied embedded cognition (EEC) and neurophenomenology (NP) are slowly invading cognitive (neuro)science. We provide a short introduction of what EEC and NP are about and an overview of the papers in this special section on EEC and NP.