Towards a Framework for Unifying Research in Theoretical Psychology

Current criticism of theoretical psychology concerns, in particular, the state of its foundations and the construction of theories, while the evolution of the discipline leads to its disunity. According to one of the points of view discussed, psychological knowledge must be unified in order to overcome theoretical fragmentation. Those who are concerned about the lack of a unified theory in psychology explore various aspects of disunity and the possibility of unifying theoretical psychology. In recent decades, a number of approaches to unification have been developed, and now theoretical studies of unification need to be harmonized. I believe that in order to develop a solid framework, it makes sense to reach a consensus on the general, conceptual and methodological ideas of unification. On this basis, it would be possible to develop a program for creating an approach to unification in theoretical psychology, and I propose an outline of three possible ones.

Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology: Why the Evolutionary Approach does not Imply Reductionism or Determinism

Does evolutionary psychology (EP) properly account for the sociocultural context? Does it underestimate both the developmental and the relational aspects of the human psyche? Is it instantiated in a mechanistic epistemology? Does it imply determinism or reductionism? The commentaries on our previous target article raised similar questions and we try to tackle them in the current response. Our "epistemological assessment" of Psychology and our consequent unification claim under the banner of the evolutionary approach (Zagaria et al., Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 54(3), 521-562, 2020 ) was deeply examined and discussed. The objections to our target article can be grouped into four main categories. We sum them up and argue why: 1) the pre-paradigmatic status of psychology is a problem rather than a richness of perspectives; 2) EP's criticisms stem from common misconceptions-furthermore, developmental and relational aspects of human psyche might find their natural explanation in EP; 3) EP does not wipe out the emergence of the sociocultural context as something qualitatively different; 4) evolutionary meta-theory is not incompatible with subjectivity. Evolutionary psychology might be approached with caution and curiosity, rather than with prejudicial concepts. Incorporating some legitimate cultural criticisms, it may aspire to become a "cultural evolutionary psychology", hence an integrative psychological meta-theory that tries to connect the biological "plane of existence" (Henriques, Review of General Psychology, 7(2), 150-182, 2003) to the cultural "plane of existence". However, a basic philosophical concern has yet to be answered, i.e. what ultimately constitutes mind and thus the "psycho-logical" science. We argue that when trying to find the answer we know where to look at.

Building an integrative science for psychotherapy for the 21st century: Preface and introduction

Psychotherapy is plagued with fragmentation of models, theories, and interventions. The future of psychotherapy requires an integrative framework rooted in the expanding science of psychology, neuroscience, and social contextualism. The papers in this special issue address these challenges for psychotherapy, ranging from explorations of the implications of epigenetics, evolutionary functional analysis, interpersonal neurobiology, the importance of social relationships as physiological regulators, through to the challenges of ethnic diversities and the growing digital technologies. PRACTITIONER POINTS: As therapists, we should be aware of the challenges posed by the proliferating 'schools of therapy' and consider commonalities rooted in a scientific understanding of the mind. The science of understanding the causes, alleviation, and prevention of mental health problems is increasingly multidimensional taking into consideration the interactions between biological, psychological and social processes and in the process dissolving the boundaries between different schools of psychotherapy.

Character Adaptation Systems Theory: A New Big Five for Personality and Psychotherapy

Although personality theory and psychotherapy were originally closely linked, the past several decades have witnessed surprising gaps between these domains. This article seeks to close that gap via character adaptation systems theory (CAST), which is a formulation derived from Henriques's (2011) unified approach to psychology that links recent developments in personality theory with integrative visions of psychotherapy via the explication of 5 systems of character adaptation: (a) the habit system, (b) the experiential system, (c) the relationship system, (d) the defensive system, and (e) the justification system. This article delineates the nature of these systems of adaptation and how they connect to modern personality theory and the major systems of individual psychotherapy, as well as how they relate to important domains in human psychology and can be applied in the context of psychotherapy.

The neurosciences and the search for a unified psychology: the science and esthetics of a single framework

The search for a so-called unified or integrated theory has long served as a goal for some psychologists, even if the search is often implicit. But if the established sciences do not have an explicitly unified set of theories, then why should psychology? After examining this question again I argue that psychology is in fact reasonably unified around its methods and its commitment to functional explanations, an indeterminate functionalism. The question of the place of the neurosciences in this framework is complex. On the one hand, the neuroscientific project will not likely renew and synthesize the disparate arms of psychology. On the other hand, their reformulation of what it means to be human will exert an influence in multiple ways. One way to capture that influence is to conceptualize the brain in terms of a technology that we interact with in a manner that we do not yet fully understand. In this way we maintain both a distance from neuro-reductionism and refrain from committing to an unfettered subjectivity.

Psychology as a Science within Comte's Hypothesized Hierarchy: Empirical Investigations and Conceptual Implications

Auguste Comte suggested that the main sciences could be grouped into a hierarchical ordering that reflected their objective characteristics (viz., generality, dependence, and complexity). In particular, the empirical sciences could be placed in the following order: astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. Although his idea was initially discredited in the sociology of science, subsequent research indicates that the conjecture has considerable empirical merit. Significantly, that research inserts psychology between biology and sociology, with significantly more proximity with biology. After replicating the earlier findings using new measures, the metatheoretical basis for the hierarchical arrangement is then examined. The article closes with suggestions for further empirical and theoretical research on psychology's placement in the hierarchical arrangement.

Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

Critics have described psychology as a science impaired by disunity. The most recent special issue of Review of General Psychology sought to specifically address this concern, seeking perspectives from a wide range of theorists, each of whom offered their tradition's approach to how psychology as a whole may be integrated into a more unified whole. To continue this discussion, this article draws upon examples from the special issue, the disunity crisis literature, and wider writings in the philosophy of science, to explore the theoretical and conceptual divisions that foster ambiguity, confusion, and apparent irreconcilable differences between the disparate fields of psychology. The authors conclude that the majority of contemporary, scientific psychology is oriented toward a shared physical ontology, which can serve as a common grounding point from which the conceptual and theoretical differences of disparate fields may be meaningfully framed and evaluated. To this end, this article proposes that the various research traditions of psychology can be understood through their positions along a continuum of practical assumptions, which embodies the inherent conflict between two scientific priorities: metaphysical certainty (the safe end of the continuum) and practical experimental predictions (the risky end of the continuum). Three theoretical perspectives offered in the unification special issue are examined under this framework: situational realism (a distinctly safe approach), developmental evolutionary psychology (an intermediate approach), and the Tree of Knowledge unified theory (a relatively risky approach). The authors explore how the recommendations of each approach can be seen as a function of its position on the continuum of practical assumptions, and the implications of this understanding for future integrative efforts is discussed.

Evolving from Methodological to Conceptual Unification

The absence of a philosophical system that can effectively address the profound problems that exist at the heart of psychology has resulted in the discipline becoming increasingly defined and unified simply by its commitment to the scientific method. This article articulates why unification via method is a weak intellectual solution and explains how the Unified Theory ( Henriques, 2011 ) provides the needed framework so that the field can evolve from its current unity via method to a more mature conceptual unity that clearly defines psychology, grounds it in a scientific worldview, and assimilates and integrates its key insights into a coherent whole.

The role of mechanisms, integration, and unification in science and psychology

I assume the importance of unifying theories in science but suggest that psychologists do not understand the concept. To clarify, I distinguish unification from both mechanisms and from integration. The psychology literature is replete with mechanisms and also integration, but there is insufficient unification. Finally, I use potential performance theory as an example of unification in a small way in psychology. Given that this theory provides small-scale unification, there is reason to hope for large-scale unification in the future—a goal to which psychologists can and should aspire.

Examining the Acceptance of and Resistance to Evolutionary Psychology

The field of psychology remains a divided one. Several different sub-disciplines (e.g., developmental, cognitive, behaviorism, social, etc.) form what could be a unified scientific area. However, there is no widely accepted theory of unification. Charles Darwin once theorized that evolutionary theory would change the foundation of psychology; but over the years, evolutionary psychology has been met with hostile resistance from some of the prominent psychologists within the other sub-disciplines. Yet in recent years, all of the divided sub-disciplines of psychology have been slowly implementing evolutionary principles into their literature and research. This slow integration of evolutionary psychology into the other sub-disciplines indicates the possibility of a unified psychology with evolution as its foundation. This paper briefly reviews the literature within each major sub-discipline of psychology to show their implementation of evolutionary psychological theories, indicating the possibility of evolutionary psychology becoming the unifying paradigm upon which the entire field of psychology can be based. A call for action to continue this process is also discussed.

On the Possibility of Unification

In this article it is argued that—in spite of contrary semantic and substantive criticisms that have been put forward—the crisis in psychology is a real problem facing the discipline. The crisis is discussed as a nexus of philosophical tensions, which divide individuals, departments, and psychological organizations, and which are therefore primarily responsible for the fragmentation of psychology. Some of the major existing analyses of the crisis are critiqued, and it is subsequently concluded that even the major analyses themselves perpetuate the crisis since they fail to direct unification efforts to the underlying philosophical tensions without at least approaching them with unbracketed a priori theoretical commitments and assumptions. The article concludes with a discussion of the difficulties facing those psychologists who take on the program of research necessary for resolving the crisis in psychology.

Special Section: Theoretical Unification as a Practical Project

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1787/1998) suggested that scientific and humanistic interpretations of human existence can and should be woven into `a single philosophical system' (p. 695). Yet, Kant was well aware of the profound tension between theoretical analyses of the natural order and practical accounts of our experience as moral agents. In this essay, I argue that the Tree of Knowledge System proposed by Henriques (2003, 2004, 2008) has the scope and conceptual power necessary to account for the emergence of the Kantian tension between theoretical and practical reason. Following Kant, however, I maintain that this tension cannot be adequately resolved on a theoretical plane. Rather, a holistic account of the cultural-person-as-a-whole requires the subordination of theoretical to practical reason. Concretely, this implies that the quest for theoretical unification cannot proceed without concomitant evaluations of the various justification systems that guide the work of scholars in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

Special Section: The Critical Role of the Dialectic in Viable Metatheory

Henriques (2008) persuasively argues that his Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System provides a more viable alternative to Wilson's (1998) consilience model as a framework for integrating knowledge generated by the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. I selectively deconstruct the ToK System to demonstrate that its capacity to solve problems through integrative solutions and to advance interdisciplinary conjunctions derives from its pervasive dialectical ontology and epistemology. Emphasis is on analyzing Behavioral Investment Theory, the Justification Hypothesis (the JH), and Henriques' solution to the problem of psychology—all essential to unifying the three great branches of learning. I also suggest directions for further development of the JH, rooted in the psychoanalytic classical—relational dialectic. Potent implications of Henriques' formulations for epistemological bridging within psychology and for multidisciplinary integration are discussed.

Special Section: Pruning the Tree of Knowledge

There are several intellectual projects embedded within the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System and they tend to blur together at critical junctions. The aim of this commentary is to identify some of these strands of analysis and their implicit metaphysical presuppositions. It is argued that the presuppositions are not consistent across the different strands. The strands can continue to be pursued independently, insofar as they have distinct purposes. However, the incompatible presuppositions are surfacing in the effort to combine the strands into a single system of analysis.