Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity

A debate surrounding modularity-the notion that the mind may be exclusively composed of distinct systems or modules-has held philosophers and psychologists captive for nearly 40 years. Concern about this thesis-which has come to be known as the massive modularity debate-serves as the primary grounds for skepticism of evolutionary psychology's claims about the mind. In this article we argue that the entirety of this debate, and the very notion of massive modularity itself, is ill-posed and confused. In particular, it is based on a confusion about the level of analysis (or reduction) at which one is approaching the mind. Here we provide a framework for clarifying at what level of analysis one is approaching the mind and explain how a systemic failure to distinguish between different levels of analysis has led to profound misunderstandings of not only evolutionary psychology but also of the entire cognitivist enterprise of approaching the mind at the level of the mechanism. We furthermore suggest that confusions between different levels of analysis are endemic throughout the psychological sciences-extending well beyond issues of modularity and evolutionary psychology. Therefore, researchers in all areas should take preventive measures to avoid this confusion in the future.

A predictive processing framework of tool use

In this paper I introduce the theory of predictive processing as a unifying conceptual framework to account for the human ability to use and innovate tools. I explain the basic concepts of predictive processing and illustrate how this framework accounts for the development of tool use in young infants and for findings in the neuropsychological and neuroscientific literature. Then, I argue that the predictive processing model needs to be complemented with a functional-evolutionary perspective, according to which the developmental and neurocognitive mechanisms should be understood in relation to the adaptive function that tools subserve. I discuss cross-cultural and comparative studies on tool use to illustrate how tools could facilitate a process of cumulative cultural and technological evolution. Furthermore, I illustrate how central premises of the predictive processing framework, such as the notion of Bayesian inference as a general principle and the role of prediction-error-updating, speak to central debates in evolutionary psychology, such as the massive modularity hypothesis and the trade-off between exploitation and innovation. Throughout the paper I make several concrete suggestions for future studies that could be used to put the predictive processing model of tool use to the test.

Penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana: Evidencia empírica en humanos

Con base en un trasfondo teórico sobre las concepciones modulares de la mente de Fodor (2001) y Pinker (2005), el objetivo del presente texto es analizar cualitativemente la solidez de la evidencia experimental de una muestra de artículos publicados entre 2002 y 2017 que apoyan la tesis de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana. El estudio se justifica por las implicaciones que pueden tener los resultados de estas investigaciones para las diferentes concepciones sobre arquitectura mental en funciones perceptuales, procesamiento de la información intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitectura mental y cerebral. La metodología que se utilizó para realizar este estudio implicó establecimiento de la tesis y de los criterios de inclusión de los artículos a revisar, selección final de los artículos más representativos sobre las subáreas seleccionadas, análisis de la calidad metodológica y de los resultados de éstos, identificación de aportes específicos de cada estudio a la tesis planteada e interpretación y síntesis de los hallazgos. De 26 artículos revisados sobre el tema, se reportan y analizan 7, que se consideran representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidad de expectativas, de percepción del color, de rasgos faciales y de reconocimiento de objetos. Se concluye que hay amplia y sólida evidencia convergente (perceptual y neurofisiológica) a favor de los fenómenos penetrativos en la visión temprana, lo cual apoyaría indirectamente la hipótesis de permeabilidad de los módulos mentales de Pinker. Se formulan recomendaciones sobre aspectos por investigar y variables a controlar en experimentos sobre este tema.

The hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche

This article presents a unifying theory of the embodied, situated human brain called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that actively minimises the decay of our sensory and physical states by producing self-fulfilling action-perception cycles via dynamical interactions between hierarchically organised neurocognitive mechanisms. This theory synthesises the free-energy principle (FEP) in neuroscience with an evolutionary systems theory of psychology that explains our brains, minds, and behaviour by appealing to Tinbergen's four questions: adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. After leveraging the FEP to formally define the HMM across different spatiotemporal scales, we conclude by exploring its implications for theorising and research in the sciences of the mind and behaviour.

The life-history basis of behavioural innovations

The evolutionary origin of innovativeness remains puzzling because innovating means responding to novel or unusual problems and hence is unlikely to be selected by itself. A plausible alternative is considering innovativeness as a co-opted product of traits that have evolved for other functions yet together predispose individuals to solve problems by adopting novel behaviours. However, this raises the question of why these adaptations should evolve together in an animal. Here, we develop the argument that the adaptations enabling animals to innovate evolve together because they are jointly part of a life-history strategy for coping with environmental changes. In support of this claim, we present comparative evidence showing that in birds, (i) innovative propensity is linked to life histories that prioritize future over current reproduction, (ii) the link is in part explained by differences in brain size, and (iii) innovative propensity and life-history traits may evolve together in generalist species that frequently expose themselves to novel or unusual conditions. Combined with previous evidence, these findings suggest that innovativeness is not a specialized adaptation but more likely part of a broader general adaptive system to cope with changes in the environment.

The evolution of general intelligence

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

Social construction, evolution and cultural universals

This paper discusses the connection between social constructionism and universals in the generation of mind. It proposes a new concept of Cultural Construction, distinct from social construction, and suggests that the latter succumbs to a Paradox of Sociality in which a socially constructed mind is non-social. Cultural construction avoids this paradox, and is best explained by an approach that roots learning in flexible evolutionary dispositions to possess culture. It also offers a novel perspective on traditional and more recent social constructionist accounts of psychological universals (e.g. omniculture) and has different implications for the prospects of reducing conflict in inter-cultural encounters.

From computers to cultivation: reconceptualizing evolutionary psychology

Does evolutionary theorizing have a role in psychology? This is a more contentious issue than one might imagine, given that, as evolved creatures, the answer must surely be yes. The contested nature of evolutionary psychology lies not in our status as evolved beings, but in the extent to which evolutionary ideas add value to studies of human behavior, and the rigor with which these ideas are tested. This, in turn, is linked to the framework in which particular evolutionary ideas are situated. While the framing of the current research topic places the brain-as-computer metaphor in opposition to evolutionary psychology, the most prominent school of thought in this field (born out of cognitive psychology, and often known as the Santa Barbara school) is entirely wedded to the computational theory of mind as an explanatory framework. Its unique aspect is to argue that the mind consists of a large number of functionally specialized (i.e., domain-specific) computational mechanisms, or modules (the massive modularity hypothesis). Far from offering an alternative to, or an improvement on, the current perspective, we argue that evolutionary psychology is a mainstream computational theory, and that its arguments for domain-specificity often rest on shaky premises. We then go on to suggest that the various forms of e-cognition (i.e., embodied, embedded, enactive) represent a true alternative to standard computational approaches, with an emphasis on “cognitive integration” or the “extended mind hypothesis” in particular. We feel this offers the most promise for human psychology because it incorporates the social and historical processes that are crucial to human “mind-making” within an evolutionarily informed framework. In addition to linking to other research areas in psychology, this approach is more likely to form productive links to other disciplines within the social sciences, not least by encouraging a healthy pluralism in approach.

Evolutionary psychology, design reification, and the denial of personhood: A reply to Klasios

Klasios, who asserts that my recent critique of evolutionary psychology contains egregious misunderstandings and a straw-man presentation of its theoretical assumptions, claims to outline the real position of evolutionary psychology while proffering a more accurate treatment of the neurobiological issues involved. On the contrary, I attempt to show that Klasios frequently misstates my position and that his arguments repeatedly prove my own. His evidentiary neurobiological examples meant to criticize my position are nearly identical to those provided by myself in pointing toward an alternative to evolutionary psychology—which suggests an unwillingness to seriously conceptualize a non-“blank-slate” null hypothesis. Klasios’ call to avoid the term “innate” and accept a revised terminology of modularity is also criticized, while his reductionist appeal to thermodynamics is argued to reveal what is most at stake in the debate between evolutionary psychologists and its critics: whether the future of psychology will leave adequate room for personhood in its conceptualization of the human mind.

What are the functions of System 2 modules? A reply to Chiappe and Gardner

Chiappe and Gardner (2012) argue that the concept of modularity proposed by us (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006) is different from the way modularity has been conventionally viewed in evolutionary psychology and that it cannot explain the existence of mechanisms designed to deal with novelty. We reiterate our view that there is no reason natural selection is limited to creating mechanisms that are innate, automatic, encapsulated, and domain-narrow. Indeed, all functionally designed mechanisms in the mind, including those that do not have these properties, are the products of natural selection, including “System 2” mechanisms. Further, if mechanisms designed to deal with “novelty” exist, then they must exploit some recurrent features of problems in order to work. Therefore, the problems System 2 mechanisms solve cannot be novel along every possible dimension, and System 2 mechanisms must have design features that allow them to find solutions.