Understanding mental health through computers: An introduction to computational psychiatry

Computational psychiatry recently established itself as a new tool in the study of mental disorders and problems. Integration of different levels of analysis is creating computational phenotypes with clinical and research values, and constructing a way to arrive at precision psychiatry are part of this new branch. It conceptualizes the brain as a computational organ that receives from the environment parameters to respond to challenges through calculations and algorithms in continuous feedback and feedforward loops with a permanent degree of uncertainty. Through this conception, one can seize an understanding of the cerebral and mental processes in the form of theories or hypotheses based on data. Using these approximations, a better understanding of the disorder and its different determinant factors facilitates the diagnostics and treatment by having an individual, ecologic, and holistic approach. It is a tool that can be used to homologate and integrate multiple sources of information given by several theoretical models. In conclusion, it helps psychiatry achieve precision and reproducibility, which can help the mental health field achieve significant advancement. This article is a narrative review of the basis of the functioning of computational psychiatry with a critical analysis of its concepts.

Mechanisms in psychology: The road towards unity?

The focus of this special issue of Theory & Psychology is on explanatory mechanisms in psychology, especially on problems of particular prominence for psychological science such as theoretical integration and unification. Proponents of the framework of mechanistic explanation claim, in short, that satisfactory explanations in psychology and related fields are causal. They stress the importance of explaining phenomena by describing mechanisms that are responsible for them, in particular by elucidating how the organization of component parts and operations in mechanisms gives rise to phenomena in certain conditions. We hope for cross-pollination between philosophical approaches to explanation and experimental psychology, which could offer methodological guidance, in particular where mechanism discovery and theoretical integration are at issue. Contributions in this issue pertain to theoretical integration and unification of psychology as well as the growing importance of causal mechanistic explanations in psychological science.