Perceptual influence of auditory pitch on motion speed

There is a cross-modal mapping between auditory pitch and many visual properties, but the relationship between auditory pitch and motion speed is unexplored. In this article, the ball and baffle are used as the research objects, and an object collision experiment is used to explore the perceptual influence of auditory pitch on motion speed. Since cross-modal mapping can influence perceptual experience, this article also explores the influence of auditory pitch on action measures. In Experiment 1, 12 participants attempted to release a baffle to block a falling ball on the basis of speed judgment, and after each trial, they were asked to rate the speed of the ball. The speed score and baffle release time were recorded and used for analysis of variance. Since making explicit judgments about speed can alter the processing of visual paths, another group of participants in Experiment 2 completed the experiment without making explicit judgments about speed. Our results show that there is a cross-modal mapping between auditory pitch and motion speed, and high or low tones cause perception shift to faster or slower speeds.

Are Rank Orders Mentally Represented by Spatial Arrays?

The present contribution argues that transitive reasoning, as exemplified in paradigms of linear order construction in mental space, is associated with spatial effects. Starting from robust findings from the early 70s, research so far has widely discussed the symbolic distance effect (SDE). This effect shows that after studying pairs of relations, e.g., "A > B," "B > C," and "D > E," participants are more correct, and faster in correct responding, the wider the "distance" between two elements within the chain A > B > C > D > E. The SDE has often been given spatial interpretations, but alternatively, non-spatial models of the effect are also viable on the empirical basis so far, which means the question about spatial contributions to the construction of analog representations of rank orders is still open. We suggest here that laterality effects can add the necessary additional information to support the idea of spatial processes. We introduce anchoring effects in terms of showing response advantages for congruent versus incongruent pairings of presentation location on a screen on the one hand, and the hypothetical spatial arrangement of the order in mental space, on the other hand. We report pertinent findings and discuss anchoring paradigms with respect to their internal validity as well as their being rooted in basic mechanisms of trained reading/writing direction.

Eye tracking as a mean to detect feigned cognitive impairment in the word memory test

Eye movements showed initial promise for the detection of deception and may be harder to consciously manipulate than conventional accuracy measures. Therefore, we integrated an eye-tracker with the Word Memory Test (WMT) and tested its usefulness for the detection of feigned cognitive impairment. As part of the study, simulators (n = 44) and honest controls (n = 41) performed WMT's immediate-recognition (IR) subtest while their eye movements were recorded. In comparison to the control group, simulators spent less time gazing at relevant stimuli, spent more time gazing at irrelevant stimuli, and had a lower saccade rate. Group classification using a scale that combined the eye movement measures and the WMT's accuracy measure showed tentative promise (i.e., it enhanced classification compared to the use of the accuracy measure as the sole predictor of group membership). Overall, integration of an eye-tracker with the WMT was found to be feasible and the eye movement measures showed initial promise for the detection of feigned cognitive impairment. Moreover, eye movement measures proved useful in enhancing our understanding of strategies utilized by the simulators and the cognitive processes that affect their behavior. While the findings are clearly preliminary, we hope that they will encourage further research of these promising psychophysiological measures.

Reflections on Bruce Bridgeman's insights into the Evolution of Consciousness and Cognition

This tribute to Bruce Bridgeman has three parts, which were selected to illustrate his diverse approaches for linking consciousness and cognition. In Part 1 Bridgeman's research on eye movements is used to show how the visual system is functionally divided into two very different streams: the temporal pathway is available for cognitive aspects available to consciousness and the parietal pathway is available to the motor system and is largely unconscious. Part 2 provides links to his Psycoloquy article that connects language and consciousness. The Psycoloquy format has other scholars write a response and then the author responds to each one. Part 3 covers Bruce Bridgeman's book Psychology and Evolution, which is special because it covers many areas with examples not typically treated in introductory psychology textbooks. I decided to quote directly from Bridgeman's writings throughout this essay. I can't think of a better way to pay tribute to him and to inspire others to read his publications.

Perception of the speed of self-motion vs. object-motion: Another example of two modes of vision?

We investigated the effect of reduced contrast on speed perception for two types of tasks: (a) the speed of a rotating image, an example of "object-motion," and (b) speed of travel when viewing wide-screen videos recorded from inside a car, an example of "self-motion." Both types of stimuli were presented over a range of spatial contrasts. The results showed that reduced contrast caused significant decreases of perceived speed for the rotating disk, replicating the well known Thompson Effect. Reduced contrast had inconsistent effects on perceived speed of self-motion, however, resulting in perception of faster self-motion at the lowest speed, slower self-motion at higher speeds, and no effect at intermediate speed. Although further research is needed, the differential effects of reduced contrast on perceived speed of object-motion vs. self-motion are consistent with evidence for two modes of vision.

Insights into Seeing and Grasping: Distinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perception and Action

Vision contributes to both perception and visuomotor control, and it has been suggested that many higher brain structures specialize in one or the other function. An alternative view, presented here, is that most higher brain areas participate in both visuomotor and perceptual functions. In the anterior frontal cortex, for example, the activity of one population of neurons reflects perceptual reports about a visual stimulus, whereas the activity of an intermingled population reflects movements aimed at the same stimulus. Similarly, posterior parietal and inferior temporal areas appear to function in both visual perception and visuomotor control. Visuomotor signals in higher order cortical areas could contribute to the perception of one’s own action. They also might reflect the existence of two systems for visual information processing: one stressing accuracy for the control of movement and the other generating hypotheses about the world.

Numeric and graphic risk information processing of high and low numerates in the intuitive and deliberative decision modes: An eye-tracker study

The influence of numeracy on information processing of two risk communication formats (percentage and pictograph) was examined using an eye tracker. A sample from the general population (N = 159) was used. In intuitive and deliberative decision conditions, the participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario presenting a test result. The participants indicated their feelings and their perceived risk, evoked by a 17% risk level. In the intuitive decision condition, a significant correlation (r = .30) between numeracy and the order of information processing was found: the higher the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the percentage, and the lower the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the pictograph. This intuitive, initial focus on a format prevailed over the first half of the intuitive decision-making process. In the deliberative decision condition, the correlation between numeracy and order of information processing was not significant. In both decision conditions, high and low numerates processed pictograph and percentage formats with similar depths and derived similar meanings from them in terms of feelings and perceived risk. In both conditions numeracy had no effects on the degree of attention on the percentage or the pictograph (number of fixations on formats and transitions between them). The results suggest that pictographs attract low numerates’ attention, and percentages attract high numerates’ attention in the first, intuitive, phase of numeric information processing. Pictographs thus ensure low numerates’ further elaboration on numeric risk information, which is an important precondition of risk understanding and decision making.

On the use of continuous flash suppression for the study of visual processing outside of awareness

The interocular suppression technique termed continuous flash suppression (CFS) has become an immensely popular tool for investigating visual processing outside of awareness. The emerging picture from studies using CFS is that extensive processing of a visual stimulus, including its semantic and affective content, occurs despite suppression from awareness of that stimulus by CFS. However, the current implementation of CFS in many studies examining processing outside of awareness has several drawbacks that may be improved upon for future studies using CFS. In this paper, we address some of those shortcomings, particularly ones that affect the assessment of unawareness during CFS, and ones to do with the use of "visible" conditions that are often included as a comparison to a CFS condition. We also discuss potential biases in stimulus processing as a result of spatial attention and feature-selective suppression. We suggest practical guidelines that minimize the effects of those limitations in using CFS to study visual processing outside of awareness.

Pacing and awareness: brain regulation of physical activity

The aim of this current opinion article is to provide a contemporary perspective on the role of brain regulatory control of paced performances in response to exercise challenges. There has been considerable recent conjecture as to the role of the brain during exercise, and it is now broadly accepted that fatigue does not occur without brain involvement and that all voluntary activity is likely to be paced at some level by the brain according to individualised priorities and knowledge of personal capabilities. This article examines the role of pacing in managing and distributing effort to successfully accomplish physical tasks, while extending existing theories on the role of the brain as a central controller of performance. The opinion proposed in this article is that a central regulator operates to control exercise performance but achieves this without the requirement of an intelligent central governor located in the subconscious brain. It seems likely that brain regulation operates at different levels of awareness, such that minor homeostatic challenges are addressed automatically without conscious awareness, while larger metabolic disturbances attract conscious awareness and evoke a behavioural response. This supports the view that the brain regulates exercise performance but that the interpretation of the mechanisms underlying this effect have not yet been fully elucidated.

Narcissism and consumer behaviour: a review and preliminary findings

We review the literature on the relation between narcissism and consumer behavior. Consumer behavior is sometimes guided by self-related motives (e.g., self-enhancement) rather than by rational economic considerations. Narcissism is a case in point. This personality trait reflects a self-centered, self-aggrandizing, dominant, and manipulative orientation. Narcissists are characterized by exhibitionism and vanity, and they see themselves as superior and entitled. To validate their grandiose self-image, narcissists purchase high-prestige products (i.e., luxurious, exclusive, flashy), show greater interest in the symbolic than utilitarian value of products, and distinguish themselves positively from others via their materialistic possessions. Our review lays the foundation for a novel methodological approach in which we explore how narcissism influences eye movement behavior during consumer decision-making. We conclude with a description of our experimental paradigm and report preliminary results. Our findings will provide insight into the mechanisms underlying narcissists’ conspicuous purchases. They will also likely have implications for theories of personality, consumer behavior, marketing, advertising, and visual cognition.

Development of an EOG (Electro-Oculography) Based Human-Computer Interface

We designed an inexpensive user computer interface for helping the disabled persons to communicate with their caretakers, which is based on EOG (electro-oculography) signals rather than the very expensive reflectance based methods. EOG signals of different eye movement patterns are analyzed with the LOS guiding setting constructed ourselves. An effective eye movement pattern is found to control the computer. Testing conducted on 12 subjects show that this system is remarkably accurate, easy to operate and reliable.

Distinct task-independent visual thresholds for egocentric and allocentric information pick up

The dominant view of the ventral and dorsal visual systems is that they subserve perception and action. De Wit, Van der Kamp, and Masters (2011) suggested that a more fundamental distinction might exist between the nature of information exploited by the systems. The present study distinguished between these accounts by asking participants to perform delayed matching (perception), pointing (action) and perceptual judgment responses to masked Müller-Lyer stimuli of varying length. Matching and pointing responses of participants who could not perceptually judge stimulus length at brief durations remained sensitive to veridical stimulus length (egocentric information), but not the illusion (allocentric, context-dependent information), which was effective at long durations. Distinct thresholds for egocentric and allocentric information pick up were thus evident irrespective of whether perception (matching) or action (pointing) responses were required. It was concluded that the dorsal and ventral systems may be delineated fundamentally by fast egocentric- and slower allocentric information pick up, respectively.

Unconscious knowledge: A survey

The concept of unconscious knowledge is fundamental for an understanding of human thought processes and mentation in general; however, the psychological community at large is not familiar with it. This paper offers a survey of the main psychological research currently being carried out into cognitive processes, and examines pathways that can be integrated into a discipline of unconscious knowledge. It shows that the field has already a defined history and discusses some of the features that all kinds of unconscious knowledge seem to share at a deeper level. With the aim of promoting further research, we discuss the main challenges which the postulation of unconscious cognition faces within the psychological community.

On giving a more active and selective role to consciousness

An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.

The control of consciousness via a neuropsychological feedback loop

Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.

Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”

Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.

Consciousness is for other people

Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds (and brains) in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.

Is there a role for extraretinal factors in the maintenance of stability in a structured environment?

The calibration solution to the stability of the world despite eye movements depends, according to Bridgeman et al., upon a combination of three factors which presumably all need to operate to achieve the goal of stability. Although the authors admit (sect. 4.3, para. 5) that the relative contributions of retinal and extraretinal factors will depend on the particular viewing situation, Figure 5 (sect. 4.3) makes it clear in its representation that the role of perceptual factors is relatively minor compared to extraretinal ones. It is with this representation that this commentary wishes to take issue, believing that it occurs as a result of some assumptions about terminology that may be ambiguous, as well as some misconceptions about the circumstances in which there is a need for stability.

Comparators, functions, and experiences

The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.

Possible roles for a predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory and imitative learning

This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. (1994) to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.

Consciousness does not seem to be linked to a single neural mechanism

On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model (or conjecture) of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.

Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings

Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.

On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness

Because consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.

Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness

In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.

Septohippocampal comparator: Consciousness generator or attention feedback loop?

As Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.

A theory of visual stability across saccadic eye movements

We identify two aspects of the problem of maintaining perceptual stability despite an observer's eye movements. The first, visual direction constancy, is the (egocentric) stability of apparent positions of objects in the visual world relative to the perceiver. The second, visual position constancy, is the (exocentric) stability of positions of objects relative to each other. We analyze the constancy of visual direction despite saccadic eye movements.

Three information sources have been proposed to enable the visual system to achieve stability: the structure of the visual field, proprioceptive inflow, and a copy of neural efference or outflow to the extraocular muscles. None of these sources by itself provides adequate information to achieve visual direction constancy; present evidence indicates that all three are used.

Our final question concerns how information processing operations result in a stable world. The three traditionally suggested means have been elimination, translation, or evaluation. All are rejected. From a review of the physiological and psychological evidence we conclude that no subtraction, compensation, or evaluation need take place. The problem for which these solutions were developed turns out to be a false one. We propose a “calibration” solution: correct spatiotopic positions are calculated anew for each fixation. Inflow, outflow, and retinal sources are used in this calculation: saccadic suppression of displacement bridges the errors between these sources and the actual extent of movement.

Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds

Perspective and reflection (whether involving conceptual or nonconceptual content) have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.

Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience

It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.

Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?

Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.

Communication and consciousness: A neural network conjecture

The communicative aspects of the contents of consciousness are analyzed in the framework of a neural network model of animal communication. We discuss some issues raised by Gray, such as the control of the contents of consciousness, the adaptive value of consciousness, conscious and unconscious behaviors, and the nature of a model's consciousness.

Overworking the hippocampus

The postulated hippocampal comparator, like any other subsystem, must rely on “syntactic” patterns in its “input,” and hence could not have the extraordinary powers Gray supposes. It may play a more modest role, but it is not the place “where it all comes together” for consciousness.

Consciousness and its (dis)contents

The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.

The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture

Drawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis appears to be able to account for a number of key features of the contents of consciousness. However, it is argued that neitherthis nor any existing comparable hypothesis is yet able to explain why the brain should generate conscious experience of any kind at all.

The elusive quale

If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements (qualia) within the brain or as internal products of the brain.

Information synthesis in cortical areas as an important link in brain mechanisms of mind

To explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP (evoked potential) component amplitude and signal detection indices (d' and criterion) were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.

The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness

This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other thirdperson perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.

Reticular-thalamic activation of the cortex generates conscious contents

Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.

Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?

Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.

Mind – your head!

Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own model – ending up dealing with the unknowable.