Judges and lawyers' beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: further guidance required

This article examines continuing misunderstanding about memory function especially for trauma, across three UK samples (N = 717). Delayed allegations of child sexual and physical abuse are prevalent in Western legal systems and often rely upon uncorroborated memory testimony to prove guilt. U.K. legal professionals and jurors typically assess the reliability of such memory recall via common sense, yet decades of scientific research show common sense beliefs often conflict with science. Recent international surveys show controversial notions of repression and accurate memory recovery remain strongly endorsed. In historical cases, these notions may lead to wrongful convictions. The current study surveyed the U.K. public, lawyers, and mental health professionals' beliefs about repression, dissociative amnesia and false memories. Study findings give unique data on judges' and barristers' beliefs. Overall, the study findings reinforce international scientists' concerns of a science - knowledge-gap. Repression was strongly endorsed by lay, legal and clinical participants (> 78%) as was dissociative amnesia (> 87%). Moreover, suboptimal professional legal education and juror guidance may increase misunderstanding. Correcting beliefs about memory function, and extending the contribution of memory science in the courtroom remains an important quest for cognitive scientists.

'Talking lines': the stories of diagnosis and support as told by those with lived experience of rare forms of dementia

BACKGROUND

People living with, or caring for someone with, rare forms of dementia can encounter issues while obtaining a diagnosis and trying to access appropriate support. This can affect their wellbeing, quality of life, social relationships and employment status. This study makes use of an arts-based narrative approach to explore individual accounts of these experiences whilst also exploring how, in telling their stories, those affected by rare forms of dementia might invoke, and situate their stories in relation to, broader cultural narratives around dementia and illness.

METHODS

Semi-structured interviews were conducted via video-conferencing software with participants (N = 27), living with, or caring for someone with, a rare forms of dementia. Participants used line drawings to depict their journey from initial symptoms to the present day, followed by prompts to verbally narrate their experiences. All interview transcripts and line drawings were subjected to narrative analysis. Four sets of transcripts and drawings were then subjected to more in-depth analysis.

RESULTS

Analysis shed light on the struggles encountered by both care-partners and people with a diagnosis, while navigating a health and social care system that does not always understand their needs. This often led to individuals feeling isolated and unsupported. Accounts also depicted challenges to identity brought on by the process. The moment of diagnosis was also drawn in a complicated light. Individuals found comfort in gaining understanding, but felt fear at recognising upcoming challenges. Participants situated their own accounts against mainstream cultural narratives around what good support for cognitive impairment and dementia might look like, whilst also demonstrating the influential role they took on in pursuing the right care.

CONCLUSIONS

The use of line drawing, alongside narrative interviews, allowed participants to tell complicated, sometimes anachronistic, stories about difficult experiences, whilst also reflecting on, and attaching meaning to, them. These stories highlighted pressing gaps in healthcare services and shone a light on the various pieces of collective action individuals were engaged in in order to improve them. Finally, in modelling some elements of the participants' service provision which were working, the narratives pointed to future directions services might move in.

New Insights on Expert Opinion About Eyewitness Memory Research

Experimental psychologists investigating eyewitness memory have periodically gathered their thoughts on a variety of eyewitness memory phenomena. Courts and other stakeholders of eyewitness research rely on the expert opinions reflected in these surveys to make informed decisions. However, the last survey of this sort was published more than 20 years ago, and the science of eyewitness memory has developed since that time. Stakeholders need a current database of expert opinions to make informed decisions. In this article, we provide that update. We surveyed 76 scientists for their opinions on eyewitness memory phenomena. We compared these current expert opinions to expert opinions from the past several decades. We found that experts today share many of the same opinions as experts in the past and have more nuanced thoughts about two issues. Experts in the past endorsed the idea that confidence is weakly related to accuracy, but experts today acknowledge the potential diagnostic value of initial confidence collected from a properly administered lineup. In addition, experts in the past may have favored sequential over simultaneous lineup presentation, but experts today are divided on this issue. We believe this new survey will prove useful to the court and to other stakeholders of eyewitness research.

When is memory more reliable? Scientific findings, theories, and myths

The question of whether human memory is reliable generated extensive research. Memory is open to reconstruction and false retrieval of unpresented information or unexperienced events. These can create problems in judgments and decisions that rely on memory accuracy. In the case of eyewitness testimony, these problems can result in injustice. Then again, memory is also reliable enough. Information acquisition, processing, and retrieval capacity of our memory made it possible to survive the course of evolution. Our memory also makes it possible to continue our daily lives, most of the time without major problems. In the present review, we suggest that the right question to ask may not be whether memory is reliable, but rather to ask when and under what circumstances memory is more reliable. The review's educational aim is to identify the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, and its theoretical aim is to discuss memory reliability. We reviewed the literature on situational, emotional, social, and individual difference variables that affect memory reliability, identified the conditions under which memory is more versus less reliable, summarized these outcomes as easy-to-reach items, and discussed them in the light of major theories. Our discussion also touched upon the differentiation of societal myths about the reliability of memory from scientific findings, since believing in memory myths can also affect the reliability of memory. Awareness of the specific circumstances under which memory is more reliable can lead to the consideration of how much memory can be trusted under those specific circumstances.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways

People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

Impact on the legal system of the generalizability crisis in psychology

Overgeneralizations by psychologists of the research evidence on memory and eyewitness testimony, such as "memory decays with time" or "memories are fluid and malleable," are beginning to appear in legal judgements and guidance documents, accompanied by unwarranted disparagement of lay beliefs about memory. These overgeneralizations could have significant adverse consequences for the conduct of civil and criminal law.

Doing right by the eyewitness evidence: a response to Berkowitz et al

Berkowitz et al. (Berkowitz, S. R., Garrett, B. L., Fenn, K. M., & Loftus, E. F. (2020). Convicting with confidence? Why we should not over-rely on eyewitness confidence. Memory. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2020.1849308) attribute to us the claim that "confidence trumps all", and the few out-of-context quotations they selected can certainly be used to create that false impression. However, it is easily disproved, and we do so here. The notion that "confidence trumps all" is the mistake that the jurors made in the DNA exoneration cases, not a position that we have ever advocated.

Is the study of memory unduly preoccupied with its sins?

A broad functional approach is taken to the analysis of human memory. The overall importance of episodic memory, the capacity to remember specific events, is illustrated by the devastating effect that loss of this aspect of memory has on the capacity to cope in the case of densely amnesic patients. Recent applied research has however focussed heavily on factors compromising the reliability of eyewitness testimony in the forensic field and on the creation of false memories. While acknowledging the progress made on this issue, it presents two dangers. The first is practical, the danger of generalising too readily from laboratory-influenced simulations that differ in important ways from the context to which they are applied. This suggests a need for fewer but more realistically representative studies. The second is a broad theoretical issue, that of extending the findings from this important but limited applied area, within which precise detail may be crucial, to the whole of memory, consequently failing to appreciate its many strengths.

Rich false memories of autobiographical events can be reversed

False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students' parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

Belief in Unconscious Repressed Memory Persists

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse).

What science tells us about false and repressed memories

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

Convicting with confidence? Why we should not over-rely on eyewitness confidence

Eyewitness memory researchers have recently devoted considerable attention to eyewitness confidence. While there is strong consensus that courtroom confidence is problematic, we now recognise that an eyewitness's initial confidence in their first identification - in certain contexts - can be of value. A few psychological scientists, however, have confidently, but erroneously claimed that in real-world cases, eyewitness initial confidence is the most important indicator of eyewitness accuracy, trumping all other factors that might exist in a case. This claim accompanies an exaggeration of the role of eyewitnesses' "initial confidence" in the DNA exoneration cases. Still worse, overstated claims about the confidence-accuracy relationship, and eyewitness memory, have reached our top scientific journals, news articles, and criminal cases. To set the record straight, we review what we actually know and do not know about the "initial confidence" of eyewitnesses in the DNA exoneration cases. Further reasons for skepticism about the value of the confidence-accuracy relationship in real-world cases come from new analyses of a separate database, the National Registry of Exonerations. Finally, we review new research that reveals numerous conditions wherein eyewitnesses with high initial confidence end up being wrong.

The Truth Is Out There: Accuracy in Recall of Verifiable Real-World Events

How accurate is memory? Although people implicitly assume that their memories faithfully represent past events, the prevailing view in research is that memories are error prone and constructive. Yet little is known about the frequency of errors, particularly in memories for naturalistic experiences. Here, younger and older adults underwent complex real-world experiences that were nonetheless controlled and verifiable, freely recalling these experiences after days to years. As expected, memory quantity and the richness of episodic detail declined with increasing age and retention interval. Details that participants did recall, however, were highly accurate (93%–95%) across age and time. This level of accuracy far exceeded comparatively low estimations among memory scientists and other academics in a survey. These findings suggest that details freely recalled from one-time real-world experiences can retain high correspondence to the ground truth despite significant forgetting, with higher accuracy than expected given the emphasis on fallibility in the field of memory research.