Extended difficulties with counterfactuals persist in reasoning with false beliefs: Evidence for teleology-in-perspective

Increasing evidence suggests that counterfactual reasoning is involved in false belief reasoning. Because existing work is correlational, we developed a manipulation that revealed a signature of counterfactual reasoning in participants' answers to false belief questions. In two experiments, we tested 3- to 14-year-olds and found high positive correlations (r = .56 and r = .73) between counterfactual and false belief questions. Children were very likely to respond to both questions with the same answer, also committing the same type of error. We discuss different theories and their ability to account for each aspect of our findings and conclude that reasoning about others' beliefs and actions requires similar cognitive processes as using counterfactual suppositions. Our findings question the explanatory power of the traditional frameworks, theory theory and simulation theory, in favor of views that explicitly provide for a relationship between false belief reasoning and counterfactual reasoning.

Belief and Counterfactuality: A Teleological Theory of Belief Attribution

Abstract. The development and relation of counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding were examined in 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 75) and adult controls (N = 14). The key question was whether false belief understanding engages counterfactual reasoning to infer what somebody else falsely believes. Findings revealed a strong correlation between false belief and counterfactual questions even in conditions in which children could commit errors other than the reality bias (r_p = .51). The data suggest that mastery of belief attribution and counterfactual reasoning is not limited to one point in development but rather develops over a longer period. Moreover, the rare occurrence of reality errors calls into question whether young children’s errors in the classic false belief task are indeed the result of a failure to inhibit what they know to be actually the case. The data speak in favor of a teleological theory of belief attribution and challenges established theories of belief attribution.

Analogical Reasoning in Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder: Evidence From an Eye-Tracking Approach

The present study examined analogical reasoning in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and its relationship with cognitive and executive functioning and processing strategies. Our findings showed that although children with ASD were less competent in solving analogical problems than typically developing children, this inferior performance was attributable to general cognitive impairments. Eye-movement analyses revealed that children with ASD paid less attention to relational items and showed fewer gaze shifts between relational locations. Nevertheless, these eye-movement patterns did not predict autistic children’s behavioral performance. Together, our findings suggest that ASD per se does not entail impairments in analogical reasoning. The inferior performance of autistic children on analogical reasoning tasks is attributable to deficits in general cognitive and executive functioning.

Pragmatic skills predict online counterfactual comprehension: Evidence from the N400

Counterfactual thought allows people to consider alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating these thoughts through language poses a social-communicative challenge because listeners typically expect a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false. Listeners must therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood, such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study focused on the comprehension of such counterfactual antecedents and investigated if pragmatic ability—the ability to apply knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in daily life—predicts the online generation of counterfactual worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language comprehension and reduces online expectations based on factual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting that individuals who are better at understanding the communicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in creating possible worlds.

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes-Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, 'What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?' which requires a false-belief inference, and 'If Anne's mother hadn't asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?' which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children.

Dynamic Assessment of Figurative Language of Children in the Autistic Spectrum: The Relation to Some Cognitive and Language Aspects

The objectives of this study were to examine (a) differences in figurative language, analogical reasoning, executive functions (EF), theory of mind (ToM), and local/central coherence (LCC) of children with high-functioning autism (HFA; n = 32) and typically developing (TD; n = 32) children; (b) improvement of figurative language using dynamic assessment; and (c) prediction of proverbial understanding by the cognitive variables. A sample of 5- to 11-year-old children with HFA was pair matched with a group of TD children on age, gender, vocabulary, and socioeconomic status (SES). Participants were administered tests of proverbial understanding, metaphorical construction, analogies, language ability, EF, LCC, and ToM. TD children scored higher than children with HFA on all tests. In the HFA group, proverbial understanding was predicted by LCC and verbal ability and in the TD group by metaphorical construction and EF. These findings refute the argument that figurative language among HFA is a function of only verbal ability.

Understanding Counterfactuality: A Review of Experimental Evidence for the Dual Meaning of Counterfactuals

Cognitive and linguistic theories of counterfactual language comprehension assume that counterfactuals convey a dual meaning. Subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals (e.g., 'If Tom had studied hard, he would have passed the test') express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Tom has not studied hard and failed). The question of how counterfactual dual meaning plays out during language processing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguistics. Whereas numerous studies using offline measures of language processing consistently support counterfactual dual meaning, evidence coming from online studies is less conclusive. Here, we review the available studies that examine online counterfactual language comprehension through behavioural measurement (self-paced reading times, eye-tracking) and neuroimaging (electroencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging). While we argue that these studies do not offer direct evidence for the online computation of counterfactual dual meaning, they provide valuable information about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and influences successive information processing. Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require more specific predictions about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence processing.

Understanding of emotions based on counterfactual reasoning in children with autism spectrum disorders

The understanding of emotions based on counterfactual reasoning was studied in children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (n = 71) and in typically developing children (n = 71), aged 6-12 years. Children were presented with eight stories about two protagonists who experienced the same positive or negative outcome, either due to their own action or by default. Relative to the comparison group, children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder were poor at explaining emotions based on downward counterfactual reasoning (i.e. contentment and relief). There were no group differences in upward counterfactual reasoning (i.e. disappointment and regret). In the comparison group, second-order false-belief reasoning was related to children's understanding of second-order counterfactual emotions (i.e. regret and relief), while children in the high-functioning autism spectrum disorder group relied more on their general intellectual skills. Results are discussed in terms of the different functions of counterfactual reasoning about emotion and the cognitive style of children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder.

Putting theory of mind in its place: psychological explanations of the socio-emotional-communicative impairments in autistic spectrum disorder

In this review, the history of the theory of mind (ToM) theory of autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is outlined (in which ToM is indexed by success on false belief tasks), and the explanatory power and psychological causes of impaired ToM in ASD are critically discussed. It is concluded that impaired ToM by itself has only limited explanatory power, but that explorations of the psychological precursors of impaired ToM have been fruitful in increasing understanding of mindreading impairments in ASD (where 'mindreading' refers those abilities that underlie triadic interaction as well as ToM). It is argued that early explanations of impaired mindreading are untenable for various reasons, but that impairments of dyadic interaction in ASD that could lead to impaired ability to represent others' mental states may be the critical psychological cause, or causes, of impaired ToM. The complexity of causal routes to impaired ToM is emphasized.

Brief report: additive and subtractive counterfactual reasoning of children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders

The development of additive (‘If only I had done…’) and subtractive (‘If only I had not done….’) counterfactual reasoning was examined in children with High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders (HFASD) (n = 72) and typically developing controls (n = 71), aged 6–12 years. Children were presented four stories where they could generate counterfactuals based on a given consequent (e.g., ‘you left muddy footprints in the kitchen. How could that have been prevented?’). Children with HFASD increasingly used subtractive counterfactuals as they got older, but controls showed an increase in additive counterfactuals, which may be linked to their growing adaptive and flexible skills. Children with HFASD likely develop different strategies for their counterfactual reasoning. The role of IQ and ideational fluency will be discussed.

Using virtual environments for teaching social understanding to 6 adolescents with autistic spectrum disorders

Six teenagers with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) experienced a Virtual Environment (VE) of a café. They also watched three sets of videos of real cafés and buses and judged where they would sit and explained why. Half of the participants received their VE experience between the first and second sets of videos, and half experienced it between the second and third. Ten naïve raters independently coded participants' judgments and reasoning. In direct relation to the timing of VE use, there were several instances of significant improvement in judgments and explanations about where to sit, both in a video of a café and a bus. The results demonstrate the potential of Virtual Reality for teaching social skills.

Implicit action encoding influences personal-trait judgments

When an observed action (e.g., kicking) is compatible to a to be produced action (e.g., a foot-key response as compared to a finger-key response), then the self-produced action is more fluent, that is, it is more accurate and faster. A series of experiments explore the notion that vision-action compatibility effects can influence personal-trait judgments. It is demonstrated that when an observed individual carries out an action that is compatible with the participants' response, (1) this individual is identified more fluently, and (2) the observed individual's personality is attributed with the properties of the observed action. For example, if it is easier to identify one individual with a foot-response when he is seen kicking a ball, as compared to typing, he is perceived to be more 'sporty'. In contrast, if it is easier to identify one individual with a finger response when he is seen typing as compared to kicking a ball, he is associated with the 'academic' trait. These personal-trait judgment effects can be observed with explicit measures, where participants are asked to rate the sporty/academic nature of the person on a scale. They are also obtained when implicit measures are taken in a priming task, where participants are never explicitly asked to rate the personalities of the individuals. A control experiment rules out that these personal-trait effects are merely due to an association of motor responses (foot, finger) to individuals while identifying them, but that these effects depend on a prior manipulation of vision-action fluency.