Monitoring Moral Virtue: When the Moral Transgressions of In-Group Members Are Judged More Severely

Literature indicates that people tend to judge the moral transgressions committed by out-group members more severely than those of in-group members. However, these transgressions often conflate a moral transgression with some form of intergroup harm. There is little research examining in-group versus out-group transgressions of harmless offenses, which violate moral standards that bind people together (binding foundations). As these moral standards center around group cohesiveness, a transgression committed by an in-group member may be judged more severely. The current research presented Dutch Muslims (Study 1), American Christians (Study 2), and Indian Hindus (Study 3) with a set of fictitious stories depicting harmless and harmful moral transgressions. Consistent with our expectations, participants who strongly identified with their religious community judged harmless moral offenses committed by in-group members, relative to out-group members, more severely. In contrast, this effect was absent when participants judged harmful moral transgressions. We discuss the implications of these results.

Highly identified power-holders feel responsible: The interplay between social identification and social power within groups

Power relations affect dynamics within groups. Power-holders' decisions not only determine their personal outcomes, but also the outcomes of others in the group that they control. Yet, power-holders often tend to overlook this responsibility to take care of collective interests. The present research investigated how social identification - with the group to which both the powerful and the powerless belong - alters perceived responsibility among power-holders (and the powerless). Combining research on social power and social identity, we argue that power-holders perceive more responsibility than the powerless when strongly (rather than when weakly) identifying with the group. A study among leaders and an experiment supported this, highlighting that although power-holders are often primarily concerned about personal outcomes, they do feel responsible for considering others' interests when these others are included in the (social) self.

Planning and Performance in Small Groups: Collective Implementation Intentions Enhance Group Goal Striving

There are two key motivators to perform well in a group: making a contribution that (a) is crucial for the group (indispensability) and that (b) the other group members recognize (identifiability). We argue that indispensability promotes setting collective (“We”) goals whereas identifiability induces individual (“I”) goals. Although both goals may enhance performance, they should align with different strategies. Whereas pursuing collective goals should involve more cooperation, pursuing individual goals should involve less cooperation. Two experiments support this reasoning and show that planning out collective goals with collective implementation intentions (cIIs or “We-plans”) relies on cooperation but planning out individual goals with individual implementation intentions (IIs or “I-plans”) does not. In Experiment 1, three-member groups first formed a collective or an individual goal and then performed a first round of a physical persistence task. Groups then either formed a respective implementation intention (cII or II) or a control plan and then performed a second round of the task. Although groups with cIIs and IIs performed better on a physical persistence task than respective control groups, only cII groups interacted more cooperatively during task performance. To confirm the causal role of these interaction processes, Experiment 2 used the same persistence task and manipulated whether groups could communicate: When communication was hindered, groups with cIIs but not groups with IIs performed worse. Communication thus qualifies as a process making cIIs effective. The present research offers a psychology of action account to small group performance.

Knowledge Contribution in Organizations via Social Media

Abstract. Knowledge exchange via social media is crucial for organizational success. Yet, many employees only read others’ contributions without actively contributing their knowledge. We thus examined predictors of the willingness to contribute knowledge. Applying social identity theory and expectancy theory to knowledge exchange, we investigated the interplay of users’ identification with their organization and perceived usefulness of a social media tool. In two studies, identification facilitated users’ willingness to contribute knowledge – provided that the social media tool seemed useful (vs. not-useful). Interestingly, identification also raised the importance of acquiring knowledge collectively, which could in turn compensate for low usefulness of the tool. Hence, considering both social and media factors is crucial to enhance employees’ willingness to share knowledge via social media.

The behavioral benefits of other people’s deviance

Employees who violate significant organizational norms are organizational deviants engaged in organizational deviance. Yet, few acts of organizational deviance involve all members of an organization; in many cases, many people are uninvolved. The current research examined the responses of the nondeviant actors. Several literatures led us to predict that organizational deviance would cause nondeviants to experience cognitive dissonance, especially its vicarious form, and redouble their own work effort in response. Yet, we also predicted that low levels of identification with the deviant actors would weaken this effect. Three studies with multiple samples and methods supported these predictions, showing that nondeviants experience deviants’ dissonance and increase their own work effort, but only when more rather than less identified with deviants. In addition to extending and connecting theories of deviance and dissonance, these findings suggest that organizational deviance may have unexpected benefits for groups and organizations.