Regulation, measurements and incentives. The experience in the US and UK: does context matter?

Gaming New Zealand's Emergency Department Target: How and Why Did It Vary Over Time and Between Organisations?

BACKGROUND

Gaming is a potentially dysfunctional consequence of performance measurement and management systems in the health sector and more generally. In 2009, the New Zealand government initiated a Shorter Stays in Emergency Department (SSED) target in which 95% of patients would be admitted, discharged or transferred from an emergency department (ED) within 6 hours. The implementation of similar targets in England led to well-documented practices of gaming. Our research into ED target implementation sought to answer how and why gaming varies over time and between organisations.

METHODS

We developed a mixed-methods approach. Four organisation case study sites were selected. ED lengths of stay (ED LOS) were collected over a 6-year period (2007-2012) from all sites and indicators of target gaming were developed. Two rounds of surveys with managers and clinicians were conducted. Interviews (n=68) were conducted with clinicians and managers in EDs and the wider hospital in two phases across all sites. The interview data was used to develop explanations of the patterns of variation across time and across sites detected in the ED LOS data.

RESULTS

Our research established that gaming behaviour - in the form of 'clock-stopping' and decanting patients to short-stay units (SSUs) or observation beds to avoid target breaches - was common across all 4 case study sites. The opportunity to game was due to the absence of independent verification of ED LOS data. Gaming increased significantly over time (2009-2012) as the means to game became more available, usually through the addition or expansion of short-stay facilities attached to EDs. Gaming varied between sites, but those with the highest levels of gaming differed substantially in terms of organisational dynamics and motives. In each case, however, high levels of gaming could be attributed to the strategies of senior management more than to the individual motivations of frontline staff.

CONCLUSION

Gaming of New Zealand's ED target increased after the real benefits (in terms of process improvement) of the target were achieved. Gaming of ED targets could be minimised by eliminating opportunities to game through independent verification, or by monitoring and limiting the means and motivations to game.

Effectiveness of UK provider financial incentives on quality of care: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Provider financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care while promoting efficiency.

AIM

To review the UK evidence on whether provider financial incentives are an effective way of improving the quality of health care.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Systematic review of UK evidence, undertaken in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) recommendations.

METHOD

MEDLINE and Embase databases were searched in August 2016. Original articles that assessed the relationship between UK provider financial incentives and a quantitative measure of quality of health care were included. Studies showing improvement for all measures of quality of care were defined as 'positive', those that were 'intermediate' showed improvement in some measures, and those classified as 'negative' showed a worsening of measures. Studies showing no effect were documented as such. Quality was assessed using the Downs and Black quality checklist.

RESULTS

Of the 232 published articles identified by the systematic search, 28 were included. Of these, nine reported positive effects of incentives on quality of care, 16 reported intermediate effects, two reported no effect, and one reported a negative effect. Quality assessment scores for included articles ranged from 15 to 19, out of a maximum of 22 points.

CONCLUSION

The effects of UK provider financial incentives on healthcare quality are unclear. Owing to this uncertainty and their significant costs, use of them may be counterproductive to their goal of improving healthcare quality and efficiency. UK policymakers should be cautious when implementing these incentives - if used, they should be subject to careful long-term monitoring and evaluation. Further research is needed to assess whether provider financial incentives represent a cost-effective intervention to improve the quality of care delivered in the UK.

Pay-for-performance remuneration for pharmacist prescribers' management of hypertension: A substudy of the RxACTION trial

BACKGROUND

To be sustainable, pharmacists providing direct patient care must receive appropriate payment for these services. This prespecified substudy of the RxACTION trial (a randomized trial of pharmacist prescribing vs usual care in patients with above-target blood pressure [BP]) aimed to determine if BP reduction achieved differed between patients whose pharmacist was paid by pay-for-performance (P4P) vs fee-for-service (FFS).

METHODS

Within RxACTION, patients with elevated BP assigned to the pharmacist prescribing group were further randomized to P4P or FFS payment for the pharmacist. In FFS, pharmacists received $150 for the initial visit and $75 for follow-up visits. P4P included FFS payments plus incentives of $125 and $250 for each patient who reached 50% and 100% of the BP target, respectively. The primary outcome was difference in change in systolic BP between P4P and FFS groups.

RESULTS

A total of 89 patients were randomized to P4P and 92 to the FFS group. Patients' average (SD) age was 63.0 (13.2) years, 49% were male and 76% were on antihypertensive drug therapy at baseline, taking a median of 2 (interquartile range = 1) medications. Mean systolic BP reductions in the P4P and FFS groups were 19.7 (SD = 18.4) vs 17.0 (SD = 16.4) mmHg, respectively (p = 0.47 for the comparison of deltas and p = 0.29 after multivariate adjustment).

CONCLUSIONS

This trial of pharmacist prescribing found substantial reductions in systolic BP among poorly controlled hypertensive individuals but with no appreciable difference when pharmacists were paid by P4P vs FFS.

The multiple causal pathways between performance measures' use and effects

In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in the design and implementation of systems using public reporting of performance measures to improve performance. In their simplest form, such interventions rest on the market-based logic of consumers using publicly released information to modify their behavior, thereby penalizing poor performers. However, evidence from large-scale efforts to use public reporting of performance measures as an instrumental performance improvement tool suggests that the causal mechanisms involved are much more complex. This article offers a typology of four different plausible causal pathways linking public reporting of performance measures and performance improvement. This typology rests on a variety of conceptual models and a review of available empirical evidence. We then use this typology to discuss the core elements that need to be taken into account in efforts to use public reporting of performance measures as a performance improvement tool.

Effect of repeated public releases on cesarean section rates

OBJECTIVES

Public release of and feedback (here after public release) on institutional (clinics and hospitals) cesarean section rates has had the effect of reducing cesarean section rates. However, compared to the isolated intervention, there was scant evidence of the effect of repeated public releases (RPR) on cesarean section rates. The objectives of this study were to evaluate the effect of RPR for reducing cesarean section rates.

METHODS

From January 2003 to July 2007, the nationwide monthly institutional cesarean section rates data (1,951,303 deliveries at 1194 institutions) were analyzed. We used autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) time-series intervention models to assess the effect of the RPR on cesarean section rates and ordinal logistic regression model to determine the characteristics of the change in cesarean section rates.

RESULTS

Among four RPR, we found that only the first one (August 29, 2005) decreased the cesarean section rate (by 0.81 percent) and continued to have an impact period through the last observation in May 2007. Baseline cesarean section rates (OR, 4.7; 95% CI, 3.1 to 7.1) and annual number of deliveries (OR, 2.8; 95% CI, 1.6 to 4.7) of institutions in the upper third of each category at before first intervention had a significant contribution to the decrease of cesarean section rates.

CONCLUSIONS

We could not found the evidence that RPR has had the significant effect of reducing cesarean section rates. Institutions with upper baseline cesarean section rates and annual number of deliveries were more responsive to RPR.

Pay for Performance—Panacea or Pandora’s Box? Revisiting an Old Debate in the Current Economic Environment

New research in neuroeconomics suggests that money may be a more powerful motivator than previously thought, with important implications for incentive pay programs.