Does Neonatal Imitation Exist? Insights From a Meta-Analysis of 336 Effect Sizes

[Formula: see text] Caregiver-reported infant motor and imitation skills predict M-CHAT-R/F

Altered motor and social-communicative abilities in infancy have been linked to later ASD diagnosis. Most diagnostic instruments for ASD cannot be utilized until 12 months, and the average child is diagnosed substantially later. Imitation combines motor and social-communicative skills and is commonly atypical in infants at risk for ASD. However, few measures have been developed to assess infant imitation clinically. One barrier to the diagnostic age gap of ASD is accessibility of screening and diagnostic services. Utilization of caregiver report to reliably screen for ASD mitigates such barriers and could aid in earlier detection. The present study developed and validated a caregiver-report measure of infant imitation at 4, 6, and 9 months and explored the relationship between caregiver-reported imitation and motor abilities with later ASD risk. Participants (N = 571) were caregivers of term and preterm infants recruited as part of a large multi-site study of PediaTrac™, a web-based tool for monitoring and tracking infant development. Caregivers completed online surveys and established questionnaires on a schedule corresponding to well-child visits from birth to 18 months, including the M-CHAT-R/F at 18 months. Distinct imitation factors were derived from PediaTrac at 4, 6, and 9 months via factor analysis. The results supported validity of the imitation factors via associations with measures of infant communication (CSBS; ASQ). Imitation and motor skills at 9 months predicted 18-month ASD risk over and above gestational age. Implications for assessment of infant imitation, detecting ASD risk in the first year, and contributing to access to care are discussed.

The expression of empathy in human's closest relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees: current and future directions

Empathy is a complex, multi-dimensional capacity that facilitates the sharing and understanding of others' emotions. As our closest living relatives, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) provide an opportunity to explore the origins of hominin social cognition, including empathy. Despite certain assumptions that bonobos and chimpanzees may differ empathically, these species appear to overlap considerably in certain socio-emotional responses related to empathy. However, few studies have systematically tested for species variation in Pan empathic or socio-emotional tendencies. To address this, we synthesise the growing literature on Pan empathy to inform our understanding of the selection pressures that may underlie the evolution of hominin empathy, and its expression in our last common ancestor. As bonobos and chimpanzees show overlaps in their expression of complex socio-emotional phenomena such as empathy, we propose that group comparisons may be as or more meaningful than species comparisons when it comes to understanding the evolutionary pressures for such behaviour. Furthermore, key differences, such as how humans and Pan communicate, appear to distinguish how we experience empathy compared to our closest living relatives.

Inability to move one's face dampens facial expression perception

Humans rely heavily on facial expressions for social communication to convey their thoughts and emotions and to understand them in others. One prominent but controversial view is that humans learn to recognize the significance of facial expressions by mimicking the expressions of others. This view predicts that an inability to make facial expressions (e.g., facial paralysis) would result in reduced perceptual sensitivity to others' facial expressions. To test this hypothesis, we developed a diverse battery of sensitive emotion recognition tasks to characterize expression perception in individuals with Moebius Syndrome (MBS), a congenital neurological disorder that causes facial palsy. Using computer-based detection tasks we systematically assessed expression perception thresholds for static and dynamic face and body expressions. We found that while MBS individuals were able to perform challenging perceptual control tasks and body expression tasks, they were less efficient at extracting emotion from facial expressions, compared to matched controls. Exploratory analyses of fMRI data from a small group of MBS participants suggested potentially reduced engagement of the amygdala in MBS participants during expression processing relative to matched controls. Collectively, these results suggest a role for facial mimicry and consequent facial feedback and motor experience in the perception of others' facial expressions.

Basic Emotions or Constructed Emotions: Insights From Taking an Evolutionary Perspective

The ongoing debate between basic emotion theories (BETs) and the theory of constructed emotion (TCE) hampers progress in the field of emotion research. Providing a new perspective, here we aim to bring the theories closer together by dissecting them according to Tinbergen's four questions to clarify a focus on their evolutionary basis. On the basis of our review of the literature, we conclude that whereas BETs focus on the evolution question of Tinbergen, the TCE is more concerned with the causation of emotion. On the survival value of emotions both theories largely agree: to provide the best reaction in specific situations. Evidence is converging on the evolutionary history of emotions but is still limited for both theories-research within both frameworks focuses heavily on the causation. We conclude that BETs and the TCE explain two different phenomena: emotion and feeling. Therefore, they seem irreconcilable but possibly supplementary for explaining and investigating the evolution of emotion-especially considering their similar answer to the question of survival value. Last, this article further highlights the importance of carefully describing what aspect of emotion is being discussed or studied. Only then can evidence be interpreted to converge toward explaining emotion.

Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?

Episodic representations can be entertained either as "remembered" or "imagined"-as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a "cognitive gadget"-a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive "feelings of remembering" from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as "I was there" or "I witnessed it myself." We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals - including human infants - show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants' cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.

Neurodiversity and Autism Intervention: Reconciling Perspectives Through a Naturalistic Developmental Behavioral Intervention Framework

Proponents of autism intervention and those of the neurodiversity movement often appear at odds, the former advocating for intensive treatments and the latter arguing that autism must be accepted as a form of diversity. The history of behavioral intervention has understandably outraged many in the Autistic community, though many still value supports focused on quality of life. This commentary argues that Naturalistic Developmental Behavioral Interventions (NDBIs) hold promise for bridging the gap between early intervention and the neurodiversity movement. However, we recognize NDBIs have much room to grow and suggest multiple strategies for improvement. We believe these updates are not only feasible for clinicians and researchers to implement but will ultimately lead to improved quality of life for Autistic individuals.

Mother-infant co-regulation from 0 to 2 years: The role of copy behaviors. A systematic review

The purpose of this review was twofold: (1) to examine how copy behaviors (CB) have been studied in mother-infant natural interactions from 0 to 24 months, and (2) to determine to what extent they can be considered co-regulation processes between both members of the dyad. To do this, 36 studies published between 1975 and 2021 were systematically examined, classified and discussed. The analyzed evidence showed that CB in spontaneous mother-infant interactions have been examined under different perspectives, that such behaviors might be differentially classified as distinct modes of copying according to their traits and, lastly, that CB operate as social facilitators that foster the co-regulation of both affects and behaviors and direct mothers and infants, most of the times, towards a mutual sense of interpersonal matching that adds quality to their interactions.

Faces and Voices Processing in Human and Primate Brains: Rhythmic and Multimodal Mechanisms Underlying the Evolution and Development of Speech

While influential works since the 1970s have widely assumed that imitation is an innate skill in both human and non-human primate neonates, recent empirical studies and meta-analyses have challenged this view, indicating other forms of reward-based learning as relevant factors in the development of social behavior. The visual input translation into matching motor output that underlies imitation abilities instead seems to develop along with social interactions and sensorimotor experience during infancy and childhood. Recently, a new visual stream has been identified in both human and non-human primate brains, updating the dual visual stream model. This third pathway is thought to be specialized for dynamics aspects of social perceptions such as eye-gaze, facial expression and crucially for audio-visual integration of speech. Here, we review empirical studies addressing an understudied but crucial aspect of speech and communication, namely the processing of visual orofacial cues (i.e., the perception of a speaker's lips and tongue movements) and its integration with vocal auditory cues. Along this review, we offer new insights from our understanding of speech as the product of evolution and development of a rhythmic and multimodal organization of sensorimotor brain networks, supporting volitional motor control of the upper vocal tract and audio-visual voices-faces integration.

Building better theories

In this My word, Press et al. tackle the 'theory crisis' in cognitive science. Using examples of good and not-so-good theoretical practice, they distinguish theories from effects, predictions, hypotheses, typologies, and frameworks in a self-help checklist of seven questions to guide theory construction, evaluation, and testing.

What Happened to Mirror Neurons?

Ten years ago, Perspectives in Psychological Science published the Mirror Neuron Forum, in which authors debated the role of mirror neurons in action understanding, speech, imitation, and autism and asked whether mirror neurons are acquired through visual-motor learning. Subsequent research on these themes has made significant advances, which should encourage further, more systematic research. For action understanding, multivoxel pattern analysis, patient studies, and brain stimulation suggest that mirror-neuron brain areas contribute to low-level processing of observed actions (e.g., distinguishing types of grip) but not to high-level action interpretation (e.g., inferring actors' intentions). In the area of speech perception, although it remains unclear whether mirror neurons play a specific, causal role in speech perception, there is compelling evidence for the involvement of the motor system in the discrimination of speech in perceptually noisy conditions. For imitation, there is strong evidence from patient, brain-stimulation, and brain-imaging studies that mirror-neuron brain areas play a causal role in copying of body movement topography. In the area of autism, studies using behavioral and neurological measures have tried and failed to find evidence supporting the "broken-mirror theory" of autism. Furthermore, research on the origin of mirror neurons has confirmed the importance of domain-general visual-motor associative learning rather than canalized visual-motor learning, or motor learning alone.

Neonatal Imitation, Intersubjectivity, and Children With Atypical Development: Do Observations on Autism and Down Syndrome Change Our Understanding?

Almost all studies on neonatal imitation to date seem to have focused on typically developing children, and we thus lack information on the early imitative abilities of children who follow atypical developmental trajectories. From both practical and theoretical perspectives, these abilities might be relevant to study in children who develop a neuropsychiatric diagnosis later on or in infants who later show impaired ability to imitate. Theoretical in the sense that it will provide insight into the earliest signs of intersubjectivity—i.e., primary intersubjectivity—and how this knowledge might influence our understanding of children following atypical trajectories of development. Practical in the sense that it might lead to earlier detection of certain disabilities. In the present work, we screen the literature for empirical studies on neonatal imitation in children with an Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or Down syndrome (DS) as well as present an observation of neonatal imitation in an infant that later was diagnosed with autism and a re-interpretation of previously published data on the phenomenon in a small group of infants with DS. Our findings suggest that the empirical observations to date are too few to draw any definite conclusions but that the existing data suggests that neonatal imitation can be observed both in children with ASD and in children with DS. Thus, neonatal imitation might not represent a useful predictor of a developmental deficit. Based on current theoretical perspectives advocating that neonatal imitation is a marker of primary intersubjectivity, we propose tentatively that an ability to engage in purposeful exchanges with another human being exists in these populations from birth.

Moving Toward Understanding Autism: Visual-Motor Integration, Imitation, and Social Skill Development

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder with a behavioral phenotype characterized by impaired development of social-communicative skills and excessive repetitive and stereotyped behaviors. Despite high phenotypic heterogeneity in ASD, a meaningful subpopulation of children with ASD (∼90%) show significant general motor impairment. More focused studies on the nature of motor impairment in ASD reveal that children with ASD are particularly impaired on tasks such as ball catching and motor imitation that require efficient visual-motor integration (VMI). Motor computational approaches also provide evidence for VMI impairment showing that children with ASD form internal sensorimotor representations that bias proprioceptive over visual feedback. Impaired integration of visual information to form internal representations of others' and the external world may explain observed impairments on VMI tasks and motor imitation of others. Motor imitation is crucial for acquiring both social and motor skills, and impaired imitation skill may contribute to the observed core behavioral phenotype of ASD. The current review examines evidence supporting VMI impairment as a core feature of ASD that may contribute to both impaired motor imitation and social-communicative skill development. We propose that understanding the neurobiological mechanisms underlying VMI impairment in ASD may be key to discovery of therapeutics to address disability in children and adults with ASD.

Do Newborns Have the Ability to Imitate?

Neonatal imitation is widely accepted as fact and cited as evidence of an inborn mirror neuron system that underpins human social behaviour, even though its existence has been debated for decades. The possibility that newborns do not imitate was reinvigorated recently by powerful longitudinal data and novel analyses. Although the evidence is still mixed, recent research progresses the debate by ruling out some long-standing explanations for why the effect might be difficult to detect, by showing that only some research groups observe it, and by revealing indications that the published literature is biased. Further advances will be made with updated testing procedures and reporting standards, and investigation of new research questions such as how infants could learn to imitate.