A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.

Attribution Impacts Implicit (And Explicit) Evaluations

Two studies examined whether the attributional framing of negative events affected explicit evaluations, as measured by differences in liking, and implicit evaluations, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 1, participants read negative information about a novel target ordered to elicit internal or external attributions. Participants in the internal attribution condition evaluated the target more negatively than did those in the external attribution condition on both implicit and explicit measures. Study 2 replicated these results and tested the effects of attribution on recently formed negative evaluations. Participants who evaluated targets before and after receiving additional negative information about them demonstrated implicit and explicit evaluative change consistent with the attributional framing of that information. This research provides clear evidence that attribution influences the formation and change of implicit evaluations; however, these effects were weaker than those on explicit measures of evaluation.

The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences

Mental representations remain the central posits of psychology after many decades of scrutiny. However, there is no consensus about the representational format(s) of biological cognition. This paper provides a survey of evidence from computational cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and social psychology, and concludes that one type of format that routinely crops up is the language-of-thought (LoT). We outline six core properties of LoTs: (i) discrete constituents; (ii) role-filler independence; (iii) predicate-argument structure; (iv) logical operators; (v) inferential promiscuity; and (vi) abstract content. These properties cluster together throughout cognitive science. Bayesian computational modeling, compositional features of object perception, complex infant and animal reasoning, and automatic, intuitive cognition in adults all implicate LoT-like structures. Instead of regarding LoT as a relic of the previous century, researchers in cognitive science and philosophy-of-mind must take seriously the explanatory breadth of LoT-based architectures. We grant that the mind may harbor many formats and architectures, including iconic and associative structures as well as deep-neural-network-like architectures. However, as computational/representational approaches to the mind continue to advance, classical compositional symbolic structures - that is, LoTs - only prove more flexible and well-supported over time.

Persuading the Implicit Mind: Changing Negative Implicit Evaluations With an 8-Minute Podcast

Implicit evaluations can be malleable via reinterpretation of previously encountered evidence. Here, we report three studies ( N = 1,007) investigating the robustness of this updating modality using ecologically realistic materials. Participants were first introduced to a target who killed an endangered black rhino in Namibia. They then listened to a real podcast providing counterattitudinal information on the benefits of trophy hunting. The podcast resulted in considerable revisions of initially negative implicit evaluations toward positivity, consistently across implicit measures (affect misattribution procedures vs. implicit association test), samples (American students vs. nonstudents from various countries), study settings (lab vs. online), and the presence versus absence of a memory retrieval manipulation prompting reflection on participants’ views on trophy hunting. Taken together, these findings suggest that reinterpretation can shift implicit evaluations of even highly negative targets, including under conditions of external validity.

Implicit bias reflects systemic racism

Implicit bias refers to automatically evoked mental associations about social groups. The idea has been influential across the social sciences as a way to explain persistent racial disparities amid changing self-report attitudes. Most research has treated implicit bias as an individual attitude. However, evidence suggests that it is neither a stable individual difference nor a strong correlate of individual behavior. Moreover, the individual-focused approach can lead researchers to neglect systemic racism as a cause of persistent disparities. We argue that implicit bias can be considered a cognitive reflection of systemic racism in the environment. In this view, implicit bias is an ongoing set of associations based on inequalities and stereotypes in the environment. As such, implicit bias changes when contexts change.

Attitudes as propositional representations

Attitudes are mental representations that help to explain why stimuli evoke positive or negative responses. Until recently, attitudes were often thought of as associations in memory. This idea inspired extensive research on evaluative conditioning (EC) and implicit evaluation. However, attitudes can also be seen as propositional representations, which, unlike associations, specify relational information and have a truth value. We review research on EC and implicit evaluation that tested the basic tenets of the propositional perspective on attitudes. In line with this perspective, studies show that both phenomena are moderated by relational and truth information. We discuss implications for the prediction and influencing of seemingly irrational behavior such as excessive alcohol intake and implicit racial bias.

Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences

Explicit (directly measured) evaluations are widely assumed to be sensitive to logical structure. However, whether implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are uniquely sensitive to co-occurrence information or can also reflect logical structure has been a matter of theoretical debate. To test these competing ideas, participants (N = 3928) completed a learning phase consisting of a series of two-step trials. In step 1, one or more conditional statements (A → B) containing novel targets co-occurring with valenced adjectives (e.g., "if you see a blue square, Ibbonif is sincere") were presented. In step 2, a disambiguating stimulus, e.g., blue square (A) or gray blob (¬A) was revealed. Co-occurrence information, disambiguating stimuli, or both were varied between conditions to enable investigating the unique and joint effects of each. Across studies, the combination of conditional statements and disambiguating stimuli licensed different normatively accurate inferences. In Study 1, participants were prompted to use modus ponens (inferring B from A → B and A). In Studies 2-4, the information did not license accurate inferences, but some participants made inferential errors: affirming the consequent (inferring A from A → B and B; Study 2) or denying the antecedent (inferring ¬B from A → B and ¬A; Studies 3A, 3B, and 4). Bayesian modeling using ordinal constraints on condition means yielded consistent evidence for the sensitivity of both explicit (self-report) and implicit (IAT and AMP) evaluations to the (correctly or erroneously) inferred truth value of propositions. Together, these data suggest that implicit evaluations, similar to their explicit counterparts, can reflect logical structure.

The Long-Term Effects of New Evidence on Implicit Impressions of Other People

Implicit impressions are often assumed to be difficult to update in light of new information. Even when an intervention appears to successfully change implicit evaluations, the effects have been found to be fleeting, reverting to baseline just hours or days later. Recent findings, however, show that two properties of new evidence—diagnosticity and believability—can result in very rapid implicit updating. In the current studies, we assessed the long-term effects of evidence possessing these two properties on implicit updating over periods of days, weeks, and months. Three studies assessed the malleability of implicit evaluations after memory consolidation (Study 1; N = 396) as well as the longer-term trajectories of implicit responses after exposure to new evidence about novel targets (Study 2; N = 375) and familiar ones (Study 3; N = 341). In contrast with recent work, our findings suggest that implicit impressions can exhibit both flexibility after consolidation and durability weeks or months later.

Behavioral and Physiological Evidence Challenges the Automatic Acquisition of Evaluations

Dual-learning theories of evaluations posit that evaluations can be automatically (i.e., efficiently, unconsciously, uncontrollably, and involuntarily) acquired. They also often assume the existence of evaluative-learning processes that are impervious to verbal information. In this article, we explain that recent research challenges both assertions for three categories of measures: explicit evaluative measures, implicit evaluative measures, and physiological measures of fear. In doing so, we also question the widespread assumption that implicit (i.e., typically behavioral and physiological) compared with explicit (i.e., self-reported) evaluative measures are indicative of the way evaluations are acquired. In the second part of the article, we discuss the practical implications of these recent findings.

Twenty-Five Years of Research Using Implicit Measures

The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of two seminal publications that have set the foundation for an exponentially growing body of research using implicit measures: Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams's (1995) work using evaluative priming to measure racial attitudes, and Greenwald and Banaji's (1995) review of implicit social cognition research that served as the basis for the development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The current article provides an overview of (1) two conceptual roots that continue to shape interpretations of implicit measures; (2) conflicting interpretations of the term implicit; (3) different kinds of dissociations between implicit and explicit measures; (4) theoretical developments inspired by these dissociations; and (5) research that used implicit measures to address domain-specific and applied questions. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and open questions that remain to be addressed, offering guidance for the next generation of research using implicit measures.

The science of belief: A progress report

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our understanding of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.

A Process Dissociation Model of Implicit Rapid Revision in Response to Diagnostic Revelations

Previous research has demonstrated that implicit evaluations can be reversed with exposure to a single impression-inconsistent behavior. But what exactly is changing when perceivers encounter diagnostic revelations about someone? One possibility is that rapid changes are occurring in the extent to which perceivers view the person positively or negatively. Another possibility is that they override the expression of initial evaluations through control-oriented processes. We conducted three studies (one preregistered) that used multinomial process trees to distinguish between these possibilities. We find consistent support across two different implicit measures that diagnostic behaviors result in rapid changes in evaluative processes. We obtained only inconsistent evidence for effects on more control-oriented processes. These findings thus help to reveal the cognitive processes underlying rapid implicit revision. Implications for theoretical perspectives on implicit attitudes are discussed.

Hypnotic Suggestions Can Induce Rapid Change in Implicit Attitudes

We sometimes evaluate our environment (e.g., persons, objects, situations) in an automatic fashion. These automatic or implicit evaluations are often considered to be based on qualitatively distinct mental processes compared with more controlled or explicit evaluations. Important evidence for this claim comes from studies showing that implicit evaluations do not change as the result of counterattitudinal information, in contrast to their explicit counterparts. We examined the impact of counterattitudinal information on implicit evaluations in two experiments (N = 60, N = 72) that included an innovative manipulation: hypnotic suggestions to participants that they would strongly process upcoming counterattitudinal information. Both experiments indicated that hypnotic suggestions facilitated effects of counterattitudinal information on implicit evaluations. These findings extend recent evidence for rapid revision of implicit evaluations on the basis of counterattitudinal information and support the controversial idea that belief-based processes underlie not only explicit but also implicit evaluations.

Moving Beyond System 1 and System 2

It is generally assumed that relational knowledge is the foundation of higher cognition such as (analogical and conditional) reasoning, language, the use of relational categories, and planning. Dual-system models (e.g., Kahneman, 2011) that divide the realm of cognition into two systems with opposing properties (e.g., fast vs. slow, intentional vs. unintentional, conscious vs. unconscious, associative vs. propositional) foster the view that other psychological phenomena are not relational in nature. In this paper, I argue that the impact of relational knowledge is more widespread than dual-system models imply. More specifically, I review evidence suggesting that also Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, and habitual responding are mediated by relational knowledge. Considering the idea that relational knowledge underlies also fast, unintentional, unconscious, and seemingly associative psychological phenomena is not only theoretically important but also reveals new opportunities for influencing thinking and behavior.

Believability of evidence matters for correcting social impressions

To what extent are we beholden to the information we encounter about others? Are there aspects of cognition that are unduly influenced by gossip or outright disinformation, even when we deem it unlikely to be true? Research has shown that implicit impressions of others are often insensitive to the truth value of the evidence. We examined whether the believability of new, contradictory information about others influenced whether people corrected their implicit and explicit impressions. Contrary to previous work, we found that across seven studies, the perceived believability of new evidence predicted whether people corrected their implicit impressions. Subjective assessments of truth value also uniquely predicted correction beyond other properties of information such as diagnosticity/extremity. This evidence shows that the degree to which someone thinks new information is true influences whether it impacts implicit impressions.

When and How Implicit First Impressions Can Be Updated

Human perceivers continually react to the social world implicitly —that is, spontaneously and rapidly. Earlier research suggested that implicit impressions of other people are slower to change than self-reported impressions in the face of contradictory evidence, often leaving them miscalibrated from what one learns to be true. Recent work, however, has identified conditions under which implicit impressions can be rapidly updated. Here, we review three lines of work showing that implicit impressions are responsive to information that is highly diagnostic, believable, or reframes earlier experience. These findings complement ongoing research on mechanisms of changing implicit impressions in a wider variety of groups, from real people to robots, and provide support for theoretical frameworks that embrace greater unity in the factors that can impact implicit and explicit social cognition.

Matters Order: The Role of Information Order on Implicit Impression Formation

A classic finding in the person perception literature is that information order is an important factor in the impressions we form of others. But how does order influence the formation of implicit evaluations? In three preregistered experiments including nearly 900 participants, we find evidence for a strong primacy effect even at the implicit level. This occurred on an affect misattribution procedure (Study 1), an evaluative priming task (Study 2), and an implicit association test (Study 3). These findings suggest that, just as explicit impressions are susceptible to primacy effects, so too are implicit ones. Implications for theories of evaluative conditioning and attitudes are discussed.

The impact of valenced verbal information on implicit and explicit evaluation: the role of information diagnosticity, primacy, and memory cueing

Previous research has shown that the presentation of valenced information about a target stimulus sometimes has different effects on implicit and explicit stimulus evaluations. Importantly, however, research examining the moderators of implicit-explicit dissociations has often failed to account for differences in the properties of the instruments used to measure implicit and explicit evaluations, preventing a clear interpretation of the results. In an effort to overcome these limitations, we conducted a study that probed the impact of valenced information on implicit and explicit evaluations as measured with procedures that were matched on methodological factors. Participants first read positive and negative information about a person named Bob and then completed measures of implicit and explicit evaluations of Bob. We examined the moderating effect of three characteristics: information diagnosticity, primacy, and whether information retrieval was cued during evaluation. Results of two high-powered experiments showed an effect of diagnosticity on implicit and explicit evaluations, replicating previous work, and extending it to new evaluation measures. We observed primacy effects on explicit evaluations in Experiment 1 and on implicit evaluations in Experiment 2. However, we did not observe memory cueing effects or any interactions. We discuss practical implications as well as implications for cognitive evaluation theories.