Target Happiness Attenuates Perceivers' Moral Condemnation of Prejudiced People

Five experiments (combined N = 4,915) tested the prediction that the moral boost of happiness would persist for social targets with moral failings. In Studies 1 and 2, White and Black participants, respectively, judged happy (versus unhappy) racist targets more morally good. In Study 3, happy (versus unhappy) racist targets were judged more morally good and less (more) likely to engage in racist (good) behavior. Behavioral expectations explained the link between happiness and moral evaluations. Study 4 replicated Studies 1 to 3 in the context of sexism. In Study 5, happy (versus unhappy) targets who engaged in racially biased behavior were evaluated as more morally good, and this effect was explained by behavioral forecasts. Happiness boosts attributions of moral goodness for prejudiced people and does so via expectations for future behavior. Future directions are discussed.

Thinking About Reasons for One's Choices Increases Sensitivity to Moral Norms in Moral-Dilemma Judgments

Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.