'Just another incentive scheme': a qualitative interview study of a local pay-for-performance scheme for primary care

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Local Primary Care Incentive Scheme: A Difference-in-Differences Study

National financial incentive schemes for improving the quality of primary care have come under criticism in the United Kingdom, leading to calls for localized alternatives. This study investigated whether a local general practice incentive-based quality improvement scheme launched in 2011 in a city in the North West of England was associated with a reduction in all-cause emergency hospital admissions. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the change in emergency admission rates in the intervention city, to the change in a matched comparison population. Emergency admissions rates fell by 19 per 1,000 people in the years following the intervention (95% confidence interval [17, 21]) in the intervention city, relative to the comparison population. This effect was greater among more disadvantaged populations, narrowing socioeconomic inequalities in emergency admissions. The findings suggest that similar approaches could be an effective component of strategies to reduce unplanned hospital admissions elsewhere.

What drives general practitioners in the UK to improve the quality of care? A systematic literature review

BACKGROUND

In the UK, the National Health Service has various incentivisation schemes in place to improve the provision of high-quality care. The Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) and other Pay for Performance (P4P) schemes are incentive frameworks that focus on meeting predetermined clinical outcomes. However, the ability of these schemes to meet their aims is debated.

OBJECTIVES

(1) To explore current incentive schemes available in general practice in the UK, their impact and effectiveness in improving quality of care and (2) To identify other types of incentives discussed in the literature.

METHODS

This systematic literature review was conducted using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. Six databases were searched: Cochrane, PubMed, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence Evidence, Health Management Information Consortium, Embase and Health Management. Articles were screened according to the selection criteria, evaluated against critical appraisal checklists and categorised into themes.

RESULTS

35 articles were included from an initial search result of 22087. Articles were categorised into the following three overarching themes: financial incentives, non-financial incentives and competition.

DISCUSSION

The majority of the literature focused on QOF. Its positive effects included reduced mortality rates, better data recording and improved sociodemographic inequalities. However, limitations involved decreased quality of care in non-incentivised activities, poor patient experiences due to tick-box exercises and increased pressure to meet non-specific targets. Findings surrounding competition were mixed, with limited evidence found on the use of non-financial incentives in primary care.

CONCLUSION

Current research looks extensively into financial incentives, however, we propose more research into the effects of intrinsic motivation alongside existing P4P schemes to enhance motivation and improve quality of care.

Health Care Professionals' Perceptions of Pay-for-Performance in Practice: A Qualitative Metasynthesis

Incentive-based pay-for-performance (P4P) models have been introduced during the last 2 decades as a mechanism to improve the delivery of evidence-based care that ensures clinical quality and improves health outcomes. There is mixed evidence that P4P has a positive effect on health outcomes and researchers cite lack of engagement from health care professionals as a limiting factor. This qualitative metasynthesis of existing qualitative research was conducted to integrate health care professionals’ perceptions of P4P in clinical practice. Four themes emerged during the research process: positive perceptions of the value of performance measurement and associated financial incentives; negative perceptions of the performance measurement and associated financial incentives; perceptions of how P4P programs influence the quality/appropriateness of care; and perceptions of the influence of P4P program on professional roles and workplace dynamics. Identifying factors that influence health care professionals’ perceptions about this type of value-based payment model will guide future research.

A pay for performance scheme in primary care: Meta-synthesis of qualitative studies on the provider experiences of the quality and outcomes framework in the UK

BACKGROUND

The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is an incentive scheme for general practice, which was introduced across the UK in 2004. The Quality and Outcomes Framework is one of the biggest pay for performance (P4P) scheme in the world, worth £691 million in 2016/17. We now know that P4P is good at driving some kinds of improvement but not others. In some areas, it also generated moral controversy, which in turn created conflicts of interest for providers. We aimed to undertake a meta-synthesis of 18 qualitative studies of the QOF to identify themes on the impact of the QOF on individual practitioners and other staff.

METHODS

We searched 5 electronic databases, Medline, Embase, Healthstar, CINAHL and Web of Science, for qualitative studies of the QOF from the providers' perspective in primary care, published in UK between 2004 and 2018. Data was analysed using the Schwartz Value Theory as a theoretical framework to analyse the published papers through the conceptual lens of Professionalism. A line of argument synthesis was undertaken to express the synthesis.

RESULTS

We included 18 qualitative studies that where on the providers' perspective. Four themes were identified; 1) Loss of autonomy, control and ownership; 2) Incentivised conformity; 3) Continuity of care, holism and the caring role of practitioners' in primary care; and 4) Structural and organisational changes. Our synthesis found, the Values that were enhanced by the QOF were power, achievement, conformity, security, and tradition. The findings indicated that P4P schemes should aim to support Values such as benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and universalism, which professionals ranked highly and have shown to have positive implications for Professionalism and efficiency of health systems.

CONCLUSIONS

Understanding how practitioners experience the complexities of P4P is crucial to designing and delivering schemes to enhance and not compromise the values of professionals. Future P4P schemes should aim to permit professionals with competing high priority values to be part of P4P or other quality improvement initiatives and for them to take on an 'influencer role' rather than being 'responsive agents'. Through understanding the underlying Values and not just explicit concerns of professionals, may ensure higher levels of acceptance and enduring success for P4P schemes.

The development and validation of a scale to explore staff experience of governance of economic efficiency and quality (GOV-EQ) of health care

BACKGROUND

In publicly funded health care systems, governance models are developed to push public service providers to use tax payers' money more efficiently and maintain a high quality of service. Although this implies change in staff behaviors, evaluation studies commonly focus on organizational outputs. Unintended consequences for staff have been observed in case studies, but theoretical and methodological development is necessary to enable studies of staff experience in larger populations across various settings. The aim of the study is to develop a self-assessment scale of staff experience of the governance of economic efficiency and quality of health care and to assess its psychometric properties.

METHODS

Factors relevant to staff members' experience of economic efficiency and quality requirements of health care were identified in the literature and through interviews with practitioners, and then compared to a theoretical model of behavior change. Relevant experiences were developed into sub-factors and items. The scale was tested in collaboration with the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine at a university hospital. 93 staff members participated. The scale's psychometric properties were assessed using exploratory factor analysis, analysis of internal consistency and criterion-related validity.

RESULTS

The analysis revealed an eight factor structure (including sub-factors knowledge and awareness, opportunity to influence, motivation, impact on professional autonomy and organizational alignment), and items showed strong factor loadings and high internal consistency within sub-factors. Sub-factors were interrelated and contributed to the prediction of impact on clinical behavior (criterion).

CONCLUSIONS

The scale clearly distinguishes between various experiences regarding economic efficiency and quality requirements among health care staff, and shows satisfactory psychometric quality. The scale has broad applications for research and practice, as it serves as a tool for capturing staff members' perspectives when evaluating and improving health care governance. The scale could also be useful for understanding the underlying processes of changes in provider performance and for adapting management strategies to engage staff in driving change that contributes to increased economic efficiency and quality, for the benefit of health care systems, patients and staff.

Primary care clinicians' perspectives about quality measurements in safety-net clinics and non-safety-net clinics

BACKGROUND

Quality metrics, pay for performance (P4P), and value-based payments are prominent aspects of the current and future American healthcare system. However, linking clinic payment to clinic quality measures may financially disadvantage safety-net clinics and their patient population because safety-net clinics often have worse quality metric scores than non-safety net clinics. The Minnesota Safety Net Coalition's Quality Measurement Enhancement Project sought to collect data from primary care providers' (PCPs) experiences, which could assist Minnesota policymakers and state agencies as they create a new P4P system. Our research study aims are to identify PCPs' perspectives about 1) quality metrics at safety net clinics and non-safety net clinics, 2) how clinic quality measures affect patients and patient care, and 3) how payment for quality measures may influence healthcare.

METHODS

Qualitative interviews with 14 PCPs (4 individual interviews and 3 focus groups) who had worked at both safety net and non-safety net primary care clinics in Minneapolis-St Paul Minnesota USA metropolitan area. Qualitative analyses identified major themes.

RESULTS

Three themes with sub-themes emerged. Theme #1: Minnesota's current clinic quality scores are influenced more by patients and clinic systems than by clinicians. Theme #2: Collecting data for a set of specific quality measures is not the same as measuring quality healthcare. Subtheme #2.1: Current quality measures are not aligned with how patients and clinicians define quality healthcare. Theme #3: Current quality measures are a product of and embedded in social and structural inequities in the American health care system. Subtheme #3.1: The current inequitable healthcare system should not be reinforced with financial payments. Subtheme #3.2: Health equity requires new metrics and a new healthcare system. Overall, PCPs felt that the current inequitable quality metrics should be replaced by different metrics along with major changes to the healthcare system that could produce greater health equity.

CONCLUSION

Aligning payment with the current quality metrics could perpetuate and exacerbate social inequities and health disparities. Policymakers should consider PCPs' perspectives and create a quality-payment framework that does not disadvantage patients who are affected by social and structural inequities as well as the clinics and providers who serve them.

The role of cost-effectiveness analysis in the development of indicators to support incentive-based behaviour in primary care in England

In England, general practitioners are incentivized through a national pay-for-performance scheme to adopt evidence-based quality improvement initiatives using a portfolio of Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) indicators. We describe the development of the methods used to assess the cost-effectiveness of these pay-for-performance indicators and how they have contributed to the development of new indicators. Prior to analysis of new potential indicators, an economic subgroup of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) Indicator Advisory Committee is formed to assess evidence on the cost-effectiveness of potential indicators in terms of the health benefits gained, compared to the cost of the intervention and the cost of the incentive. The expert subgroup is convened to reach consensus on the amounts that could potentially be paid to general practices for achieving new indicators. Indicators are also piloted in selected general practices and evidence gathered about their practical implementation. The methods used to assess economic viability of new pilot indicators represent a pragmatic and effective way of providing information to inform recommendations. Current policy to reduce QOF funding could shift the focus from national (QOF) to local schemes, with economic appraisal remaining central.

Does a local financial incentive scheme reduce inequalities in the delivery of clinical care in a socially deprived community? A longitudinal data analysis

BACKGROUND

Socioeconomic deprivation is associated with inequalities in health care and outcomes. Despite concerns that the Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme in the UK would exacerbate inequalities in primary care delivery, gaps closed over time. Local schemes were promoted as a means of improving clinical engagement by addressing local health priorities. We evaluated equity in achievement of target indicators and practice income for one local scheme.

METHODS

We undertook a longitudinal survey over four years of routinely recorded clinical data for all 83 primary care practices. Sixteen indicators were developed that covered five local clinical and public health priorities: weight management; alcohol consumption; learning disabilities; osteoporosis; and chlamydia screening. Clinical indicators were logit transformed from a percentage achievement scale and modelled allowing for clustering of repeated measures within practices. This enabled our study of target achievements over time with respect to deprivation. Practice income was also explored.

RESULTS

Higher practice deprivation was associated with poorer performance for five indicators: alcohol use registration (OR 0.97; 95 % confidence interval 0.96,0.99); recorded chlamydia test result (OR 0.97; 0.94,0.99); osteoporosis registration (OR 0.98; 0.97,0.99); registration of repeat prednisolone prescription (OR 0.98; 0.96,0.99); and prednisolone registration with record of dual energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) scan/referral (OR 0.92; 0.86,0.97); practices in deprived areas performed better for one indicator (registration of osteoporotic fragility fracture (OR 1.26; 1.04,1.51). The deprivation-achievement gap widened for one indicator (registered females aged 65-74 with a fracture referred for a DEXA scan; OR 0.97; 0.95,0.99). Two other indicators indicated a similar trend over two years before being withdrawn (registration of fragility fracture and over-75 s with a fragility fracture assessed and treated for osteoporosis risk). For one indicator the deprivation-achievement gap reduced over time (repeat prednisolone prescription (OR 1.01; 1.01,1.01). Larger practices and those serving more affluent areas earned more income per patient than smaller practices and those serving more deprived areas (t = -3.99; p =0.0001).

CONCLUSIONS

Any gaps in achievement between practices were modest but mostly sustained or widened over the duration of the scheme. Given that financial rewards may not reflect the amount of work undertaken by practices serving more deprived patients, future pay-for-performance schemes also need to address fairness of rewards in relation to workload.