Does a local financial incentive scheme reduce inequalities in the delivery of clinical care in a socially deprived community? A longitudinal data analysis

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Local Primary Care Incentive Scheme: A Difference-in-Differences Study

National financial incentive schemes for improving the quality of primary care have come under criticism in the United Kingdom, leading to calls for localized alternatives. This study investigated whether a local general practice incentive-based quality improvement scheme launched in 2011 in a city in the North West of England was associated with a reduction in all-cause emergency hospital admissions. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the change in emergency admission rates in the intervention city, to the change in a matched comparison population. Emergency admissions rates fell by 19 per 1,000 people in the years following the intervention (95% confidence interval [17, 21]) in the intervention city, relative to the comparison population. This effect was greater among more disadvantaged populations, narrowing socioeconomic inequalities in emergency admissions. The findings suggest that similar approaches could be an effective component of strategies to reduce unplanned hospital admissions elsewhere.

Socioeconomic inequalities in the quality of primary care under Brazil's national pay-for-performance programme: a longitudinal study of family health teams

Background

Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care. Evidence on whether these programmes reduce or exacerbate disparities in health care is scarce. In this study, we aimed to assess socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health teams under Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ).

Methods

For this longitudinal study, we analysed data on the quality of care delivered by family health teams participating in PMAQ over three rounds of implementation: round 1 (November, 2011, to March, 2013), round 2 (April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 (October, 2015, to December, 2019). The primary outcome was the percentage of the maximum performance score obtainable by family health teams (the PMAQ score), based on several hundred (ranging from 598 to 914) indicators of health-care delivery. Using census data on household income of local areas, we examined the PMAQ score by income ventile. We used ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and the income of each local area across implementation rounds, and we did an analysis of variance to assess geographical variation in PMAQ score.

Findings

Of the 40 361 family health teams that were registered as ever participating in PMAQ, we included 13 934 teams that participated in the three rounds of PMAQ in our analysis. These teams were located in 11 472 census areas and served approximately 48 million people. The mean PMAQ score was 61·0% (median 61·8, IQR 55·3–67·9) in round 1, 55·3% (median 56·0, IQR 47·6–63·4) in round 2, and 61·6% (median 62·7, IQR 54·4–69·9) in round 3. In round 1, we observed a positive socioeconomic gradient, with the mean PMAQ score ranging from 56·6% in the poorest group to 64·1% in the richest group. Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance increased by 7·1 percentage points for the poorest group and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest group (p<0·0001), with the gap between richest and poorest narrowing from 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5) to –0·4 percentage points over the same period (–1·6 to 0·8).

Interpretation

Existing income inequalities in the delivery of primary health care were eliminated during the three rounds of PMAQ, plausibly due to a design feature of PMAQ that adjusted financial payments for socioeconomic inequalities. However, there remains an important policy agenda in Brazil to address the large inequities in health.

Funding

UK Medical Research Council, Newton Fund, and CONFAP (Conselho Nacional das Fundações Estaduais de Amparo à Pesquisa).

Incentive schemes to increase dementia diagnoses in primary care in England: a retrospective cohort study of unintended consequences

BACKGROUND

The UK government introduced two financial incentive schemes for primary care to tackle underdiagnosis in dementia: the 3-year Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18) and the 6-month Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS). The schemes appear to have been effective in boosting dementia diagnosis rates, but their unintended effects are unknown.

AIM

To identify and quantify unintended consequences associated with the DES18 and DIS schemes.

DESIGN AND SETTING

A retrospective cohort quantitative study of 7079 English primary care practices.

METHOD

Potential unintended effects of financial incentive schemes, both positive and negative, were identified from a literature review. A practice-level dataset covering the period 2006/2007 to 2015/2016 was constructed. Difference-in-differences analysis was employed to test the effects of the incentive schemes on quality measures from the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF); and four measures of patient experience from the GP Patient Survey (GPPS): patient-centred care, access to care, continuity of care, and the doctor-patient relationship. The researchers controlled for effects of the contemporaneous hospital incentive scheme for dementia and for practice characteristics.

RESULTS

National practice participation rates in DES18 and DIS were 98.5% and 76% respectively. Both schemes were associated not only with a positive impact on QOF quality outcomes, but also with negative impacts on some patient experience indicators.

CONCLUSION

The primary care incentive schemes for dementia appear to have enhanced QOF performance for the dementia review, and have had beneficial spillover effects on QOF performance in other clinical areas. However, the schemes may have had negative impacts on several aspects of patient experience.

Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS) trial: a three-armed randomised controlled trial of financial incentives

Background

The UK national diabetic eye screening (DES) programme invites diabetic patients aged > 12 years annually. Simple and cost-effective methods are needed to increase screening uptake. This trial tests the impact on uptake of two financial incentive schemes, based on behavioural economic principles.

Objectives

To test whether or not financial incentives encourage screening attendance. Secondarily to understand if the type of financial incentive scheme used affects screening uptake or attracts patients with a different sociodemographic status to regular attenders. If financial incentives were found to improve attendance, then a final objective was to test cost-effectiveness.

Design

Three-armed randomised controlled trial.

Setting

DES clinic within St Mary’s Hospital, London, covering patients from the areas of Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster.

Participants

Patients aged ≥ 16 years, who had not attended their DES appointment for ≥ 2 years.

Interventions

(1) Fixed incentive – invitation letter and £10 for attending screening; (2) probabilistic (lottery) incentive – invitation letter and 1% chance of winning £1000 for attending screening; and (3) control – invitation letter only.

Main outcome measures

The primary outcome was screening attendance. Rates for control versus fixed and lottery incentive groups were compared using relative risk (RR) and risk difference with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs).

Results

A total of 1274 patients were eligible and randomised; 223 patients became ineligible before invite and 1051 participants were invited (control,n = 435; fixed group,n = 312; lottery group,n = 304). Thirty-four (7.8%, 95% CI 5.29% to 10.34%) control, 17 (5.5%, 95% CI 2.93% to 7.97%) fixed group and 10 (3.3%, 95% CI 1.28% to 5.29%) lottery group participants attended. Participants offered incentives were 44% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.56, 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Examining incentive groups separately, the lottery group were 58% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98). No significant differences were found between fixed incentive and control groups (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.35 to 1.39) or between fixed and lottery incentive groups (RR 1.66, 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21). Subgroup analyses showed no significant associations between attendance and sociodemographic factors, including gender (female vs. male, RR 1.25, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.03), age (≤ 65 years vs. > 65 years, RR 1.26, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.08), deprivation [0–20 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) decile vs. 30–100 IMD decile, RR 1.12, 95% CI 0.69 to 1.83], years registered [mean difference (MD) –0.13, 95% CI –0.69 to 0.43], and distance from screening location (MD –0.18, 95% CI –0.65 to 0.29).

Limitations

Despite verification, some address details may have been outdated, and high ethnic diversity may have resulted in language barriers for participants.

Conclusions

Those receiving incentives were not more likely to attend a DES than those receiving a usual invitation letter in patients who are regular non-attenders. Both fixed and lottery incentives appeared to reduce attendance. Overall, there is no evidence to support the use of financial incentives to promote diabetic retinopathy screening. Testing interventions in context, even if they appear to be supported by theory, is important.

Future work

Future research, specifically in this area, should focus on identifying barriers to screening and other non-financial methods to overcome them.

Trial registration

Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN14896403.

Funding

This project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Services and Delivery Research programme and will be published in full inHealth Services and Delivery Research; Vol. 5, No. 15. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.

Does a pay-for-performance program for primary care physicians alleviate health inequity in childhood vaccination rates?

Introduction

Childhood vaccination rates in Manitoba populations with low socioeconomic status (SES) fall significantly below the provincial average. This study examined the impact of a pay-for-performance (P4P) program called the Physician Integrated Network (PIN) on health inequity in childhood vaccination rates.

Methods

The study used administrative data housed at the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy. We included all children born in Manitoba between 2003 and 2010 who were patients at PIN clinics receiving P4P funding matched with controls at non-participating clinics. We examined the rate of completion of the childhood primary vaccination series by age 2 across income quintiles (Q1–Q5). We estimated the distribution of income using the Gini coefficient, and calculated concentration indices for vaccination to determine whether the P4P program altered SES-related differences in vaccination completion. We compared these measures between study cohorts before and after implementation of the P4P program, and over the course of the P4P program in each cohort.

Results

The PIN cohort included 6,185 children. Rates of vaccination completion at baseline were between 0.53 (Q1) and 0.69 (Q5). Inequality in income distribution was present at baseline and at study end in PIN and control cohorts. SES-related inequity in vaccination completion worsened in non-PIN clinics (difference in concentration index 0.037; 95 % CI 0.013, 0.060), but remained constant in P4P-funded clinics (difference in concentration index 0.006; 95 % CI 0.008, 0.021).

Conclusions

The P4P program had a limited impact on vaccination rates and did not address health inequity.

'Just another incentive scheme': a qualitative interview study of a local pay-for-performance scheme for primary care

BACKGROUND

A range of policy initiatives have addressed inequalities in healthcare and health outcomes. Local pay-for-performance schemes for primary care have been advocated as means of enhancing clinical ownership of the quality agenda and better targeting local need compared with national schemes such as the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). We investigated whether professionals' experience of a local scheme in one English National Health Service (NHS) former primary care trust (PCT) differed from that of the national QOF in relation to the goal of reducing inequalities.

METHODS

We conducted retrospective semi-structured interviews with primary care professionals implementing the scheme and those involved in its development. We purposively sampled practices with varying levels of population socio-economic deprivation and achievement. Interviews explored perceptions of the scheme and indicators, likely mechanisms of influence on practice, perceived benefits and harms, and how future schemes could be improved. We used a framework approach to analysis.

RESULTS

Thirty-eight professionals from 16 general practices and six professionals involved in developing local indicators participated. Our findings cover four themes: ownership, credibility of the indicators, influences on behaviour, and exacerbated tensions. We found little evidence that the scheme engendered any distinctive sense of ownership or experiences different from the national scheme. Although the indicators and their evidence base were seldom actively questioned, doubts were expressed about their focus on health promotion given that eventual benefits relied upon patient action and availability of local resources. Whilst practices serving more affluent populations reported status and patient benefit as motivators for participating in the scheme, those serving more deprived populations highlighted financial reward. The scheme exacerbated tensions between patient and professional consultation agendas, general practitioners benefitting directly from incentives and nurses who did much of the work, and practices serving more and less affluent populations which faced different challenges in achieving targets.

CONCLUSIONS

The contentious nature of pay-for-performance was not necessarily reduced by local adaptation. Those developing future schemes should consider differential rewards and supportive resources for practices serving more deprived populations, and employing a wider range of levers to promote professional understanding and ownership of indicators.