Conscientious objection to intentional killing: an argument for toleration

Conscientious Objection and Other Motivations for Refusal to Treat in Hastened Death: A Systematic Review

BACKGROUND

Conscientious objection (CO) in the context of health care arises when a health care professional (HCP) refuses to participate in a certain procedure because it is not compatible with their ethical or moral principles. Refusal to treat in health care includes, in addition to CO, other factors that may lead the HCP not to want to participate in a certain procedure. Therefore, we can say that CO is a form of refusal of treatment based on conscience. Hastened death has become an increasingly reality around the world, being a procedure in which not all HCPs are willing to participate. There are several factors that can condition the HCPs' refusal to treat in this scenario.

METHODS

With the aim of identifying these factors, we performed a systematic review, following the PRISMA guidelines. On 1 October 2022, we searched for relevant articles on Pubmed, Web of Science and Scopus databases.

RESULTS

From an initial search of 693 articles, 12 were included in the final analysis. Several motivations that condition refusal to treat were identified, including legal, technical, social, and CO. Three main motivations for CO were also identified, namely religious, moral/secular, and emotional/psychological motivations.

CONCLUSIONS

We must adopt an understanding approach respecting the position of each HCP, avoiding judgmental and discriminatory positions, although we must ensure also that patients have access to care. The identification of these motivations may permit solutions that, while protecting the HCPS' position, may also mitigate potential problems concerning patients' access to this type of procedure.

The Reasonableness Standard for Conscientious Objection in Healthcare

In complex, pluralistic societies, different views concerning the moral duties of healthcare professionals inevitably exist: according to some accounts, doctors can and should cooperate in performing abortion or physician-assisted suicide, while according to others they should always defend human life and protect their patients' health. It is argued that the very plurality of responses presently given to questions such as these provides a liberal argument in favour of conscientious objection (CO), as an attempt to deal with moral diversity by protecting both the professionals' claim to moral integrity and the patients' claim to receive lawful and safe medical treatments. A moderate view on CO is defended, according to which none of these claims can be credited with unconditional value. Claims to CO by healthcare professionals can be justified but must be subjected to a reasonableness standard. Both the incompatibility of CO with the medical profession and its unconditional sanctioning by conscience absolutism are therefore rejected. The paper contributes to the definition of the conditions of such reasonableness, particularly by stressing the role played by conceptions of good medicine in discriminating claims to CO; it is argued that respecting these conditions prevents from having the negative consequences dreaded by critics. The objection according to which accepting the physician's duty to inform and refer is inconsistent with the professed value of moral integrity is also discussed.

Unjustified Asymmetry: Positive Claims of Conscience and Heartbeat Bills

In 2019, several US states passed "heartbeat" bills. Should such bills go into effect, they would outlaw abortion once an embryonic heartbeat can be detected, thereby severely limiting an individual's access to abortion. Many states allow health care professionals to refuse to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. Yet heartbeat bills do not include a positive conscience clause that would allow health care professionals to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. I argue that this asymmetry is unjustified. The same criteria that justify protecting conscientious refusals to provide abortion also justify protecting positive conscientious appeals regarding abortion. Thus, if the law provides legal exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, refuse to provide abortions where it is legal, it should also provide exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, feel obligated to provide abortions where it is illegal.

Voluntarily chosen roles and conscientious objection in health care

The longstanding dominant view is that health care practitioners should be permitted to refrain from participating in medical interventions when they have a conscientious objection to doing so in a broad range of cases. In recent years, a growing minority have been fervently advocating a sea change. In their view, medical professionals should not be permitted to refuse to participate in medical interventions merely because doing so conflicts with their own moral or religious views. One of the most commonly offered arguments in support of this position focuses on the fact that health care practitioners knew what they were getting into when they voluntarily chose to take on their professional roles; nobody forced them to do this. I will argue that, despite its popularity among opponents of conscientious refusal, this argument from voluntariness fails to provide us with a good reason to reject broad accommodationism in favour of non-accommodationism.

Becoming a medical assistance in dying (MAiD) provider: an exploration of the conditions that produce conscientious participation

The availability of willing providers of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) in Canada has been an issue since a Canadian Supreme Court decision and the subsequent passing of federal legislation, Bill C14, decriminalised MAiD in 2016. Following this legislation, Hamilton Health Sciences (HHS) in Ontario, Canada, created a team to support access to MAiD for patients. This research used a qualitative, mixed methods approach to data collection, obtaining the narratives of providers and supporters of MAiD practice at HHS. This study occurred at the outset of MAiD practice in 2016, and 1 year later, once MAiD practice was established. Our study reveals that professional identity and values, personal identity and values, experience with death and dying, and organisation context are the most significant contributors to conscientious participation for MAiD providers and supporters. The stories of study participants were used to create a model that provides a framework for values clarification around MAiD practice, and can be used to explore beliefs and reasoning around participation in MAiD across the moral spectrum. This research addresses a significant gap in the literature by advancing our understanding of factors that influence participation in taboo clinical practices. It may be applied practically to help promote reflective practice regarding complex and controversial areas of medicine, to improve interprofessional engagement in MAiD practice and promote the conditions necessary to support moral diversity in our institutions.

Quotas: Enabling Conscientious Objection to Coexist with Abortion Access

The debate regarding the role of conscientious objection in healthcare has been protracted, with increasing demands for curbs on conscientious objection. There is a growing body of evidence that indicates that in some cases, high rates of conscientious objection can affect access to legal medical services such as abortion—a major concern of critics of conscientious objection. Moreover, few solutions have been put forward that aim to satisfy both this concern and that of defenders of conscientious objection—being expected to participate in the provision of services that compromise their moral integrity. Here we attempt to bring some resolution to the debate by proposing a pragmatic, long-term solution offering what we believe to be an acceptable compromise—a quota system for medical trainees in specialties where a conscientious objection can be exercised, and is known to cause conflict. We envisage two main objectives of the quota system we propose. First, as a means to introduce conscientious objection into countries where this is not presently permitted. Second, to minimise or eliminate the effects of high rates of conscientious objection in countries such as Italy, where access to legal abortion provision can be negatively affected.

Conscientious objection to abortion: why it should be a specified legal right for doctors in South Korea

Background

In 2019, the Constitutional Court of South Korea ruled that the anti-abortion provisions in the Criminal Act, which criminalize abortion, do not conform to the Constitution. This decision will lead to a total reversal of doctors’ legal duty from the obligation to refuse abortion services to their requirement to provide them, given the Medical Service Act that states that a doctor may not refuse a request for treatment or assistance in childbirth. I argue, confined to abortion services in Korea that will take place in the near future, that doctors should be granted the legal right to exercise conscientious objection to abortion.

Main text

Considering that doctors in Korea have been ethically and legally obligated to refrain from abortions for many years, imposing a universal legal duty to provide abortions that does not allow exception may endanger the moral integrity of individual doctors who chose a career when abortion was illegal. The universal imposition of such a duty may result in repudiation of doctors as moral agents and damage trust in doctors that forms the basis of medical professionalism. Even if conscientious objection to abortion is granted as a legal right, most patients would experience no impediment to receiving abortion services because the healthcare environment of Korea provides options in which patients can choose their doctors based on prior information, there are many doctors who would be willing to provide an abortion, and Korea is a relatively small country. Finally, the responsibility to effectively balance and guarantee the respective rights of the two agents involved in abortion, the doctor and the patient, should be imposed on the government rather than individual doctors. This assertion is based on the government’s past behaviours, the nature of its relationship with doctors, and the capacity it has to satisfy both doctors’ right to conscientious objection and patients’ right to legal medical services.

Conclusion

With regard to abortion services that will be sought in the near future, doctors should be granted the legal right to exercise conscientious objection based on the importance of doctor’s moral integrity, lack of impediment to patients, and government responsibility.

Conscientious Objection and Clinical Judgement: The Right to Refuse to Harm

This paper argues that healthcare aims at the good of health, that this pursuit of the good necessitates conscience, and that conscience is required in every practical judgement, including clinical judgment. Conscientious objection in healthcare is usually restricted to a handful of controversial ends (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, contraception), yet the necessity of conscience in all clinical judgements implies the possibility of conscientious objection to means. The distinction between conscientious objection to means and ends is explored and its implications considered. Based on this, it is suggested that conscientious objection, whether to means or ends, occurs when a proposed course of action comes into irreconcilable conflict with the moral principle 'do no harm'. It is, therefore, concluded that conscientious objection in healthcare can be conceived as a requirement of the moral imperative to do no harm, the right to refuse to harm in regard to health.

Conscientious Objection: A Talmudic Paradigm Shift

Conscientious objection remains a very heated topic with strong opinions arguing for and against its utilization in contemporary health care. This paper summarizes and analyzes various arguments in the bioethical literature, favoring and opposing conscientious objection, as well as some of the proposed solutions and compromises. I then present a paradigm shifting compromise approach that arises out of very recent Jewish bioethical thought that refocuses the discussion and can minimize the frequency with which conscientious objection is required.

Refusals to perform ritual circumcision: a qualitative study of doctors' professional and ethical reasoning

Background

Ritual circumcision of infant boys is controversial in Norway, as in many other countries. The procedure became a part of Norwegian public health services in 2015. A new law opened for conscientious objection to the procedure. We have studied physicians’ refusals to perform ritual circumcision as an issue of professional ethics.

Method

Qualitative interview study with 10 urologists who refused to perform ritual circumcision from six Norwegian public hospitals. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, then analysed with systematic text condensation, a qualitative analysis framework.

Results

The physicians are unanimous in grounding their opposition to the procedure in professional standards and norms, based on fundamental tenets of professional ethics. While there is homogeneity in the group when it comes to this reasoning, there are significant variations as to how deeply the matter touches the urologists on a personal level. About half of them connect their stance to their personal integrity, and state that performing the procedure would go against their conscience and lead to pangs of conscience.

Conclusions

It is argued that professional moral norms sometimes might become more or less ‘integrated’ in the professional’s core moral values and moral identity. If this is the case, then the distinction between conscience-based and professional refusals to certain healthcare services cannot be drawn as sharply as it has been.

Protecting reasonable conscientious refusals in health care

Recently, debate over whether health care providers should have a protected right to conscientiously refuse to offer legal health care services-such as abortion, elective sterilization, aid in dying, or treatments for transgender patients-has grown exponentially. I advance a modified compromise view that bases respect for claims of conscientious refusal to provide specific health care services on a publicly defensible rationale. This view requires health care providers who refuse such services to disclose their availability by other providers, as well as to arrange for referrals or facilitate transfers of care. This requirement raises the question of whether providers are being forced to be complicit in the provision of services they deem to be morally objectionable. I conclude by showing how this modified compromise view answers the most significant objections mounted by critics of the right to conscientious refusal and safeguards providers from having to offer services that most directly threaten their moral integrity.