Aiding empirical research on the commercial determinants of health: a scoping review of datasets and methods about lobbying

Continuities and change in alcohol policy at the global level: a documentary analysis of the 2010 Global Strategy for Reducing the Harmful Use of Alcohol and the Global Alcohol Action Plan 2022-2030

BACKGROUND

There are only two major statements which define alcohol policy development at the global level. There has not been any comparative analysis of the details of these key texts, published in 2010 and 2022 respectively, including how far they constitute similar or evolving approaches to alcohol harm.

METHODS

Preparatory data collection involved examination of documents associated with the final policy statements. A thematic analysis across the two policy documents was performed to generate understanding of continuity and change based on comparative study. Study findings are interpreted in the contexts of the evolving conceptual and empirical literatures.

RESULTS

Both documents exhibit shared guiding principles and identify similar governance challenges, albeit with varying priority levels. There is more emphasis on the high-impact interventions on price, availability and marketing in 2022, and more stringent targets have been set for 2030 in declaring alcohol as a public health priority therein, reflecting the action-oriented nature of the Plan. The identified roles of policy actors have largely remained unchanged, albeit with greater specificity in the more recent statement, appropriately so because it is concerned with implementation. The major exception, and the key difference in the documents, regards the alcohol industry, which is perceived primarily as a threat to public health in 2022 due to commercial activities harmful to health and because policy interference has slowed progress.

CONCLUSIONS

The adoption of the Global Alcohol Action Plan 2022-30 potentially marks a pivotal moment in global alcohol policy development, though it is unclear how fully it may be implemented. Perhaps, the key advances lie in advancing the ambitions of alcohol policy and clearly identifying that the alcohol industry should not be seen as any kind of partner in public health policymaking, which will permit progress to the extent that this influences what actually happens in alcohol policy at the national level.

Mapping the Lobbying Footprint of Harmful Industries: 23 Years of Data From OpenSecrets

Policy Points Our research reveals the similarities and differences among the lobbying activities of tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed food industries, which are often a barrier to the implementation of public health policies. Over 23 years, we found that just six organizations dominated lobbying expenses in the tobacco and alcohol sectors, whereas the gambling sector outsourced most of their lobbying to professional firms. Databases like OpenSecrets are a useful resource to monitor the commercial determinants of health.

CONTEXT

Commercial lobbying is often a barrier to the development and implementation of public health policies. Yet, little is known about the similarities and differences in the lobbying practices of different industry sectors or types of commercial actors. This study compares the lobbying practices of four industry sectors that have been the focus of much public health research and advocacy: tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed foods.

METHODS

Data on lobbying expenditures and lobbyist backgrounds were sourced from the OpenSecrets database, which monitors lobbying in the United States. Lobbying expenditure data were analyzed for the 1998-2020 period. We classified commercial actors as companies or trade associations. We used Power BI software to link, analyze, and visualize data sets.

FINDINGS

We found that the ultraprocessed food industry spent the most on lobbying ($1.15 billion), followed by gambling ($817 million), tobacco ($755 million), and alcohol ($541 million). Overall, companies were more active than trade associations, with associations being least active in the tobacco industry. Spending was often highly concentrated, with two organizations accounting for almost 60% of tobacco spending and four organizations accounting for more than half of alcohol spending. Lobbyists that had formerly worked in government were mainly employed by third-party lobby firms.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study shows how comparing the lobbying practices of different industry sectors offers a deeper appreciation of the diversity and similarities of commercial actors. Understanding these patterns can help public health actors to develop effective counterstrategies.