Defining hospital markets - an application to the German hospital sector

Can competition improve hospital quality of care? A difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effect of increasing quality transparency on hospital quality

Public reporting on the quality of care is intended to guide patients to the provider with the highest quality and to stimulate a fair competition on quality. We apply a difference-in-differences design to test whether hospital quality has improved more in markets that are more competitive after the first public release of performance data in Germany in 2008. Panel data from 947 hospitals from 2006 to 2010 are used. Due to the high complexity of the treatment of stroke patients, we approximate general hospital quality by the 30-day risk-adjusted mortality rate for stroke treatment. Market structure is measured (comparatively) by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and by the number of hospitals in the relevant market. Predicted market shares based on exogenous variables only are used to compute the HHI to allow a causal interpretation of the reform effect. A homogenous positive effect of competition on quality of care is found. This effect is mainly driven by the response of non-profit hospitals that have a narrow range of services and private for-profit hospitals with a medium range of services. The results highlight the relevance of outcome transparency to enhance hospital quality competition.

The effects of market concentration on health care price and quality in hospital markets in Ibadan, Nigeria

Evidence about the Nigerian health indicators show that the quality of health care in Nigeria is low and inflation of health care prices also persists. Theoretically, by observing the market concentration, inferences can be drawn as to how hospitals conduct themselves, which allows the evaluation of the market performance. Therefore, the effects of market concentration on the health care price and quality were examined. Market concentration was measured by Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) and four hospital concentration ratios (CR₄). The values of HHI were disaggregated into the less and more concentrated markets. Quality of health care was measured by the staff-nurse-patient ratio. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) was used to estimate the effects of market concentration on price and quality of health care. The price of health care was found to be 13.4% lower in the less concentrated markets than in the more concentrated market. Income significantly and positively influenced health care prices by 17.8%. Also, a low HHI lead to 33.4% increase in Staff-nurse Patient Ratio (SPR) indicating that the quality of health care was higher in less concentrated markets as hospitals increased the treatment intensity via staff-nurse patient ratio. A less concentrated market is linked with higher health care quality and lower health care prices. Therefore, a strategy that will reduce market concentration so as to enhance consumer welfare in terms of price and quality is recommended.

What drives different treatment choices? Investigation of hospital ownership, system membership and competition

BACKGROUND

Differences in ownership types have attracted considerable interest because of policy implications. Moreover, competition in hospital markets is promoted to reduce health care spending. However, the effects of system membership and competition on treatment choices of hospitals have not been considered in studying hospital ownership types. We examine the treatment choices of hospitals considering ownership types (not-for-profit, for-profit, and government), system membership, patient insurance status (insured, and uninsured) and hospital competition in the United States.

METHODS

We estimate the probability of according the procedure as the treatment employing logistic regression. We consider all procedures accorded at hospitals, controlling for procedure type and diagnosis as well as relevant patient and hospital characteristics. Competition faced by hospitals is measured using a distance-weighted approach separately for procedural groups. Patient records are obtained from State Inpatient Databases for 11 states and hospital characteristics come from American Hospital Association Annual Survey.

RESULTS

Not-for-profit hospitals facing low for-profit competition that are nonmembers of hospital systems, act like government hospitals, whereas not-for-profits facing high for-profit competition and system member not-for-profits facing low for-profit competition are not statistically significantly different from their for-profit counterparts in terms of treatment choices. Uninsured patients are on average 7% less likely to be accorded the procedure as the treatment at system member not-for-profit hospitals facing high for-profit competition than insured patients. System member not-for-profit hospitals, which account for over half of the observations in the analysis, are on average 16% more likely to accord the procedure as the treatment when facing high for-profit competition than low-for-profit competition.

CONCLUSIONS

We show that treatment choices of hospitals differ by system membership and the level of for-profit competition faced by the hospitals in addition to hospital ownership type and health insurance status of patients. Our results support that hospital system member not-for-profits and not-for-profits facing high for-profit competition are for-profits in disguise. Therefore, system membership is an important characteristic to consider in addition to market competitiveness when tax exemption of not-for-profits are revisited. Moreover, higher competition may lead to increasing health care costs due to more aggressive treatment choices, which should be taken into account while regulating hospital markets.

Price effects of a hospital merger: Heterogeneity across health insurers, hospital products, and hospital locations

In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average across hospital products and across payers. However, little is known about whether price effects vary between hospital locations, products, and payers. We expand existing bargaining models to allow for heterogeneous price effects and use a difference-in-differences model in which price changes at the merging hospitals are compared with price changes at comparison hospitals. We find evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, hospital products and hospital locations. These findings have implications for ex ante merger scrutiny.