Preparing for a "dirty bomb" attack: the optimum mix of medical countermeasure resources

Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies: Biological Effects, Countermeasures and Biodosimetry

Atomic and radiological crises can be caused by accidents, military activities, terrorist assaults involving atomic installations, the explosion of nuclear devices, or the utilization of concealed radiation exposure devices. Direct damage is caused when radiation interacts directly with cellular components. Indirect effects are mainly caused by the generation of reactive oxygen species due to radiolysis of water molecules. Acute and persistent oxidative stress associates to radiation-induced biological damages. Biological impacts of atomic radiation exposure can be deterministic (in a period range a posteriori of the event and because of destructive tissue/organ harm) or stochastic (irregular, for example cell mutation related pathologies and heritable infections). Potential countermeasures according to a specific scenario require considering basic issues, e.g., the type of radiation, people directly affected and first responders, range of doses received and whether the exposure or contamination has affected the total body or is partial. This review focuses on available medical countermeasures (radioprotectors, radiomitigators, radionuclide scavengers), biodosimetry (biological and biophysical techniques that can be quantitatively correlated with the magnitude of the radiation dose received), and strategies to implement the response to an accidental radiation exposure. In the case of large-scale atomic or radiological events, the most ideal choice for triage, dose assessment and victim classification, is the utilization of global biodosimetry networks, in combination with the automation of strategies based on modular platforms.

Estimation of radiation-induced health hazards from a "dirty bomb" attack with radiocesium under different assault and rescue conditions

In the case of a terrorist attack by a "dirty bomb", blast injuries, external irradiation and the incorporation of radioactivity are to be expected. Departing from information about the radiological attack scenario with cesium-137 in the U.S. National Scenario Planning Guide, we estimated the radiological doses absorbed. Similar calculations were performed for a smaller plume size and a detonation in a subway. For conditions as described in the U.S. scenario, the committed effective dose amounted to a maximum of 848 mSv, even for very unfavorable conditions. Red bone marrow equivalent doses are insufficient to induce acute radiation sickness (ARS). In the case of a smaller plume size, the ARS threshold may be exceeded in some cases. In a subway bombing, doses are much higher and the occurrence of ARS should be expected. The health hazards from a dirty bomb attack will depend on the location and the explosive device. The derived Haddon matrix indicates that preparing for such an event includes education of all the medical staff about radiation effects, the time lines of radiation damages and the treatment priorities. Further determinants of the outcome include rapid evacuation even from difficult locations, the availability of a specific triage tool to rapidly identify victims at risk for ARS, the availability of an antidote stockpile and dedicated hospital beds to treat seriously irradiated victims.