The relationship between political affiliation and beliefs about sources of "fake news"

Distractions, analytical thinking and falling for fake news: A survey of psychological factors

Analytical thinking safeguards us against believing or spreading fake news. In various forms, this common assumption has been reported, investigated, or implemented in fake news education programs. Some have associated this assumption with the inverse claim, that distractions from analytical thinking may render us vulnerable to believing or spreading fake news. This paper surveys the research done between 2016 and 2022 on psychological factors influencing one's susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news, considers which of the psychological factors are plausible distractors to one's exercise of analytical thinking, and discusses some implications of considering them as distractors to analytical thinking. From these, the paper draws five conclusions: (1) It is not analytical thinking per se, but analytical thinking directed to evaluating the truth that safeguards us from believing or spreading fake news. (2) While psychological factors can distract us from exercising analytical thinking and they can also distract us in exercising analytical thinking. (3) Whether a psychological factor functions as a distractor from analytical thinking or in analytical thinking may depend on contextual factors. (4) Measurements of analytical thinking may not indicate vulnerability to believing or spreading fake news. (5) The relevance of motivated reasoning to our tendency to believe fake news should not yet be dismissed. These findings may be useful to guide future research in the intersection of analytical thinking and susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news.

Who Will Help to Strive Against the “Infodemic”? Reciprocity Norms Enforce the Information Sharing Accuracy of the Individuals

In recent years, misinformation sharing has become the focus of public debate and academic research. We aim to explore whether individuals prefer to share accurate information or not, and discover what factors increase people’s preferences for sharing accurate information. Combining behavioral economics experiments and psychology experiments, we construct “an information search—information sharing—information feedback experiment” to examine individuals’ behavior of sharing accurate information and its influencing factors. A total of 210 students are recruited for the laboratory experiment. Our results show that when individuals can control the accuracy of the information they obtain through their efforts, they are more willing to share accurate information with others. We also find that positive feedback from information receivers can promote the accuracy of information shared by individuals, and this effect works through reciprocity norms. Individuals with higher reciprocity are more willing to share accurate information, especially in the treatment with the role of reciprocity norms enhanced by feedback. These findings indicate that individuals who are willing to obtain accurate information prefer to share information, and information feedback can enhance this preference through reciprocity norms. This study captures individuals’ behavior and preference characteristics with regard to the accuracy of the information they share in the era of highly developed network interaction.

Fake news: Why do we believe it?

Fake news dissemination has increased greatly in recent years, with peaks during the US presidential elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. Research has addressed fake news creation, consumption, sharing, and detection as well as approaches to counteract it and prevent people from believing it. This update addresses only a part of the fake news-related issues and focuses on determinants leading individuals to believe fake news, noting that rheumatology is scarcely represented. Some determinants relate to the ecosystem of media and social networks, such as the availability and rapid spread of fake news, the unselected information on platforms and the fact that consumers can become creators of fake news. Cognitive factors are important, such as confirmation bias, political partisanship, prior exposure and intuitive thinking. Low science knowledge and low educational level are also involved. Psychological factors include attraction to novelty, high emotional state, and the emotionally evocative content of fake news. High digital literacy protects against believing fake news. Sociological factors such as online communities, or echo chambers, and the role of pressure groups have been identified. The implication for practice can be deduced, including education in media literacy and warning tips, reliable journalism and fact-checking, social media regulation, partnership of media platforms’ with fact-checkers, warning messages on networks, and digital detection solutions. Health professionals need to better understand the factors that cause individuals to believe fake news. Identifying these determinants may help them in their counseling role when talking to patients about misinformation.

Source Information Affects Interpretations of the News across Multiple Age Groups in the United States

People have access to more news from more sources than ever before. At the same time, they increasingly distrust traditional media and are exposed to more misinformation. To help people better distinguish real news from “fake news,” we must first understand how they judge whether news is real or fake. One possibility is that people adopt a relatively effortful, analytic approach, judging news based on its content. However, another possibility—consistent with psychological research—is that people adopt a relatively effortless, heuristic approach, drawing on cues outside of news content. One such cue is where the news comes from: its source. Beliefs about news sources depend on people’s political affiliation, with U.S. liberals tending to trust sources that conservatives distrust, and vice versa. Therefore, if people take this heuristic approach, then judgments of news from different sources should depend on political affiliation and lead to a confirmation bias of pre-existing beliefs. Similarly, political affiliation could affect the likelihood that people mistake real news for fake news. We tested these ideas in two sets of experiments. In the first set, we asked University of Louisiana at Lafayette undergraduates (Experiment 1a n = 376) and Mechanical Turk workers in the United States (Experiment 1a n = 205; Experiment 1b n = 201) to rate how “real” versus “fake” a series of unfamiliar news headlines were. We attributed each headline to one of several news sources of varying political slant. As predicted, we found that source information influenced people’s ratings in line with their own political affiliation, although this influence was relatively weak. In the second set, we asked Mechanical Turk workers in the United States (Experiment 2a n = 300; Experiment 2b n = 303) and University of Louisiana at Lafayette undergraduates (Experiment 2b n = 182) to watch a highly publicized “fake news” video involving doctored footage of a journalist. We found that people’s political affiliation influenced their beliefs about the event, but the doctored footage itself had only a trivial influence. Taken together, these results suggest that adults across a range of ages rely on information other than news content—such as how they feel about its source—when judging whether news is real or fake. Moreover, our findings help explain how people experiencing the same news content can arrive at vastly different conclusions. Finally, efforts aimed at educating the public in combatting fake news need to consider how political affiliation affects the psychological processes involved in forming beliefs about the news.