Mink infection with influenza A viruses: an ignored intermediate host?

Induction and antiviral activity of ferret myxovirus resistance (Mx) protein 1 against influenza A viruses

Myxovirus resistance (Mx) proteins are products of interferon stimulated genes (ISGs) and Mx proteins of different species have been reported to mediate antiviral activity against a number of viruses, including influenza A viruses (IAV). Ferrets are widely considered to represent the 'gold standard' small animal model for studying pathogenesis and immunity to human IAV infections, however little is known regarding the antiviral activity of ferret Mx proteins. Herein, we report induction of ferret (f)Mx1/2 in a ferret lung cell line and in airway tissues from IAV-infected ferrets, noting that fMx1 was induced to higher levels that fMx2 both in vitro and in vivo. Overexpression confirmed cytoplasmic expression of fMx1 as well as its ability to inhibit infection and replication of IAV, noting that this antiviral effect of fMx1was modest when compared to cells overexpressing either human MxA or mouse Mx1. Together, these studies provide the first insights regarding the role of fMx1 in cell innate antiviral immunity to influenza viruses. Understanding similarities and differences in the antiviral activities of human and ferret ISGs provides critical context for evaluating results when studying human IAV infections in the ferret model.

Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures

Avian influenza viruses (AIV) remain prevalent among wild bird populations in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA), leading to significant illness in and death of birds. Transmission between bird and mammal species has been observed, particularly in fur animal farms, where outbreaks have been reported. While transmission from infected birds to humans is rare, there have been instances of exposure to these viruses since 2020 without any symptomatic infections reported in the EU/EEA. However, these viruses continue to evolve globally, and with the migration of wild birds, new strains carrying potential mutations for mammalian adaptation could be selected. If avian A(H5N1) influenza viruses acquire the ability to spread efficiently among humans, large-scale transmission could occur due to the lack of immune defences against H5 viruses in humans. The emergence of AIV capable of infecting mammals, including humans, can be facilitated by various drivers. Some intrinsic drivers are related to virus characteristics or host susceptibility. Other drivers are extrinsic and may increase exposure of mammals and humans to AIV thereby stimulating mutation and adaptation to mammals. Extrinsic drivers include the ecology of host species, such as including wildlife, human activities like farming practices and the use of natural resources, climatic and environmental factors. One Health measures to mitigate the risk of AIV adapting to mammals and humans focus on limiting exposure and preventing spread. Key options for actions include enhancing surveillance targeting humans and animals, ensuring access to rapid diagnostics, promoting collaboration between animal and human sectors, and implementing preventive measures such as vaccination. Effective communication to different involved target audiences should be emphasised, as well as strengthening veterinary infrastructure, enforcing biosecurity measures at farms, and reducing wildlife contact with domestic animals. Careful planning of poultry and fur animal farming, especially in areas with high waterfowl density, is highlighted for effective risk reduction.