The Motherhood Wage Penalty and Female Entrepreneurship

The need to resolve work–family conflict has long been considered a central motive for women’s pursuit of entrepreneurship. In this paper, we propose and empirically uncover a novel mechanism driving female entrepreneurship: reduced earnings opportunities in wage employment due to motherhood status. Combining insights from career mobility research and the motherhood penalty literature, we propose that women who become mothers will disproportionately launch a new business to reduce the motherhood penalty they would otherwise incur in wage work due to employer discrimination. We further predict that this tendency to launch a new venture will be more pronounced for women who occupy high-paying or managerial positions, given the higher opportunity cost of staying in wage work and the higher potential payoffs from entrepreneurship that accrue mothers occupying such positions. Using matched employer–employee data from Sweden that distinguish new-venture founding from self-employment, we find support for our arguments. Overall, this study sheds light on the two antecedents of female entrepreneurship and contributes to a more thorough understanding of what motivates women to pursue irregular and atypical careers, such as entrepreneurship.

Funding: This work was supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Ewing Marion Kauffman Junior Faculty Fellowship) and the Wharton Dean’s Research Fund.

Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1657 .

Do Employees Work Less for Female Leaders? A Multi-Method Study of Entrepreneurial Firms

We propose that female-founded ventures receive a lower amount of employee labor for equal pay because employees are more likely to decline requests for additional labor by female founders. First, using longitudinal matched employer-employee data covering all founders of new ventures with personnel in Portugal between 2002 and 2012, we confirm that full-time employees contribute fewer regular hours and less overtime work to female-founded firms. Second, using a series of online experiments, we show that this variation in employee labor across female and male-founded firms is partly motivated by a difference in the employee’s expectations of work demands. Specifically, employees perceive female founders’ requests for additional labor to be unfair and more difficult than expected, and both these perceptions explain the lower amount of employee labor supplied in female-founded ventures. Overall, our findings uncover a novel mechanism that helps explain the existence of a gender gap in entrepreneurship beyond the entry stage.

The Evaluation of Founder Failure and Success by Hiring Firms: A Field Experiment

Organizations tout the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship. Yet, when hiring it remains unclear how they evaluate entrepreneurial human capital—namely, job candidates with founder experience. How hiring firms evaluate this experience—and especially how this evaluation varies by entrepreneurial success and failure—reveals insights into the structures and processes within organizations. Organizations research points to two perspectives related to the evaluation of founder experience: Former founders may be advantaged, due to founder experience signaling high-quality capabilities and human capital, or disadvantaged, due to concerns related to fit and commitment. To identify the dominant class of mechanisms driving the evaluation of founder experience, it is important to consider how these evaluations differ, depending on whether the founder’s venture failed or succeeded. To isolate demand-side mechanisms and hold supply-side factors constant, we conducted a field experiment. We sent applications varying the candidate’s founder experience to 2,400 software engineering positions in the United States at random. We find that former founders received 43% fewer callbacks than nonfounders and that this difference is driven by older hiring firms. Further, this founder penalty is greatest for former successful founders, who received 33% fewer callbacks than former failed founders. Our results highlight that mechanisms related to concerns about fit and commitment, rather than information asymmetry about quality, are most influential when hiring firms evaluate former founders in our context.

Do New Firms Recruit Employees From Small or Large Firms, and Do Small or Large Firms Recruit Employees From Firms That Cease to Operate?

Panel data of Norwegian industries show that when they increase in the number of firms, firm size inequality in employees decreases. Decreasing firm size inequality implies that large firms become smaller in employees, and an increasing number of firms in an industry implies that more new firms are established than closed, i.e., ceasing to operate and going out of business. Thus, new firms chiefly recruit employees from large firms. Similarly, the data show that when industries decrease in the number of firms, firm size inequality in employees increases. Increasing firm size inequality implies that large firms become larger in employees, and a decreasing number of firms in an industry implies that more firms are closed than established. Thus, large firms chiefly recruit employees from firms that cease to operate. An implication of our findings is that large firms are crucial in recruiting employees to new firms and in recruiting employees from firms that cease to operate.

A Founding Penalty: Evidence from an Audit Study on Gender, Entrepreneurship, and Future Employment

There is both widespread interest in encouraging entrepreneurship and universal recognition that the vast majority of these founders will fail, which raises an important unanswered question: What happens to ex-founders when they apply for jobs? Whereas existing research has identified many factors that facilitate movement out of an established organization and into entrepreneurship, far less attention has been devoted to understanding what transpires during the return journey—most notably, how employers evaluate entrepreneurial experience at the point of hire. We propose that employers penalize job candidates with a history of founding a new venture because they believe them to be worse fits and less committed employees than comparable candidates without founding experience. We further predict that the discount for having been an entrepreneur will diminish when other stereotypes about the candidate, particularly those based on gender, will contradict the negative beliefs about ex-founders. We test our proposition using a résumé-based audit and an experimental survey. The audit reveals that founding significantly reduces the likelihood that an employer interviews a male candidate, but there is no comparable penalty for female ex-founders. The experimental survey confirms the gendered nature of the founding penalty and provides evidence that it results from employers’ concerns that founders are less committed and worse organizational fits than nonfounders. Critically, the survey also indicates that these concerns are mitigated for women, helping to explain why they suffer no equivalent founding penalty.

Iterative Coordination and Innovation: Prioritizing Value over Novelty

An innovating organization faces the challenge of how to prioritize distinct goals of novelty and value, both of which underlie innovation. Popular practitioner frameworks like Agile management suggest that organizations can adopt an iterative approach of frequent meetings to prioritize between these goals, a practice we refer to as iterative coordination. Despite iterative coordination’s widespread use in innovation management, its effects on novelty and value in innovation remain unknown. With the information technology firm Google, we embed a field experiment within a hackathon software development competition to identify the effect of iterative coordination on innovation. We find that iterative coordination causes firms to implicitly prioritize value in innovation: Although iteratively coordinating firms develop more valuable products, these products are simultaneously less novel. Furthermore, by tracking software code, we find that iteratively coordinating firms favor integration at the cost of knowledge-creating specialization. A follow-on laboratory study documents that increasing the frequency and opportunities to reprioritize goals in iterative coordination meetings reinforces value and integration, while reducing novelty and specialization. This article offers three key contributions: highlighting how processes to prioritize among multiple performance goals may implicitly favor certain outcomes; introducing a new empirical methodology of software code version tracking for measuring the innovation process; and leveraging the emergent phenomenon of hackathons to study new methods of organizing.

Lowering the Bar? External Conditions, Opportunity Costs, and High-Tech Start-Up Outcomes

We assess the heterogeneous impact of economic downturns on individuals’ decisions to bring high-technology ideas to the market in the form of new ventures. We thereby examine how worsening labor market conditions influence individuals’ opportunity costs of starting new ventures, the resulting composition of the entrepreneurial pool, and start-up performance outcomes. Using a rich data set of start-up founders in the biotechnology and medical device sectors, we find that an increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a substantial rise in the share of entrepreneurs who are most sensitive to worsening labor market conditions. Additionally, we find that start-ups founded by these entrepreneurs display lower financial and innovative performance than start-ups founded by entrepreneurs who are relatively insensitive to business cycles. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that individuals’ heterogeneous response to worsening labor market conditions is a relevant factor in explaining the negative relationship between unemployment and start-up performance outcomes.