Receptor specificity of influenza A viruses from sea mammals correlates with lung sialyloligosaccharides in these animals

Host Receptors of Influenza Viruses and Coronaviruses-Molecular Mechanisms of Recognition

Among the four genera of influenza viruses (IVs) and the four genera of coronaviruses (CoVs), zoonotic αIV and βCoV have occasionally caused airborne epidemic outbreaks in humans, who are immunologically naïve, and the outbreaks have resulted in high fatality rates as well as social and economic disruption and losses. The most devasting influenza A virus (IAV) in αIV, pandemic H1N1 in 1918, which caused at least 40 million deaths from about 500 million cases of infection, was the first recorded emergence of IAVs in humans. Usually, a novel human-adapted virus replaces the preexisting human-adapted virus. Interestingly, two IAV subtypes, A/H3N2/1968 and A/H1N1/2009 variants, and two lineages of influenza B viruses (IBV) in βIV, B/Yamagata and B/Victoria lineage-like viruses, remain seasonally detectable in humans. Both influenza C viruses (ICVs) in γIV and four human CoVs, HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63 in αCoV and HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 in βCoV, usually cause mild respiratory infections. Much attention has been given to CoVs since the global epidemic outbreaks of βSARS-CoV in 2002–2004 and βMERS-CoV from 2012 to present. βSARS-CoV-2, which is causing the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that has resulted in 890,392 deaths from about 27 million cases of infection as of 8 September 2020, has provoked worldwide investigations of CoVs. With the aim of developing efficient strategies for controlling virus outbreaks and recurrences of seasonal virus variants, here we overview the structures, diversities, host ranges and host receptors of all IVs and CoVs and critically review current knowledge of receptor binding specificity of spike glycoproteins, which mediates infection, of IVs and of zoonotic, pandemic and seasonal CoVs.

Impact of Mutations in the Hemagglutinin of H10N7 Viruses Isolated from Seals on Virus Replication in Avian and Human Cells

Wild birds are the reservoir for low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses, which are frequently transmitted to domestic birds and occasionally to mammals. In 2014, an H10N7 virus caused severe mortality in harbor seals in northeastern Europe. Although the hemagglutinin (HA) of this virus was closely related to H10 of avian H10N4 virus, it possessed unique nonsynonymous mutations, particularly in the HA1 subunit in or adjacent to the receptor binding domain and proteolytic cleavage site. Here, the impact of these mutations on virus replication was studied in vitro. Using reverse genetics, an avian H10N4 virus was cloned, and nine recombinant viruses carrying one of eight unique mutations or the complete HA from the seal virus were rescued. Receptor binding affinity, replication in avian and mammalian cell cultures, cell-to-cell spread, and HA cleavability of these recombinant viruses were studied. Results show that wild-type recombinant H10N4 virus has high affinity to avian-type sialic acid receptors and no affinity to mammalian-type receptors. The H10N7 virus exhibits dual receptor binding affinity. Interestingly, Q220L (H10 numbering) in the rim of the receptor binding pocket increased the affinity of the H10N4 virus to mammal-type receptors and completely abolished the affinity to avian-type receptors. No remarkable differences in cell-to-cell spread or HA cleavability were observed. All viruses, including the wild-type H10N7 virus, replicated at higher levels in chicken cells than in human cells. These results indicate that H10N7 acquired adaptive mutations (e.g., Q220L) to enhance replication in mammals and retained replication efficiency in the original avian host.

Complete genome sequence of a novel influenza A H1N2 virus circulating in swine from Central Bajio region, Mexico

The aim of this study was to perform the complete genome sequence of a swine influenza A H1N2 virus strain isolated from a pig in Guanajuato, México (A/swine/Mexico/GtoDMZC01/2014) and to report its seroprevalence in 86 counties at the Central Bajio zone. To understand the evolutionary dynamics of the isolate, we undertook a phylogenetic analysis of the eight gene segments. These data revealed that the isolated virus is a reassortant H1N2 subtype, as its genes are derived from human (HA, NP, PA) and swine (M, NA, PB1, PB2 and NS) influenza viruses. Pig serum samples were analysed by the hemagglutination inhibition test, using wild H1N2 and H3N2 strains (A/swine/México/Mex51/2010 [H3N2]) as antigen sources. Positive samples to the H1N2 subtype were processed using the field-isolated H1N1 subtype (A/swine/México/Ver37/2010 [H1N1]). Seroprevalence to the H1N2 subtype was 26.74% in the sampled counties, being Jalisco the state with highest seroprevalence to this subtype (35.30%). The results herein reported demonstrate that this new, previously unregistered influenza virus subtype in México that shows internal genes from other swine viral subtypes isolated in the past 5 years, along with human virus-originated genes, is widely distributed in this area of the country.

Influenza Virus Infection of Marine Mammals

Interspecies transmission may play a key role in the evolution and ecology of influenza A viruses. The importance of marine mammals as hosts or carriers of potential zoonotic pathogens such as highly pathogenic H5 and H7 influenza viruses is not well understood. The fact that influenza viruses are some of the few zoonotic pathogens known to have caused infection in marine mammals, evidence for direct transmission of influenza A virus H7N7 subtype from seals to man, transmission of pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses to seals and also limited evidence for long-term persistence of influenza B viruses in seal populations without significant genetic change, makes monitoring of influenza viruses in marine mammal populations worth being performed. In addition, such monitoring studies could be a great tool to better understand the ecology of influenza viruses in nature.

Molecular basis of a pandemic of avian-type influenza virus

Despite heroic efforts to prevent the emergence of an influenza pandemic, avian influenza A virus has prevailed by crossing the species barriers to infect humans worldwide, occasionally with morbidity and mortality at unprecedented levels, and the virus later usually continues circulation in humans as a seasonal influenza virus, resulting in health-social-economic problems each year. Here, we review current knowledge of influenza viruses, their life cycle, interspecies transmission, and past pandemics and discuss the molecular basis of pandemic acquisition, notably of hemagglutinin (lectin) acting as a key contributor to change in host specificity in viral infection.

Connecting the study of wild influenza with the potential for pandemic disease

Continuing outbreaks of pathogenic (H5N1) and pandemic (SOIVH1N1) influenza have underscored the need to understand the origin, characteristics, and evolution of novel influenza A virus (IAV) variants that pose a threat to human health. In the last 4-5years, focus has been placed on the organization of large-scale surveillance programs to examine the phylogenetics of avian influenza virus (AIV) and host-virus relationships in domestic and wild animals. Here we review the current gaps in wild animal and environmental surveillance and the current understanding of genetic signatures in potentially pandemic strains.

Influenza A and B virus attachment to respiratory tract in marine mammals

Patterns of virus attachment to the respiratory tract of 4 marine mammal species were determined for avian and human influenza viruses. Attachment of avian influenza A viruses (H4N5) and (H7N7) and human influenza B viruses to trachea and bronchi of harbor seals is consistent with reported influenza outbreaks in this species.

Adaptive pathways of zoonotic influenza viruses: from exposure to establishment in humans

Human influenza viruses have their ultimate origin in avian reservoirs and may adapt, either directly or after passage through another mammalian species, to circulate independently in the human population. Three sets of barriers must be crossed by a zoonotic influenza virus before it can become a human virus: animal-to-human transmission barriers; virus-cell interaction barriers; and human-to-human transmission barriers. Adaptive changes allowing zoonotic influenza viruses to cross these barriers have been studied extensively, generating key knowledge for improved pandemic preparedness. Most of these adaptive changes link acquired genetic alterations of the virus to specific adaptation mechanisms that can be screened for, both genetically and phenotypically, as part of zoonotic influenza virus surveillance programs. Human-to-human transmission barriers are only sporadically crossed by zoonotic influenza viruses, eventually triggering a worldwide influenza outbreak or pandemic. This is the most devastating consequence of influenza virus cross-species transmission. Progress has been made in identifying some of the determinants of influenza virus transmissibility. However, interdisciplinary research is needed to further characterize these ultimate barriers to the development of influenza pandemics, at both the level of the individual host and that of the population.

Infectivity phenotypes of H3N2 influenza A viruses in primary swine respiratory epithelial cells are controlled by sialic acid binding

BACKGROUND

In the late 1990s, triple reassortant H3N2 influenza A viruses emerged and spread widely in the US swine population. We have shown previously that an isolate representative of this virus-lineage, A/Swine/Minnesota/593/99 (Sw/MN), exhibits phenotypic differences compared to a wholly human-lineage H3N2 virus isolated during the same time period, A/Swine/Ontario/00130/97 (Sw/ONT). Specifically, Sw/MN was more infectious for pigs and infected a significantly higher proportion of cultured primary swine respiratory epithelial cells (SRECs). In addition, reverse genetics-generated Sw/MN × Sw/ONT reassortant and point mutant viruses demonstrated that the infectivity phenotypes in SRECs were strongly dependent on three amino acids within the hemagglutinin (HA) gene.

OBJECTIVES

To determine the mechanism by which Sw/MN attains higher infectivity than Sw/ONT in SRECs.

METHODS

A/Swine/Minnesota/593/99, Sw/ONT, and mutant (reverse genetics-generated HA reassortant and point mutant) viruses were compared at various HA-mediated stages of infection: initial sialic acid binding, virus entry, and the pH of virus-endosome fusion.

RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS

Sialic acid binding was the sole stage where virus differences directly paralleled infectivity phenotypes in SRECs, indicating that binding is the primary mechanism responsible for differences in the infectivity levels of Sw/MN and Sw/ONT.

Ecological factors driving the long-term evolution of influenza's host range

The evolution of a pathogen's host range is shaped by the ecology of its hosts and by the physiological traits that determine host specificity. For many pathogen traits, there is a trade-off: a phenotype suitable for infecting one set of hosts poorly infects another. Introducing and analysing a simple evo-epidemiological model, here we study how such a trade-off is expected to affect evolution of the host ranges of influenza viruses. We examine a quantitative trait underlying host specificity, given by an influenza virus's degree of adaptation to certain conformations of sialic acid receptors, and investigate how this receptor preference evolves in a minimal network of host species, including humans, that differ in life history and receptor physiology. Using adaptive dynamics theory, we establish thresholds in interspecific transmission rates and host population sizes that govern the emergence and persistence of human-adapted viruses. These ecological thresholds turn out to be largely independent of the strength of the evolutionary trade-off, underscoring the importance of ecological conditions in determining a disease's host range.

Up to new tricks - a review of cross-species transmission of influenza A viruses

Influenza is a highly contagious disease that has burdened both humans and animals since ancient times. In humans, the most dramatic consequences of influenza are associated with periodically occurring pandemics. Pandemics require the emergence of an antigenically novel virus to which the majority of the population lacks protective immunity. Historically, influenza A viruses from animals have contributed to the generation of human pandemic viruses and they may do so again in the future. It is, therefore, critical to understand the epidemiological and molecular mechanisms that allow influenza A viruses to cross species barriers. This review summarizes the current knowledge of influenza ecology, and the viral factors that are thought to determine influenza A virus species specificity.

Antibodies to human-related H3 influenza A virus in Baikal seals (Phoca sibirica) and ringed seals (Phoca hispida) in Russia

Antibodies to influenza A virus were detected using enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) in the sera from two of seven Baikal seals (Phoca sibrica) and from five of six ringed seals (Phoca hispida) in Russia. In a hemagglutination-inhibition test using H1-H15 reference influenza A viruses, ELISA-positive sera from one Baikal seal and four ringed seals reacted to A/Aichi/2/68 (H3N2) and A/Bangkok/1/79 (H3N2) strains. One ringed seal serum sample reacted to A/seal/Massachusetts/1/80 (H7N7). The present results suggested that human-related H3 viruses were prevalent in Baikal seals and ringed seals inhabiting the central Russian Arctic.

Serological evidence of transmission of human influenza A and B viruses to Caspian seals (Phoca caspica)

Seroepidemiological surveillance of influenza in Caspian seals (Phoca caspica) was conducted. Antibodies to influenza A virus were detected in 54% (7/13), 57% (4/7), 40% (6/15) and 26% (11/42) of the serum samples collected in 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2000 by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). In an hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) test using H1-H15 reference influenza A viruses as antigens, more than half of the examined ELISA-positive sera reacted with an H3N2 prototype strain A/Aichi/2/68. These sera were then examined by HI test with a series of naturally occurring antigenic variants of human H3N2 virus, and H3 viruses of swine, duck, and equine origin. The sera reacted strongly with the A/Bangkok/1/79 (H3N2) strain, which was prevalent in humans in 1979-1981. The present results indicate that human A/Bangkok/1/79-like virus was transmitted to Caspian seals probably in the early 1980s, and was circulated in the population. Antibodies to influenza B virus were detected by ELISA in 14% (1/7) and 10% (4/42) serum samples collected from Caspian seals in 1997 and 2000, respectively. Our findings indicate that seal might be a reservoir of both influenza A and B viruses originated from humans.

The pathogenesis of influenza in humans

The rapid evolution of influenza A and B viruses contributes to annual influenza epidemics in humans. In addition, pandemics of influenza are also caused by influenza A viruses, whereas influenza B does not have the potential to cause pandemics because there is no animal reservoir of the virus. Study of the genetic differences between influenza A and influenza B viruses, which are restricted to humans, may be informative in understanding the factors that govern mammalian adaptation of influenza A viruses. Aquatic birds provide the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses, but in general, avian influenza is asymptomatic in feral birds. Occasionally, however, highly pathogenic strains of influenza cause serious systemic infections in domestic poultry. The pathogenicity of these strains is related to the presence of a polybasic cleavage sequence in the precursor of the surface glycoprotein haemagglutinin, which makes the glycoprotein susceptible to activation by ubiquitous proteases such as furin and PC6. However, the mechanism of pathogenicity may differ in highly pathogenic strains of human influenza, such as the H1N1 pandemic strain of 1918 and the H5N1 strain involved in the outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997. Binding of host proteases by the viral neuraminidase to assist activation of the haemagglutinin, shortening of the neuraminidase and substitutions in the polymerase gene, PB2, have all been suggested as alternative molecular correlates of pathogenicity of human influenza viruses. Additionally, systemic spread in humans of pathogenic subtypes has not been demonstrated and host factors such as interferons may be crucial in preventing the spread of the virus outside the respiratory tract.