Is Emotion a Form of Perception?

A Unifying Perspective on Perception and Cognition Through Linguistic Representations of Emotion

This article will provide a unifying perspective on perception and cognition via the route of linguistic representations of emotion. Linguistic representations of emotions provide a fertile ground for explorations into the nature and form of integration of perception and cognition because emotion has facets of both perceptual and cognitive processes. In particular, this article shows that certain types of linguistic representations of emotion allow for the integration of perception and cognition through a series of steps and operations in cognitive systems, whereas certain other linguistic representations of emotion are not so representationally structured as to permit the unity of perception and cognition. It turns out that the types of linguistic representations of emotion that readily permit the desired unity of perception and cognition are exactly those that are linguistically encoded emotive representations of everyday objects, events, and things around us. It is these ordinary objects, events and things that provide the scaffolding for task-dependent or goal-oriented activities of cognitive systems including autonomous systems. In this way, cognitive systems can be saliently tuned to the outer world by being motivated and also subtly governed by emotion-driven representations. This helps not only tie together perceptual and cognitive processes via the interface between language and emotive representations, but also reveal the limits of emotive representations in amalgamating perceptual and cognitive processes in cognitive systems.

A general theory of consciousness I: Consciousness and adaptation

This paper examines how cognitive processes in living beings become conscious. Consciousness is often assumed to be a human quality only. While the basis of this paper is that consciousness is as much present in animals as it is in humans, the human form is shown to be fundamentally different. Animal consciousness expresses itself in sensory images, while human consciousness is largely verbal. Because spoken language is not an individual quality - thoughts are shared with others via communication - consciousness in humans is complex and difficult to understand. The theory proposed postulates that consciousness is an inseparable part of the body's adaptation mechanism. In adaptation to a new environmental disturbance, the outcome of the neural cognitive process - a possible solution to the problem posed by the disturbance - is transformed into a sensory image. Sensory images are essentially conscious as they are the way living creatures experience new environmental information. Through the conversion of neural cognitive activity - thoughts - about the state of the outside world into the way that world is experienced through the senses, the thoughts gain the reality that sensory images have. The translation of thoughts into sensory images makes them real and understandable which is experienced as consciousness. The theory proposed in this paper is corroborated by functional block diagrams of the processes involved in the complex regulated mechanism of adaptation and consciousness during an environmental disturbance. All functions in this mechanism and their interrelations are discussed in detail.

The emotion of compassion and the likelihood of its expression in nursing practice

Philosophical and empirical work on the nature of the emotions is extensive, and there are many theories of emotions. However, all agree that emotions are not knee jerk reactions to stimuli and are open to rational assessment or warrant. This paper's focus is on the condition or conditions for compassion as an emotion and the likelihood that it or they can be met in nursing practice. Thus, it is attempting to keep, as far as possible, compassion as an emotion separate from both moral norms and professional norms. This is because empirical or causal conditions that can make experiencing and acting out of compassion difficult seem especially relevant in nursing practice. I consider how theories of emotion in general and of compassion in particular are somewhat contested, but all recent accounts agree that emotions are not totally immune to reason. Then, using accounts of constitutive conditions of the emotion of compassion, I will show how they are often likely to be quite fragile or unstable in practice and particularly so within much nursing practice. In addition, some of the conditions for compassion will be shown to be problematic for nursing practice. It is difficult to keep ideas of compassion separate from morality, and this connection is noticeable in the claims made of compassion for nursing and so I will briefly highlight one such connection that of the need for normative theory to give an account of the value that emotions such as compassion presume and that compassionate motivation is separate from moral motivation and may conflict with it. The fragility or instability of the emotion of compassion in practice has implications for both what can be expected and what should be expected of compassion; at least if what is wanted is a realist rather than idealist account of "should."