Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD

Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station

True randomness is necessary for the security of any cryptographic protocol, including quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD transceivers, randomness is supplied by one or more local, private entropy sources of quantum origin which can be either passive (e.g., a beam splitter) or active (e.g., an electronic quantum random number generator). In order to better understand the role of randomness in QKD, I revisit the well-known "detector blinding" attack on the BB84 QKD protocol, which utilizes strong light to achieve undetectable and complete recovery of the secret key. I present two findings. First, I show that the detector-blinding attack was in fact an attack on the receiver's local entropy source. Second, based on this insight, I propose a modified receiver station and a statistical criterion which together enable the robust detection of any bright-light attack and thus restore security.

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme and outline a possible countermeasure.

Quantum key distribution over a 72 dB channel loss using ultralow dark count superconducting single-photon detectors

We report the first quantum key distribution (QKD) experiment over a 72 dB channel loss using superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SSPD, SNSPD) with the dark count rate (DCR) of 0.01 cps. The DCR of the SSPD, which is dominated by the blackbody radiation at room temperature, is blocked by introducing cold optical bandpass filter. We employ the differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) scheme with a 1 GHz system clock rate. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) below 3% is achieved when the length of the dispersion shifted fiber (DSF) is 336 km (72 dB loss), which is low enough to generate secure keys.

Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors

We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.

Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack

We derive the time-dependent photo-detection probability equation of a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) to study the responsive property for a pulse train at high repetition rate. Using this equation, we analyze the characteristics of SSPDs when illuminated by bright pulses in blinding attack on a quantum key distribution (QKD). We obtain good agreement between expected values based on our equation and actual experimental values. Such a time-dependent probability analysis contributes to security analysis.