Can you catch a liar? How negative emotions affect brain responses when lying or telling the truth

The path of dishonesty: identification of mental processes with electrical neuroimaging

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach-the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.

Lie Detection Using fNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates Infrequent but not Frequent Liars

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to test whether monitoring inhibition-related brain regions is a feasible method for detecting both infrequent liars and frequent liars. Thirty-two participants were divided into two groups: the deceptive group (liars) and the non-deceptive group (ND group, innocents). All the participants were required to undergo a simulated interrogation by a computer. The participants from the deceptive group were instructed to tell a mix of lies and truths and those of the ND group were instructed always to tell the truth. Based on the number of deceptions, the participants of the deceptive group were further divided into a infrequently deceptive group (IFD group, infrequent liars) and a frequently deceptive group (FD group, frequent liars). The infrequent liars exhibited greater neural activities than the frequent liars and the innocents in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) when performing the deception detection tasks. While performing deception detection tasks, infrequent liars showed significantly greater neural activation in the left MFG than the baseline, but frequent liars and innocents did not exhibit this pattern of neural activation in any area of inhibition-related brain regions. The results of individual analysis showed an acceptable accuracy of detecting infrequent liars, but an unacceptable accuracy of detecting frequent liars. These results suggest that using fNIRS monitoring of inhibition-related brain regions is feasible for detecting infrequent liars, for whom deception may be more effortful and therefore more physiologically marked, but not frequent liars.

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying deceptive hazard evaluation: An event-related potentials investigation

Deceptive behavior is common in human social interactions. Researchers have been trying to uncover the cognitive process and neural basis underlying deception due to its theoretical and practical significance. We used Event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neural correlates of deception when the participants completed a hazard judgment task. Pictures conveying or not conveying hazard information were presented to the participants who were then requested to discriminate the hazard content (safe or hazardous) and make a response corresponding to the cues (truthful or deceptive). Behavioral and electrophysiological data were recorded during the entire experiment. Results showed that deceptive responses, compared to truthful responses, were associated with longer reaction time (RT), lower accuracy, increased N2 and reduced late positive potential (LPP), suggesting a cognitively more demanding process to respond deceptively. The decrement in LPP correlated negatively with the increment in RT for deceptive relative to truthful responses, regardless of hazard content. In addition, hazardous information evoked larger N1 and P300 than safe information, reflecting an early processing bias and a later evaluative categorization process based on motivational significance, respectively. Finally, the interaction between honesty (truthful/deceptive) and safety (safe/hazardous) on accuracy and LPP indicated that deceptive responses towards safe information required more effort than deceptive responses towards hazardous information. Overall, these results demonstrate the neurocognitive substrates underlying deception about hazard information.

Embodying Others in Immersive Virtual Reality: Electro-Cortical Signatures of Monitoring the Errors in the Actions of an Avatar Seen from a First-Person Perspective

Brain monitoring of errors in one's own and other's actions is crucial for a variety of processes, ranging from the fine-tuning of motor skill learning to important social functions, such as reading out and anticipating the intentions of others. Here, we combined immersive virtual reality and EEG recording to explore whether embodying the errors of an avatar by seeing it from a first-person perspective may activate the error monitoring system in the brain of an onlooker. We asked healthy participants to observe, from a first- or third-person perspective, an avatar performing a correct or an incorrect reach-to-grasp movement toward one of two virtual mugs placed on a table. At the end of each trial, participants reported verbally how much they embodied the avatar's arm. Ratings were maximal in first-person perspective, indicating that immersive virtual reality can be a powerful tool to induce embodiment of an artificial agent, even through mere visual perception and in the absence of any cross-modal boosting. Observation of erroneous grasping from a first-person perspective enhanced error-related negativity and medial-frontal theta power in the trials where human onlookers embodied the virtual character, hinting at the tight link between early, automatic coding of error detection and sense of embodiment. Error positivity was similar in 1PP and 3PP, suggesting that conscious coding of errors is similar for self and other. Thus, embodiment plays an important role in activating specific components of the action monitoring system when others' errors are coded as if they are one's own errors.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Detecting errors in other's actions is crucial for social functions, such as reading out and anticipating the intentions of others. Using immersive virtual reality and EEG recording, we explored how the brain of an onlooker reacted to the errors of an avatar seen from a first-person perspective. We found that mere observation of erroneous actions enhances electrocortical markers of error detection in the trials where human onlookers embodied the virtual character. Thus, the cerebral system for action monitoring is maximally activated when others' errors are coded as if they are one's own errors. The results have important implications for understanding how the brain can control the external world and thus creating new brain-computer interfaces.

Tell me sweet little lies: An event-related potentials study on the processing of social lies

In reading tasks, words that convey a false statement elicit an enhanced N400 brainwave response, relative to words that convey a true statement. N400 amplitude reductions are generally linked to the online expectancy of upcoming words in discourse. White lies, contrary to false statements, may not be unexpected in social scenarios. We used the event-related potential (ERP) technique to determine whether there is an impact of social context on sentence processing. We measured ERP responses to target words that either conveyed a social "white" lie or a socially impolite blunt truth, relative to semantic violations. Word expectancy was controlled for by equating the cloze probabilities of white lying and blunt true targets, as measured in previous paper-and-pencil tests. We obtained a classic semantic violation effect (a larger N400 for semantic incongruities relative to sense making statements). White lies, in contrast to false statements, did not enhance the amplitude of the N400 component. Interestingly, blunt true statements yielded both a late frontal positivity and an N400 response in those scenarios particularly biased to white lying. Thus, white lies do not interfere with online semantic processing, and they do not engage further reanalysis processes, which are typically indexed by subsequent late positivity ERP effects. Instead, an N400 and a late frontal positivity obtained in response to blunt true statements indicate that they were treated as unexpected events. In conclusion, unwritten rules of social communicative behavior influence the electrical brain response to locally coherent but socially inappropriate statements.

Neurophysiologic studies of functional neurologic disorders

Functional neurologic disorders are largely genuine and represent conversion disorders, where the dysfunction is unconscious, but there are some that are factitious, where the abnormality is feigned and conscious. Malingering, which can have the same manifestations, is similarly feigned, but not considered a genuine disease. There are no good methods for differentiating these three entities at the present time. Physiologic studies of functional weakness and sensory loss reveal normal functioning of primary motor and sensory cortex, but abnormalities of premotor cortex and association cortices. This suggests a top-down influence creating the dysfunction. Studies of functional tremor and myoclonus show that these disorders utilize normal voluntary motor structures to produce the involuntary movements, again suggesting a higher-level abnormality. Agency is abnormal and studies shows that dysfunction of the temporoparietal junction may be a correlate. The limbic system is overactive and might initiate involuntary movements, but the mechanism for this is not known. The limbic system would then be the source of top-down dysfunction. It can be speculated that the involuntary movements are involuntary due to lack of proper feedforward signaling.

The motor cost of telling lies: electrocortical signatures and personality foundations of spontaneous deception

Although universal, lying is generally considered immoral behavior. Most neuroscience studies on lying sanction or instruct deceptive behaviors and thus might fail to acknowledge the significance of lie-related moral conflicts. By combining electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings with a novel paradigm in which participants decided freely whether to deceive another person, we have generated indices of the cognitive (reaction times and stimulus-locked event-related components) and moral (readiness potential and its correlations with deception-related personality traits) cost of spontaneous deception. Our data fail to support the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling, suggesting that spontaneous deception, as opposed to lying out of requirement, might not mandate additional cognitive workload. Interestingly, lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an event-related potential (ERP) component that is linked to motor preparation of self-determined actions and modulated when we face moral dilemmas. Notably, this reduction was less extensive in manipulative participants and greater in those who cared highly about their impression management. Our study expands on previous findings on deception by associating a cortical marker of reduced preparation to act with individual differences in moral cognition.

Functional MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges

Functional MRI (fMRI)-based lie detection has been marketed as a tool for enhancing personnel selection, strengthening national security and protecting personal reputations, and at least three US courts have been asked to admit the results of lie detection scans as evidence during trials. How well does fMRI-based lie detection perform, and how should the courts, and society more generally, respond? Here, we address various questions — some of which are based on a meta-analysis of published studies — concerning the scientific state of the art in fMRI-based lie detection and its legal status, and discuss broader ethical and societal implications. We close with three general policy recommendations.

ERP correlates of malingered executive dysfunction

Assessment of malingering has become an integral part of many neuropsychological evaluations, particularly in forensic settings. However, traditional malingering measures are known to be vulnerable to both manipulation and coaching. Consequently, recent research has attempted to identify physiological indices of cognitive functioning that are less susceptible to overt manipulation. While prior studies have explored the validity of physiological assessment of memory deficits, this study evaluates the effectiveness of a physiological measure of executive functioning. This study used EEG recording in conjunction with a three-stimulus oddball design to compare neural responses in simulated malingerers feigning cognitive deficits associated with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and controls. Specifically, the study explored the efficacy of an event-related potential (ERP) known as P3a, which is believed to be an index of frontal lobe executive processes, specifically the attentional orienting response. The results of this study demonstrated that simulated malingerers did not produce a P3a response that was significantly different from control participants. Furthermore, the P3a in simulated malingerers did not demonstrate any of the properties reported in prior studies with TBI patients. Not only were malingerers unable to produce a significant change in their basic orienting response, but the very process of attempting to employ additional strategies to appear impaired produced other physiological markers of deception. Therefore, the P3a component appeared to be unaffected by an individual's motivation or overt performance, which suggests that it may have potential for development as a physiological measure for differentiating between malingerers and those with genuine TBI.